LITERARY AND CHARACTERISTICAL

LIVES

OF

JOHN GREGORY, M. D.
HENRY HOME, LORD KAMES.
DAVID HUME, ESQ.
AND
ADAM SMITH, L. L. D.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED

A DISSERTATION ON PUBLIC SPIRIT;

AND

THREE ESSAYS.

BY THE LATE

WILLIAM SMELLIE,
MEMBER OF THE ANTIQUARIAN AND ROYAL SOCIETIES OF EDINBURGH.

EDINBURGH:

PRINTED AND SOLD BY ALEX. SMELLIE, ANCHOR CLOSE, BELL & BRADFUTE, J. DICKSON, W. CREECH, E. BALFOUR, P. HILL, J. SIMPSON, W. LAING, A. LAWRIE, MANNERS & MILLER, J. OGLE, J. GUTHRIE, A. CONSTABLE, R. JACK, AND G. GRAY, EDINBURGH; G. G. & J. ROBINSON, CADELL & DAVIES, T. KAY, AND R. OGLE, LONDON.

1800.

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

ROBERT DUNDAS

OF ARNISTON,

LORD ADVOCATE OF SCOTLAND.

My Lord,

I have preſumed, without aſking permiſſion, to Dedicate this Work to your Lordſhip.

Though men, like you, who are engaged in the important buſineſs and active ſcenes which your High and Honourable Office in a great nation neceſſarily requires, have little leiſure either of time or of mind for abſtract ſtudies, an Account of the Lives of four of your eminent Countrymen, may find,

find, amidſt your more ſerious occupations, a vacant hour which it may intereſt or amuſe.

My Father's deſign, had he lived to execute it, was to have written Literary and Characteriſtical Accounts of Scottiſh Authors with whom he was perſonally acquainted, and to have publiſhed them after the manner of Biographical Dictionaries, in an Alphabetical Arrangement.—Among theſe were,

Arnot (Hugo), Eſq; Advocate.
Alſton (Dr) Profeſſor of Botany, in the Univerſity of Edinburgh.
Blair (Dr Hugo) one of the miniſters of Edin^{r}.
Beattie (Dr).
Blacklock (Dr).
Black (Dr).
Campbell (Dr) Profeſſor at Aberdeen.
Cullen (Dr).
Dalrymple (Sir David), Bart. Lord Hailes.
Erſkine, Profeſſor of Scottiſh Law.
Elibank (Lord).
Ferguſſon (Profeſſor).
Garden (Francis), Eſq; one of the Senators of the College of Juſtice.
Gardiner (Dr John).
Gregory (Dr John).

Home,

Home, Lord Kames
Hume (David).
Hutton (Dr).
Monboddo (Lord).
Monro (Dr Alex.)
Plummer (Dr).
Robertſon (Principal).
Smith (Adam), L. L. D.
Stuart (Dr Gilbert).
Stuart (Dr Matthew).
Tytler (William), W. S. of Woodhouſelee.
Wilſon (Dr) Profeſſor of Aſtronomy at Glaſgow.
Wilkie (Dr).
White (Dr).

THE Author's intention, beſide the particular information and remarks which he meant his Work to convey, was to encourage in his native country a taſte for biographical writing, which never fails to excite a ſpirit of inquiry, and, of courſe, to expand the views of men with regard to ſcience and every thing that contributes to aggrandiſe, or to adorn a nation.

BIOGRAPHY beſides affords that reward moſt valued by generous minds which the gratitude of poſterity beſtows on patriotiſm and virtue. The intereſt, My LORD, which this

this circumſtance might induce you to feel in it, your Countrymen will acknowledge much more readily than yourſelf. But truth, not panegyric, is equally the object of this Addreſs as it was of my Father's Work, to which I take the liberty of prefixing it. Allow me, therefore, only to add the aſſurance of that ſincere reſpect and attachment with which I have the honour to be,

MY LORD,

Your Lordſhip's moſt

Humble Servant,

EDINBURGH,
Nov. 20. 1799.

ALEX. SMELLIE.

CON-

CONTENTS.

Page.

The Life of JOHN GREGORY, *M. D.* 1

——— *Henry Home, Lord Kames* - - 119

——— *David Hume, Esq.* 149

——— *Adam Smith, L. L. D.* 211

A Dissertation on the Means of Promoting and Supporting Public Spirit - 299

PART I.

Origin of Selfishness - - 313

PART II.

Of the Education of Children with regard to Public Spirit - - 327

SECT. II. *Of Infants*, i. e. *that particular Stage of Life before Children Acquire the Use of Artificial Language* - 339

SECT.

Page.

SECT. III. *Of Cultivating Public Spirit in Children, from the Infantine Stage, till they arrive at the Reasoning Period of Life* - - 344

PART III.

Means of Promoting Public Spirit, adapted to the Present Situation of Mankind - - - - - 376

SECT. I. *Of Gaming* - - 394

—— II. *Contempt of the Vulgar* - 397

—— III. *Scandal; or False Judgment of Actions* - - 399

—— IV. *Marriage* - - - 401

—— V. *Profanity; or Contempt of Religion* - - - - 403

ESSAY I.

Whether are all Animate and Inanimate Bodies Made for the Immediate Use and Conveniency of Mankind; or, is that only a Secondary End of their Existence - - - - - 413

ESSAY

ESSAY II.

Page.

Whether Oratory, upon the whole, has been of Use to Mankind - - 431

ESSAY III.

Of Poverty - - - - 439

ADVERTISEMENT.

A Small Addition to the Price mentioned in the Proſpectus of this Book is made on Account of the Work being Larger than what was originally intended.

THE

LIFE

OF

JOHN GREGORY,

M. D. F. R. S.

LATE PROFESSOR OF MEDICINE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH, AND FIRST PHYSICIAN TO HIS MAJESTY IN SCOTLAND.

DR JOHN GREGORY was the ſon of Dr James Gregory, Profeſſor of Medicine in King's College, Aberdeen, and grandſon of James, the inventor of the Gregorian Teleſcope. His father was firſt married to Catharine Forbes, daughter of Sir John Forbes of Monymuſk, by whom he had ſix children, but moſt of them died in infancy; ſometime afterwards, he married Anne Chalmers, daughter of the Rev. Mr George Chalmers Principal of King's College, by whom he had two ſons and a

A daughter.

daughter. John, the youngeſt of the three, was born at Aberdeen June 3. 1724. When only ſeven years of age, his father died; and his education was ſuperintended chiefly by his grandfather Principal Chambers. At the grammar ſchool of Aberdeen, he received the rudiments of his claſſical education, which he afterwards improved and extended by ſtudying the antient authors with whoſe writings he was greatly delighted; and, under the inſpection of his grandfather, he finiſhed, in King's College, his ſtudies in the Latin and Greek languages, as well as in the ſciences of Ethics, Mathematics, and Natural Philoſophy.

Mr Gregory, in the year 1742, went to Edinburgh, where, at that time, the now ſo celebrated ſchool of medicine was riſing into high reputation. He attended the Anatomical Lectures of Dr Alexander Monro the elder, of Dr Sinclair on the Theory of Medicine, and of Dr Rutherford on the Practice. He likewiſe attended the Prelections of Dr Alſton on the Materia Medica and Botany, and thoſe of Dr Plummer

mer on Chemiſtry. The Medical Society of Edinburgh was inſtituted for the purpoſe of diſcuſſing with freedom all ſubjects connected with Medicine and Philoſophy. Mr Gregory, it appears, was a member of that ſociety in the year 1742, when the famous Dr Mark Akenſide, his fellow ſtudent and intimate companion, belonged to that uſeful inſtitution. In 1745, Mr Gregory went to Leyden, where he ſtudied under the celebrated Gaubius, Albinus, and Van Royen. While reſiding at Leyden, he had the honour of receiving, from the King's College of Aberdeen, an unſollicited degree of Doctor of Medicine; and, ſoon after his return from Holland, he was elected Profeſſor of Philoſophy in that Univerſity. Agreeably to the nature of his employment, in the years 1747, 1748, and 1749, he delivered lectures on Mathematics, Natural Philoſophy, and Moral Philoſophy. Towards the end of the year 1749, however, he choſe to reſign his Profeſſorſhip of Philoſophy, having directed his views chiefly to the Practice of Phyſic. But, previouſly to his ſettling as a phyſician at Aberdeen, he went for

ſome

ſome months to the Continent, both, perhaps, to enlarge his ideas and to procure amuſement. After his return to Scotland, Dr Gregory in the year 1745, married Eliſabeth daughter of Lord Forbes, a beautiful and accompliſhed young lady, with whom he received a conſiderable addition to his fortune. During the period of their union, which was nine years only, they mutually enjoyed a high degree of domeſtic felicity.

At that period, the chief medical practice was pre-occupied by his elder brother, Dr James Gregory. This circumſtance induced Dr John to try his fortune in London; to which city he repaired in the year 1754, where his reputation as a man of genius ſoon procured him the countenance and intimate intercourſe of many of the firſt literary characters in England. In the ſame year, he was made a member of the Royal Society in London; and he would unqueſtionably, if he had remained in that metropolis, ſoon have acquired an extenſive practice.

practice. But the death of his brother Dr James Gregory, in November 1755, occaſioned a vacancy in the Profeſſorſhip of Medicine in King's College, Aberdeen. To this chair, in his abſence, he was elected, and ſolicited to perform the duties of that office. For this purpoſe, in the beginning of the following year, he returned to his native country.

The philoſophical opinions and writings of Reid, of Campbell, of Beattie, of Gerard, and of Gregory, eſtabliſh virtue on a firm and unalterable baſis, give ſtability to morals, and vindicate the ſupremacy of what is denominated common ſenſe. Many of the moſt celebrated works of thoſe and other Philoſophers derived their origin from a literary ſociety, which held its meetings, in Aberdeen, once every week. A part of the entertainment for the evening was the reading of ſhort eſſays, which were compoſed, in rotation, by the members. Dr Reid and Dr Gregory were the inſtitutors of this Society. It conſiſted chiefly of ſome

of

of the Profeſſors of the King's and Mariſchal Colleges of Aberdeen, but admitted other literary gentlemen of the place. In this Society, Dr Gregory read occaſionally thoſe Eſſays which he afterwards methodiſed and publiſhed in the year 1764, under the title of *A Comparative View of the State and Faculties of Man with thoſe of the Animal World.*

To convey ſome idea of this book, I ſhall give a ſhort ſketch of its plan.—The condition of man, in a ſtate of ſociety, may be viewed in three different aſpects. In his ſavage ſtate, he is diſtinguiſhed by the higheſt improvement of his corporeal powers, and, of courſe, by a proportional neglect of his intellectual faculties. As ſociety advances in its progreſs, the ſocial affections begin to appear; the heroic virtues are diſplayed; war is, in ſome meaſure, regulated by the principles of honour; and the ſpirit of patriotiſm produces high exertions of generoſity and courage. Succeeding ages behold the ſame people extending their territory; holding intercourſe with diſtant nations;

tions; acquiring wealth by means of commerce; and gradually advancing to the period of refinement and luxury. In this ſtage of ſociety, the heroic virtues are obliterated, and are ſucceeded by a paſſion for the objects of Taſte in productions of the fine arts. Invention is excited and induſtry ſtimulated by the artificial wants created by luxury. Extenſion of intercourſe refines the manners of mankind, and leiſure and eaſe invite them to improve their underſtandings and their genius. The poſſibility of any nation being capable of uniting the advantages peculiar to each of thoſe ſtages of ſociety, is perfectly chimerical; but it appeared to our author, that, though it was impoſſible for large aſſociations of men to realiſe this idea, ſtill it was practicable for individuals to attain this moſt deſirable end. To him, it ſeemed not irrational to think, that men endowed with the moſt perfect uſe of their bodily powers, might alſo reach the higheſt improvement of their mental faculties; that the heroic virtues might be united with a taſte for elegance and of beauty; that they might, to

ſimplicity

ſimplicity and inoffenſive manners, add genuine politeneſs, and, at once, cultivate the virtuous feelings of the heart and the faculties of the mind.

Dr Gregory's obſervations, in the firſt ſection of this ſmall but ingenious and uſeful book, on the management of infants, and their education, merit the particular attention of all parents. Here he ſhews, that moſt human calamities derive their origin, not from Nature, but from mens own caprice, inattention, and folly. Of this kind are the innumerable evils which ariſe from the miſmanagement of infants, and the abſurd ſeverity in the mode of educating them. Theſe evils the remarks and remonſtrances of Dr Gregory, ſoon contributed, in a great meaſure, to eradicate. But with regard to the too common ſyſtem of early education, his obſervations, though extremely juſt, have not obtained equal ſucceſs. Every man muſt regret, with our author, that "the happieſt period of human life, the days of health, chearfulneſs, and innocence, on which we always reflect with pleaſure,

pleaſure, not without ſome mixture of regret, are ſpent in the midſt of tears, puniſhment, and ſlavery; and this to anſwer no other end, but to make a child a man ſome years before Nature intended he ſhould be one."

In treating more directly of the comparative ſtate of man and the inferior animals, he remarks, that, by the moſt accurate calculations, one half of the human ſpecies die before they arrive at their eighth year. This mortality is greateſt among the opulent and luxurious part of mankind. It gradually diminiſhes as the diet becomes ſimpler, the exerciſe more frequent, and the manner of living more hardy. Among wild animals no ſuch calamity takes place. From theſe facts, the general foundations of this mortality among the offſpring of men are, in ſome meaſure, apparent. The great havock made by diſeaſes ariſes chiefly from the unnatural treatment they receive. Their own inſtincts, and the conduct of Nature in rearing other animals, are never regarded. When farther advanced in

life, the inſtincts of Nature become irreſiſtible. The great mortality among children has been conſidered as a natural evil, and, therefore, an unavoidable one, and, of courſe, is ſubmitted to without examination. Why the ſtate of infancy is the moſt ſickly, and why ſo great a proportion of mankind is cut off at that early period, phyſicians have aſcribed to ſeveral cauſes; as, the dangers ariſing from the ſudden and almoſt total change of the animal oeconomy which takes place immediately at birth; the dangers produced by the free admiſſion of the external air to their bodies; the high degree of irritability in their nervous ſyſtem; the delicacy of their whole frame, and the aceſcency of their food. This account of the matter, though ſeemingly plauſible, is by no means ſatisfactory. It ſhould be conſidered, that all theſe ſuppoſed cauſes of the diſeaſes of infants are not confined to the human ſpecies, but extend to many other animals, without producing thoſe or ſimilar effects; that the diſeaſes moſt fatal to children have no exiſtence among ſavage nations; and that their prevalence is proportioned

tioned to the progreſs of luxury and of effeminate manners, joined to the neglect of the plain dictates of inſtinct and of Nature.

During infancy, children, in general, enjoy a greater luxuriancy of life and health than in any other period. Infants, it is true, are more delicately ſenſible of injury than thoſe advanced in life. But, as a compenſation, their fibres and veſſels are more capable of diſtention, and their whole ſyſtem more flexible; their fluids are leſs acrid, and leſs liable to aſſume a putreſcent quality; they can ſupport every evacuation more eaſily, except the loſs of blood; and, what is much in their favour, they are entirely emancipated from the often injurious conſequences of imaginary terrors. Their animal ſpirits, if not blunted by the preſſure of diſeaſe, are always vivacious; they ſoon forget paſt ſufferings, and never anticipate future. Theſe, and ſimilar advantages, enable children to recover from diſeaſes which are always fatal to adults.

All animals, except the females of the human

human ſpecies, bring forth their young without aſſiſtance, except ſome which we have corrupted and debilitated by forcing them from a natural to a domeſtic ſtate. But we moſt abſurdly think Nature unqualified for this important office; and, to ſupply that defect, call in the aſſiſtance of ignorant and often dangerouſly blundering midwives. It is too well known, that numbers of infants, as well as mothers, fall daily victims to the prepoſterous management of thoſe pretended artiſts. A well inſtructed widwife, it muſt be acknowledged, is, for many reaſons, preferable to an accoucheur. Women have generally more patience than men; beſides, men are often ſo occupied with buſineſs as ſurgeons, &c. that they tire, cannot wait the ſlow but ſure operations of Nature; and, for theſe reaſons, not unfrequently employ force when no force is neceſſary. The moſt ſkilful practitioners allow, that, in all common caſes, Nature alone is perfectly ſufficient, and that it is their buſineſs only to aſſiſt her efforts when the mother is weak, or the child preſents itſelf in an unfavourable poſition. An infant

fant no ſooner comes into the world than it is crammed with phyſic. At their birth, the bowels of infants, and of many other animals, contain a viſcid kind of liquor, which it is neceſſary to have diſcharged. Nature has prepared a medicine that produces this ſalutary effect; this medicine is the firſt milk of the mother. But practitioners abſurdly think that ſome drug forced down the child's throat will anſwer the purpoſe much better. On this ſubject, it is worthy of remark, that calves, the only animals generally under our immediate care and management, when brought forth, are treated in the ſame manner as infants. The ſame kind of phyſic is adminiſtered to them, which is followed by the ſame effect, for many of them either die under the operation, or of its conſequences.

The natural inſtinct of an infant, ſome hours after birth, induces it to cry, in order to procure the milk of the mother. But the common practice is very generally to deny that ſalutary gratification till after the third day. By this prepoſterous ſuppreſſion of

of the natural evacuation of the milk, a fever is uſually brought on; the conſequences of which are not unfrequently fatal to the mother: At any rate, it prevents her, for ſome time, from giving ſuck to her child. Another bad conſequence of this delay is a ſudden ſwelling of the breaſts, which generally happens about the third day. When the breaſts are thus ſuddenly and greatly diſtended, a child is unable to ſuck, and, by ſtruggling and crying, fatigues and heats both the mother and itſelf. This is another cauſe which ofter prevents maternal nurſing. Here it is worthy of notice, that the gentlemen, who ſuperintended the Lying-in Hoſpital of London, were the firſt who had the honour, in this momentous and intereſting buſineſs, of bringing us back to Nature and common ſenſe, and of preſerving the lives of thouſands. They made the children be put to the breaſt of the mother as ſoon as they diſcovered any deſire for it, which generally happened ten or twelve hours after birth. This management rendered the uſual doſe of phyſic perfectly unneceſſary: and

the

the milk flowed gradually, and with eaſe, into the breaſts. It is much to be regretted, however, that this moſt ſenſible and ſalutary practice has been but very partially followed. If a mother, from weakneſs, or other cauſes, is reſolved not to nurſe her own child, ſhe ought, for her own ſake, to ſuckle it for ſome weeks before ſhe transfers it to the charge of a ſtranger. By purſuing this conduct, ſhe, in all probability, will prevent the dangers ariſing from repelling the milk.

Mothers who are able, and do not nurſe their own children, violate one of the ſtrongeſt laws of Nature. This violation is committed by none of thoſe inferior animals which were deſtined, by the ſtructure of their organs, to ſuckle their young. This unnatural practice is unknown among barbarous nations; and was equally unknown in the poliſhed nations of Greece and Rome. A woman, whatever be her condition in life, by not nurſing her child, is in imminent danger of loſing her life by a milk-fever, beſide the riſk of inducing ſwellings and

and impoſtumes in the breaſts, and ſuch obſtructions in their veſſels as frequently give riſe to cancers.—In the Lying-in Hoſpital of London, of 4,400 women, who brought forth children, four only had milk-ſores; and even theſe had either very ſmall nipples, or formerly ſore breaſts. Children ſhould be ſuckled from nine to twelve months. Several circumſtances indicate the propriety of weaning them about that time. In many parts of Europe, and in the whole of the Levant, children are allowed nothing but the milk of the mothers till they complete their firſt year. By giving children food of more difficult digeſtion at a more early period, many diſorders are often produced in their tender frames. Infants, recently after birth, often ſuffer by giving them particular kinds of nouriſhment which are thought to be perfectly mild and agreeable to their conſtitution, ſuch as gruels, milk and water, wine-whey, &c. At this time, however, Nature requires very little food, but a great deal of repoſe. During ſome weeks after birth, infants ſleep almoſt perpetually. Children ſhould be weaned by

by degrees, and every ſubſequent alteration in their diet ſhould likewiſe be gradual; for too ſudden tranſitions often produce very bad effects. We are aſtoniſhed at the abſurdity, and even cruelty, of ſome nations exhibited in the management of children, and of the various modes of dreſs in different nations and regions of the globe. The Chineſe, from ſome capricious fancy, think that the feet of their females, if not ſqueezed, from the earlieſt infancy, into one fourth of the ſize which Nature intended, are unhandſome. The Africans have a ſimilarly abſurd practice of flattening the noſes of their offspring, with a view to make them more beautiful. But we ſeldom think of an equally abſurd and more pernicious practice in our own and many other nations of Europe. We think, that the natural ſhape of a woman's body is not ſo elegant as when compreſſed with ſtays, which, by the deep inſection of the lower part of the abdomen, makes her reſemble an *ant*.

Diſorders in the ſtomach, and even conſumptions, are often the effects of this hurt-

ful practice. Nature reſents this practice in a moſt remarkable manner, by rendering more than one half of the women of faſhion, in one degree or other, deformed. Deformity, except from accidental cauſes, is peculiar to civilized nations. The Turkiſh, the Aſiatic women, as well as thoſe who inhabit the numerous iſlands of the ſouthern ocean, who are diſtinguiſhed by the elegance of their form and the gracefulneſs of their movements, wear no dreſs but what is perfectly looſe. The ſtrength, fine proportions, and agility of Savages, are the natural reſults of their hardy education, of their living chiefly in the open air, and of their members having never ſuffered any confinement.

The remainder of this ſection * is occupied with judicious and pertinent remarks concerning the general management of children, with regard to food, clothing, exerciſe, &c. till they arrive at their fourth or fifth year.

The ſecond ſection treats of thoſe powers or

* The book conſiſts of five.

or faculties which give man a ſuperiority over other animals. Thoſe powers are derived from reaſon, from the ſtrong aſſociating principle, from what is called *taſte*, and from religion. How far each of theſe contributes to the happineſs and comfort of mankind, Dr Gregory conſiders at ſome length. Reaſon of itſelf, he remarks, unleſs when a proper uſe is made of it, cannot be reckoned an immediate bleſſing. We are furniſhed by Nature with a variety of internal ſenſes and taſtes. If properly cultivated, all theſe are ſources of manly pleaſures. This culture is the province of reaſon. It is by reaſon that we analyſe our taſtes and pleaſures, and aſſign to each that degree of indulgence and cultivation which its rank deſerves. But, if reaſon, inſtead of doing juſtice to the benevolence of Providence, neglects her ſuperintending charge, reaſon has no right to the denomination of a *bleſſing*. The advantages of genius, and of a ſuperior underſtanding, are obvious. But theſe uncommon talents ſeldom procure much emolument either to the poſſeſſor or the public. This waſte or abuſe of genius

genius exhibits a melancholy picture. "A large library," Dr Gregory remarks, "gives a full view of it. Among the multitude of books of which it is compoſed, how few engage any one's attention? Such as are addreſſed to the heart and imagination, ſuch as paint life and manners in juſt colours and intereſting ſituations, and the very few that give genuine deſcriptions of Nature in any of her forms, or of the uſeful and elegant arts, are read and admired. But the far more numerous volumes, productions of the intellectual powers, profound ſyſtems and diſquiſitions of philoſophy and theology, are neglected and deſpiſed, and remain only as monuments of the pride, ingenuity, and impotency of human underſtanding. Yet many of the inventors of theſe ſyſtems diſcover the greateſt acuteneſs and depth of genius; half of which, exerted on any of the uſeful or elegant arts of life, would have rendered their names immortal."

It has always, however, been the misfortune of philoſophical men to attempt the inveſtigation

inveſtigation of objects which Nature has placed beyond their reach, and to aſcend to general principles, and to fabricate ſyſtems, without a previous collection and arrangement of facts, which alone can give them a ſolid foundation. This only proper mode of philoſophyſing was inculcated in the moſt ſtrenuous and clear manner by the celebrated Bacon, Lord Verulam. But few attempts have been made to cultivate philoſophy upon his moſt rational and excellent plan. Sir Iſaac Newton, Mr Boyle, and ſome others, however, muſt be excepted. Genius is naturally impatient of reſtraint, and impetuous in its purſuits. Hence, it delights in employing its own internal materials, or thoſe which the imagination ſpontaneouſly ſupplies. But the materials neceſſary for the improvement of arts or ſciences muſt be collected by ſuch ſlow and patient obſervation, as is, in a great meaſure, incompatible with the rapidity and ſprightlineſs of genius. Men of real genius cannot endure the fetters of method and ſyſtem; but they are the only people whoſe province it is to invent them. Lord Verulam

rulam brought the ſyſtematic method of thoſe who are called the ſchoolmen, which was founded on metaphyſical and often nominal ſubtleties, into merited contempt, and pointed out a mode of inveſtigation founded on the moſt juſt and extenſive views of Nature. For theſe and ſimilar reaſons, it has happened, that few of the uſeful arts of life have been improved by philoſophers. Improvements of this kind have chiefly originated from accidental diſcoveries, or from men who exerciſed thoſe arts, and were totally unacquainted with philoſophical ſpeculations.

Dr Gregory, with much liberality of ſentiment, applies the above remarks to Medicine. "If by medicine," ſays he, "be meant the art of preſerving health, and reſtoring it when loſt, any man of ſenſe and candour, who has been regularly bred to it, will own, that his time has been moſtly taken up with inquiries into branches of learning, which, upon trial, he finds utterly unprofitable to the main ends of his profeſſion, or waſted in reading uſeleſs theories and voluminous

voluminous explanations and commentaries on theſe theories; and will ingenuouſly acknowledge, that every thing uſeful, which he ever learned from books in the courſe of many years ſtudy, might be taught to any man of common ſenſe and attention in almoſt as many months, and that a few years experience is worth all his library Medicine, in reality, owes more to that illiterate enthuſiaſt, Paracelſus, for introducing ſome of the moſt uſeful remedies, than to any phyſician who has written ſince the days of Hippocrates, if we except Dr Sydenham, who owes his reputation to a great natural ſagacity in making obſervations, and to a ſtill more uncommon candour in relating them.*"

Philoſophers, generally, in their inquiries, keep at an unfortunate diſtance from ſubjects which might redound to the utility of mankind. Agriculture, as a ſcience, for inſtance, is ſtill in a lamentably imperfect ſtate. A philoſopher, or a mathematician, who happens to poſſeſs a farm, does not underſtand

* Gregory's Works, vol. 2. p. 91.

underſtand the conſtruction of a cart or a plough, ſo well as the ſervant who drives them: Neither is he ſo well acquainted with the method of cultivating the ground to advantage. Many of what are denominated ſyſtems of agriculture have been publiſhed; but they are only collections of maxims, or rather noſtrums, accompanied with a profuſion of ridiculous reaſonings. What is chiefly to be wiſhed for in huſbandry, is a detail of obſervations and experiments, fully and diſtinctly related, as well as properly atteſted; for no leſs authority can give ſtability to general maxims in any ſcience whatever. With pleaſure, however, we obſerve the ſpirit of a liberal philoſophy beginning to ariſe, better calculated to promote both private and public utility. In matters of opinion, the authority of antiquity and of celebrated names is now leſs regarded. Men begin to tire of theories which produce no uſeful conſequences. The load of contemptible rubbiſh, under which ſcience had been ſo long oppreſſed, begins to be removed; and a general diſpoſition ariſes to expoſe and deſpiſe

thoſe

thoſe quackiſh arts which have ſo often diſgraced literature and gentlemen who were even trained to what always ought to be liberal profeſſions. The beſt method of promoting uſeful ſcience, is to communicate it with perſpicuity, and in language as void of technical terms as the nature of the ſubject will permit.

The good effects of method and perſpicuity are no where more remarkable than in Chymiſtry. For many ages, this ſcience was involved in the deepeſt obſcurity. It was concealed from mankind by a jargon which was intelligible only to a few adepts; and, by an abſurd aſſociation, it was interwoven with a mad religious enthuſiaſm. The great Dr Boerhaave was the firſt who brought this valuable ſcience out of obſcurity, and illuſtrated it in a language intelligible to all men poſſeſſed of common ſenſe. Since that period, the knowledge of Chymiſtry has advanced with rapidity. The French philoſophers have had particular merit in rendering this ſcience, as well as many other branches of natural philoſophy,

ſubſervient, by their eaſy mode of conveying their ſentiments, to the uſeful and elegant arts of life. The ſame liberal ſpirit of inquiry has now begun to exhibit itſelf in the theory and practice of medicine. Greater weight is now given to experiment and obſervation; idle and uſeleſs theories are not only quickly detected, but held in contempt; and the pedantry and quackery of the profeſſion have become objects of juſt ridicule.

Great natural parts are not unfrequently rendered uſeleſs to the world, as well as to the poſſeſſor. The force of genius, by graſping at too great a number of objects, is exhauſted in the endleſs labour of accumulating promiſcuous or inſignificant facts, while, by confining its exertions to fewer objects, it might have improved and extended ſcience, as well as ſome of the uſeful arts. The moſt effectual check to this diſſipation of genius is the love of fame, which ſtimulates men to become authors. Superior powers of underſtanding, though they adorn any human character, are too ſeldom

ſeldom of much uſe to the public, and often ſtill leſs to the individual who poſſeſſes them. Men who ſpend moſt of their time in the exertions of the underſtanding, are by no means the moſt happy. They derive pleaſure, it muſt be acknowledged, from the purſuits or diſcovery of truth, and from a conſciouſneſs of ſuperior talents. But they are, in a great meaſure, deprived of many natural ſources of pleaſure. All the ſocial and public affections, if not properly cheriſhed and cultivated, ſoon become languid. People of this deſcription muſt, of courſe, live, in a manner, abſtracted from the world. Envy and jealouſy are remarkable among this claſs of men. Hence there is, perhaps, leſs real friendſhip among authors than among the reſt of mankind. Men of independent fortunes, who feel not the rivalſhip of authors, connect themſelves with thoſe who reſemble them in taſte and ſentiment; and, as there are no interferences in their purſuits, their friendſhips are often ſincere, and continue through life. In profeſſions where intereſt is the chief object, men are often moſt cordially attached

to

to one another, provided the field of employment be ſufficiently ſpacious. In the purſuits of fame or vanity, however, the caſe is entirely reverſed. Here jealouſy admits of no rival. It makes people regard what is given to others as taken from themſelves. Hence that expreſſive ſilence, that cold and extorted approbation, beſtowed by rival authors on works which, by more impartial and diſintereſted judges, receive the warmeſt applauſe. Such generoſity and greatneſs of mind as render men ſuperior to ſo mean a jealouſy, are virtues too rarely exhibited to the view of the world.

This almoſt perpetual conteſt among men of genius and learning prevents many of them from receiving that degree of fame to which they are juſtly entitled: It is alſo one of the chief cauſes which exclude them from that influence and aſcendency in the various profeſſions and affairs of life, which their talents would otherwiſe readily procure. Ignorant or dull people cannot comprehend the labours of men of genius, are afraid of them, and naturally combine

bine againſt them; and the mutual diſſentions and jealouſies among ſuch men give dunces all the advantages which they ſo eagerly deſire.

Thoſe who occupy their time in the ſtudy of ſpeculative ſciences, ſoon blunt their ſocial affections, becauſe they are not properly exerciſed. For the ſame reaſon, the love of liberty and of country are rendered extremely feeble. No men, perhaps, entertain ſentiments of patriotiſm and public liberty with ſo much arduor, as thoſe who are juſt entering upon the world, and have received a liberal education. Youth, indeed, is the ſeaſon when generous and elevated ſentiments moſt eaſily penetrate the heart. At this moſt happy period of life, that acute love of independency, that zeal for public proſperity, which animated the antient Greeks and Romans, are felt with peculiar warmth and enthuſiaſm. This fervour, however, too ſoon ſubſides. When young men engage in the buſineſs of active life, the manly and diſintereſted motives are in danger of being ſuffocated by diſſipation

tion and corruption of manners, which every where ſolicit attention, and debauch the manners of mankind. Depravity of manners at laſt becomes ſo enormous, that every pretenſion to public virtue is regarded as folly or hypocriſy. On the other hand, when particular men chuſe to lead a ſpeculative and ſedentary life, the active powers and virtues of the mind are ſtill more effectually annihilated. Steady and vigorous exertions can alone be ſupported by uniform habits of activity. Love of country and of the public can have no exiſtence among men who neither know nor love the individuals of which it is compoſed. When a man has a family and friends, theſe give him an intereſt in the community, and attach him to it. But, if he is a ſingle ſolitary animal, unconnected with family or friends, he can feel little or no affection for one country in preference to another.

If abſtraction from ſocial intercourſe be carried beyond its proper limits, it is uniformly accompanied with groſs ignorance of

of life and manners, and deprives a man of all thoſe little but neceſſary accompliſhments which are eſſential in poliſhed ſocieties. A neglect of thoſe often prevents the ſucceſs of perſons of real merit, and is a common ſource both of diſguſt at the world and at themſelves. Such men are apt to complain that merit, in this world, is almoſt entirely neglected. But no man, who has never taken the trouble of making his merit known, can have any title to make ſuch a complaint. Want of health is, likewiſe, moſt frequently a concomitant of genius, eſpecially when its exertions are more occupied with the ſpeculative than the active ſcenes of life. Vivacity of genius is generally attended with remarkable delicacy of conſtitution. A ſtudious, and, of courſe, a ſedentary life, augments this weakneſs, and creates a train of nervous diſorders, which render life burdenſome to the poſſeſſor, though not always uſeleſs to the public. Exerciſe and frequent relaxations of mind are the only effectual means of preventing or of removing theſe maladies.

Among

Among the many inconveniencies which originate from ſuperior talents, we may reckon that ſolitude in which they neceſſarily place a perſon on whom they are beſtowed. To the few who are capable of forming a judgment of his abilities, he becomes an object of jealouſy and of envy. Moſt men regard him with a diſtant awe which is perfectly incompatible with friendſhip and confidence. They never can unboſom themſelves to a perſon of whom ſuperiority of learning and genius makes them afraid. Hence it is not unfrequent to ſee men of parts aſſociating affectionately with thoſe who are greatly inferior to them in underſtanding, good-humoured people, with whom they can indulge, without reſerve, all their peculiarities and even weakneſſes.

From what has been delivered concerning the boaſted high privilege of being poſſeſſed of the reaſoning faculty, Dr Gregory draws the following ſtrange, but, perhaps, juſt concluſion; "That, from the little influence it ſeems to have in promoting either public or private

private good, we are almoſt tempted to ſuſpect, that Providence deprives us of thoſe fruits we naturally expect from it, in order to preſerve a balance and equality among mankind. Certain it is, that virtue, genius, beauty, wealth, power, and every natural advantage one can be poſſeſſed of, are uſually mixed with ſome alloy, which diſappoint the fond hope of their raiſing the poſſeſſor to any uncommon degree of eminence, and even, in ſome meaſure, bring him down to the common level of his ſpecies.*"

That principle which induces men to aſſociate with one another, in Dr Gregory's eſtimation, ſeems to have no natural connection with the underſtanding; for perſons of the beſt underſtanding often poſſeſs it in a very inferior degree. But this, he obſerves, does not proceed from inſenſibility of heart, but from the languiſhing of the ſocial principle by neglecting its proper cultivation and exerciſe. The idle and diſſipated derive moſt enjoyment from this

 principle;

* Gregory's Works, vol. 2. p. 113.

principle; becauſe not only their pleaſures but their vices are generally of a ſocial nature. Even drinking, if not carried to exceſs, is favourable to this principle, particularly in northern climates, where the affections are naturally cold and phlegmatic: For generous liquor excites a warmth of temper, opens the heart, and diſpels that gloomy reſerve, which is perhaps too common among learned men, but is always inconſiſtent with the joys ariſing from ſympathetic and chearful affections. Thoſe elevated and warm deſcriptions of friendſhip, which charm the minds of youth, and repreſent it as the higheſt degree of human felicity, are ſeldom, if ever, realiſed in northern regions. High ſentiments of friendſhip, and even of love, are the productions chiefly of warmer climes. Many of the male ſex, becauſe they have ſome learning, aſſume a tone of ſuperior wiſdom, and conſider ſexual attachment as a weakneſs below the dignity of man; though they allow, that the fair ſex are uſeful, and ſometimes deign to regard them as rational and agreeable companions. But this is, perhaps, only the

the language of inſenſibility of heart, or of diſappointed pride, rather than of wiſdom. Women were never deſpiſed by any man who was a favourite with them; nor does any man contemn love who ever was conſcious of loving and of being loved by a woman of merit.

In eaſtern climates, as the power of beauty is very abſolute, nothing but perſonal accompliſhments are held in eſtimation. Hence women, in theſe countries, are deprived of every opportunity of improvement, and ſpend their days in an ignominious confinement, excluded from a free and promiſcuous intercourſe with ſociety. But, in northern climates, ſuch as our own, the power of beauty is extremely limited. With us, accordingly, love is a feeble paſſion, and eaſily yields to intereſt, ambition, and even to vanity. Hence, in proportion as luxury advances among us, love muſt ſoon be extinguiſhed, eſpecially in the higher ranks of life. To give love more force and permanency, it muſt be connected with ſentiment and eſteem. But this deſirable

effect

effect can never be produced as long as we continue to treat women like children. While uſed in this manner, their minds are depreſſed, and all generous emulation is annihilated. If treated in a more liberal manner, a ſenſe of their own dignity and value would induce them to become, what they ought to be, our friends and companions. This, however, can never be accompliſhed by laying aſide their own natural characters and aſſuming thoſe of the men. The two ſexes have very different parts to act on the theatre of life. Nature has ſufficiently marked their different characters, and enables both of them to perform their reſpective duties in ſociety. The original deſtination of men was to protect the women, and to provide ſubſiſtance for them and their children. The more laborious and active parts in the great ſcene of human affairs muſt be performed by the men. They muſt, of courſe, exert greater bodily ſtrength, greater perſonal courage, and greater powers of underſtanding. Domeſtic life, as friends, wives, and mothers, conſtitute the higheſt glories of the female character. Their office

fice is to ſuperintend the oeconomy of families. A more important office is committed to their charge. Not only during infancy, but during that critical period when both the conſtitution of body, and the temper and diſpoſitions of the mind, are principally formed, the training of youth of both ſexes devolves chiefly upon the women. They ſoften our hearts and poliſh our manners. Men, it is true, have the power of directing public ſocieties as well as private families. But women poſſeſs a ſtrong defence againſt the abuſe of this power, by employing that ſoft and inſinuating addreſs, which enables them to control it, and frequently to transfer it to themſelves.

From theſe and other circumſtances it is apparent, that women have a part to act in life which is both important and reſpectable; and Nature has amply provided them with the means of accompliſhing that end. They poſſeſs, in a ſuperior degree, ſweetneſs of temper, gentleneſs of manners, and ſenſibility of heart. They are more chearful and

and vivacious than men; and they have a quicker diſcernment of characters. They enjoy a more lively fancy and a greater delicacy of taſte. They are better judges of grace, elegance, and propriety. Hence they are ſuperior to men in ſuch works of taſte as depend on theſe qualities.

In the third ſection of his *Comparative View*, Dr Gregory gives an ingenious account of the ſeveral advantages and pleaſures which mankind derive from what is called *Taſte*, or a proper uſe of the powers of imagination. Theſe, however, he conſiders as very limited in their number. Taſte implies a quick and juſt intellectual diſcernment, joined to a delicacy of feeling with regard to pleaſure or pain excited by different objects either of ſentiment or imagination. The ſervile and laborious, who conſtitute the great body of mankind, are neceſſarily deprived of the means of improving the various powers of their minds. Nature beſtows on us the ſeeds only of taſte, which it is our buſineſs to foſter, and bring to maturity, otherwiſe they will never produce

duce much pleaſure. The powers of the underſtanding, till of late, have chiefly been cultivated in this iſland. A diſunion between philoſophy and the fine arts has, accordingly, been one unhappy conſequence. We left Muſic, Painting, Sculpture, Architecture, &c. in the poſſeſſion of artiſts who derived no aid from philoſophy, and were equally unacquainted with the works of the moſt celebrated maſters. The productions of natural genius, though unaſſiſted by culture, are ſometimes great and ſurpriſing. But they are generally accompanied with a wild luxuriancy, which is totally inconſiſtent with genuine taſte. To analyſe and aſcertain the principles of every art which depends upon taſte, is the province of philoſophy. But to be maſter of the executive parts of theſe arts, or even to be an inventor in them, does not require the aid of philoſophers. It is their proper buſineſs to direct the exertions of genius in ſuch a manner as to produce the greateſt perfection.

In

In this country, it was ſo late as the days of Hogarth and of Aviſon, that the principles of beauty and of muſical expreſſion were unfolded. Both were eminent maſters and performers in their reſpective arts, which was a ſingular advantage to them in writing upon thoſe ſubjects, but not ſo eſſential as is commonly imagined. Mr Webb was not a painter; but he analyſed the principles of painting with an accuracy and a perſpicuity which would have done honour to the greateſt maſter.

Muſic has, perhaps, a greater influence on the mind than any of the other fine arts. By muſic all our paſſions and emotions may be either excited or ſoothed. Still its real effects are not conſiderable; which is principally owing to its being left in the hands of practical muſicians, and not under the direction of taſte and philoſophy. In order to give muſic any extenſive influence over the mind, both the compoſer and performer muſt underſtand the various aſſociations of the paſſions, and the natural tranſitions from one to another, that, in conſequence

of

of their ſkill in muſical expreſſion, they may be enabled to command them. No ſcience, Dr Gregory remarks, ever flouriſhed as long as it was confined to men who lived by it as a profeſſion. The intereſted views of a trade differ greatly from the liberal proſpects of genius and ſcience. When an art is limited in this manner, private practitioners muſt either adhere to the generally received principles of their craft, or run the riſk of ſtarving. This has been particularly the caſe with muſic, the ſcience of which is ſcarcely underſtood by any perſon, except a few compoſers and performers. They alone direct the public taſte, or rather faſhion. While men of candour and ſenſe, when they derive not that pleaſure from muſic which they expected, relinquiſh all pretenſions to the knowledge of it.

Dr Gregory next examines ſome of the firſt principles of taſte in muſic. Muſic, he obſerves, is "the ſcience of ſounds, ſo far as they affect the mind." Independently of cuſtom, Nature has connected certain ſounds with particular ſenſations.

Meaſure and proportion in ſounds are likewiſe founded in Nature. Certain tones are adapted to ſolemn, plaintive, and mournful ſubjects, and the movements are ſlow; others are expreſſive of the joyous and elevating, and the movements are quick.—Diſtinct from their gravity or acuteneſs, ſounds affect the mind according to their loudneſs or ſoftneſs, as well as their roughneſs or ſmoothneſs. The tones produced by the Æolian harp, for inſtance, are pleaſant, though it gives no ſucceſſion of notes which vary in acuteneſs, but in loudneſs only. The effect of the *drum* in rouſing, in elevating, or in depreſſing the mind, is ſtrong; but the drum poſſeſſes no variety of notes, though the effect produced ariſes chiefly from the meaſure and proportion of the notes it is capable of expreſſing.

Melody, Dr Gregory remarks, conſiſts of a ſucceſſion of ſingle and agreeable ſounds. Melody which pleaſes in one country is not equally grateful to the natives of another. *Harmony* is that agreeable ſenſation of ſounds, which, though produced together, differ

differ in acuteneſs. The mere communication of pleaſure, by giving a tranſient gratification to the ear, is one end of muſic: But its more noble and important purpoſe is to influence the paſſions, and to affect the heart. In the one view, it is an innocent amuſement, which agreeably relaxes the mind after the fatigues of buſineſs or of ſtudy; in another, it is one of the uſeful arts of life. It has always, however, been an art of greater importance among uncultivated than civilized nations; and it appears, from many ancient authors, that under the term *muſic* melody, dance, and ſong, were comprehended. By the exertions of theſe, barbarous nations, in almoſt every climate, have expreſſed all the ſtrong and animated emotions of the mind. By theſe powerful and attractive arts, they celebrate their public ſolemnities, and lament their private and public calamities, as the death of friends, or the loſs of warriors; by theſe united, they expreſs their joy on marriages, harveſts, huntings, and victories; praiſe the great actions of their heroes; and ſtimulate each other to fight bravely,

bravely, or to ſuffer torments and death with a firmneſs and conſtancy which are perfectly aſtoniſhing to poliſhed and effeminate nations. In the earlier periods of the Grecian States, their maxims, exhortations, laws, and even their hiſtory, were written, or recited, in verſe. The rites of their religion were accompanied by dance and ſong*; and their oracles were delivered in verſe, and ſung by the prieſts or prieſteſſes of their multifarious gods. Hence, as long as melody, conjoined with poetry, continued to be the vehicles of the chief principles of religion, morals, and polity, they were the proper and natural objects of public attention, and conſtituted a principal part of the education of children†.

The character of a *bard*, in antient times, was univerſally held in the higheſt eſtimation; for it was commonly united with that of legiſlator and chief magiſtrate. After the ſeparation between muſic and poetry took place, the bard, for ſome time, continued

* A practice common among the ſavages of the iſlands in the Pacific Ocean.

† Plutarchus, de Muſica.

nued to be the ſecond character in the community, becauſe he aſſiſted the magiſtrate in governing and adminiſtering juſtice to the people *. The bards, in all the Celtic nations, and particularly in Britain, were highly eſteemed. The characters of general, poet, and muſician, were united in Fingal and Oſſian. "Such was the ſong of Fingal, in the day of his joy. His thouſand bards leaned forward from their ſeats, to hear the voice of the king. It was like the muſic of the harp on the gale of the ſpring. Lovely were thy thoughts, O Fingal! Why had not Oſſian the ſtrength of thy ſoul? But thou ſtandeſt alone, my father; and who can equal the King of Morven?†" The influence of the Welſh bards ſo much retarded the progreſs of the arms of Edward I. that he ſhamefully ordered the whole of them to be ſlain. As the ſimplicity and purity of ancient manners declined in ancient Greece, the arts of muſic and poetry, formerly the ſtrongeſt incitements to virtue and every manly exertion, were gradually proſtituted to anſwer

* Suidas on the Leſbian Song. Heſiod. † Carthon.

ſwer the purpoſes of vice, or of mere amuſement.

The powers of *eloquence* derive their force chiefly from muſic, or the art of affecting the mind by ſounds variouſly combined. The moſt pathetic compoſitions may be pronounced in ſuch an awkward and unintereſting manner as makes them loſe all their natural influence. Orations which have rouſed the minds of the greateſt men, and determined the fate of nations, have not unuſually been read in private with langour, and even with diſguſt. Like eloquence, muſic ſhould be directed to have ſome determined effect upon the hearers. If this effect is produced, the muſic is good; if it fails, it is bad. Every country poſſeſſes a peculiar melody adapted to effect different paſſions or emotions, to which compoſers ſhould pay the greateſt attention. In Scotland, for example, there is a chearful muſic perfectly ſuited to inſpire the joyous ſenſations which excite dancing and mirth; and a plaintive muſic that is highly expreſſive of the tenderneſs and pleaſant melancholy which are felt

by

by lovers in diſtreſs. Both theſe ſpecies are original, and differ greatly from every other in Europe. It is of little conſequence from what ſource this muſic derived its origin, whether it be ſimple or complex, and whether agreeable to the ſtrict rules of compoſition or not. As long as it produces the intended effects, either joyous or mournful, in a degree ſuperior to that of any other country, it deſerves the preference. It is to be lamented, however, that the Scottiſh nation is likely to loſe its original muſic. The greater part of muſical people in Scotland either neglect it, or deprive it of that ſimplicity upon which its ſurpriſing and agreeable effects depended, by abſurd and fantaſtical additions, moſt prepoſterouſly denominated *graces*.

The admiration pretended to be given to foreign muſic in Britain is, in general, a moſt deſpicable affectation. In Italy, the natives are often tranſported, at the opera, with all the variety of delight and paſſion which the compoſer intended to produce. But, in Britain, the ſame opera is viewed with

with the moſt apathetic inattention. To the very few who underſtand the language, and who reliſh Italian muſic, the dramatic part of an opera appears to be perfectly ridiculous. An abſurd vanity, however, is ſo predominant over people of faſhion in England, that the Italian opera is more frequented than any other public amuſement. In all melody intended to touch the heart, or even to pleaſe the ear, ſimplicity is indiſpenſible. If ſimplicity of melody be ſo neceſſary to move the paſſions, it is ſtill more neceſſary in harmony. The antient muſic produced greater effects than the modern, even if the accounts of it handed down to us ſhould be allowed to be much exaggerated. Among them, muſic, as a ſcience, was, however, in a very low ſtate. They were probably ignorant of harmony; for all their voices and inſtruments were uniſons in concert. Beſides, the inſtruments they employed ſeem to have been greatly inferior, in compaſs, expreſſion, and variety, to thoſe we now poſſeſs. Still theſe deficiencies might render their muſic more powerfully expreſſive.

Though

Though we are ignorant of the particular conſtruction of the antient muſic, we know, that it muſt have been very ſimple; for it was often compoſed by ſtateſmen, warriors, and bards; and people of all ranks, and even children, could practice this delightful art. In muſic, Dr Gregory remarks, the introduction of harmony opened a new and an extenſive field. It promiſed to exhibit a variety which melody alone could never produce: It likewiſe promiſed to beſtow on melody an additional charm and energy. But, unfortunately, the firſt compoſers were ſo totally occupied with the ſtudy of harmony, which was ſoon diſcovered to be a ſcience of great intricacy and extent, that the principal ends of it were entirely overlooked. Theſe compoſers valued themſelves on the laboured conſtruction of parts, which they multiplied ſurpriſingly. The art of counter-point and complicated harmony was invented by Guido in the eleventh century, and carried to its higheſt perfection by Palaeſtrini, who lived in the days of Leo X. This ſpecies of muſic, however, was underſtood only by ſuch perſons as had

made it a particular ſtudy. The few who did underſtand it, acknowledged that it was evidently defective in air or melody, eſpecially when the parts ran into fugues or canons. It muſt be allowed, however, that theſe old full compoſitions were frequently attended with a gravity, a majeſty, and a ſolemnity, which were admirably adapted to the public ſervices of the church. They gave a ſoothing tranquillity to the mind, which diſpelled all earthly cares, and elevated it to heaven.

Fugues, in vocal muſic, is ill adapted to move the paſſions. When four voices are employed at the ſame time, and each of them is expreſſing a different ſentiment, as well as a different muſical paſſage, it is impoſſible that a hearer ſhould attend to, and be affected by, all of them. Catches are a ſpecies of fugues, the pleaſure of which ariſes not from the melody nor from its being expreſſive of the ſubject, but from the unexpected aſſemblage of words, joined to the ſpirit and humour of the ſingers. Vocal is the firſt and moſt natural muſic of every

every country; it is, therefore, reaſonable to expect, that it ſhould have ſome analogy with the poetry of the country, to which it is always adapted. The remarkable ſuperiority of the Scottiſh ſongs to the Engliſh, may be accounted for from the following facts. The Scottiſh ſongs are ſimple, pathetic, and abound in ſtrokes of Nature and paſſion. Their muſic is finely adapted to their ſongs. But moſt of the Engliſh ſongs are full of childiſh conceits. All of them aim at wit, and ſome of them attain their end. But muſic has no expreſſion for wit. Hence the muſic of their ſongs is flat and inſipid, and ſo little eſteemed by the Engliſh themſelves, that it is perpetually fluctuating, and has never reached any characteriſtic ſtile. Dr Brown properly remarks, "that moſt countries peopled by colonies, which, after a certain period of civilization, have iſſued from their native ſoil, poſſeſs no characteriſtic muſic of their own; that the Iriſh, Welſh, and Scotch, are ſtrictly natives, and, accordingly, have a muſic of their own; that the Engliſh, on the contrary, are a foreign mixture

ture of late eſtabliſhed colonies, and, as a conſequence of this, have no native muſic; and that the original muſic of England muſt be ſought for in Wales."

England has, however, produced many excellent compoſers of church-muſic. Religion opens an ample field for muſical, as well as poetical genius. Religion furniſhes almoſt the whole variety of ſubjects which muſic is capable of expreſſing; the ſublime, the joyous, the ſerene, the devout, and the plaintive. It, at the ſame time, warms the heart with an enthuſiaſm which works of genius uniformly excite. The fineſt compoſitions in muſic, accordingly, are in the church ſtile. Though far advanced in years, and when his conſtitution and ſpirits ſeemed to be nearly exhauſted, Handel was ſo much rouſed by this ſubject, that, in his *Meſſiah*, he exhibited an extent and ſublimity of genius, ſuperior to any he had diſcovered in the moſt vigorous periods of his life. Marcello, a noble Venetian, is another inſtance of the ſame kind. He ſet to muſic the firſt fifty pſalms of David, King of Iſrael.

Iſrael. In this performance, Marcello united the ſimplicity and pathos of antient muſic with the grace and variety of the modern.

In vocal muſic, the great object is to make it expreſſive of the ſentiments meant to be conveyed. Where imitation is intended, it ſhould be laid not upon the voice, but on the inſtrumental accompanyments, which, by their greater compaſs and variety, are better ſuited to perform the imitation, while the voice is left at liberty to expreſs the ſentiment. In the union of muſic with poetry, the muſic ſhould always be ſubſervient to the poetry: But the reverſe is the common practice; for the poetry is univerſally made ſubordinate to the muſic. Handel obliged thoſe who compoſed the words of his oratories to alter and tranſpoſe them, as he thought beſt ſuited his muſic; and, as no man of genius could poſſibly ſubmit to ſuch a practice, the poetry is generally moſt abominable.

Beſide its connection with poetry, the effects of muſic depend upon many other circumſtances.

circumſtances. For inſtance, the effect of cathedral muſic depends greatly on its being properly adapted to the ſervice of the day and the diſcourſe of the preacher: Yet this circumſtance is never regarded. The whole conduct of the muſic is left entirely to the caprice of the organiſt, who makes it airy or grave, chearful or plaintive, as ſuits his own fancy. The ſame want of taſte is often exhibited in the muſic performed between the acts of a tragedy, where the tone of paſſion is frequently interrupted and deſtroyed by impertinent and chearful muſic. The effuſions of unbridled fancy are often honoured with the titles of invention, ſpirit, and genius, and muſical taſte, in general, ſeems to mean nothing more than an attachment to what is new, and a contempt for whatever is old. Hence it is pretty generally admitted, that, in muſic, there are no fixed principles, as in other fine arts, and that it has no foundation but in faſhion and caprice.

Dr Gregory, however, with much propriety, remarks, that the principles of taſte in

in muſic are equally founded in human nature as thoſe of any other art or ſcience. The chief principles which merit attention are thoſe which beſtow on muſic the power over the paſſions. The next principles to be examined are thoſe which the art exhibits merely for the purpoſes of amuſement and a tranſient gratification of the ear. In the laſt and loweſt place, may be conſidered the powers of execution, when employed ſolely with the view of exciting ſurpriſe and admiration of the abilities of the performer.

In the fourth ſection, Dr Gregory remarks, that as he had formerly made a few obſervations on the effects produced by a cultivated taſte in ſome of the fine arts, he ſhall now proceed to conſider its influence on the pleaſure we derive from ſuch works of genius as are peculiarly addreſſed to the imagination and the heart. In the earlier periods of life, this pleaſure is often very great. In youth the imagination is lively, and the heart is equally ſuſceptible of the joyous impreſſions of wit and humour, the energy of the ſublime, and of every delicate

delicate ſentiment of humanity. Like every other thing in nature, the imagination is governed by fixed and general laws, which can be diſcovered by experience alone. But theſe laws are not eaſily aſcertained. The ſubject varies ſo much in different countries, and even in the conſtitutions and ages of individuals, that very ſuperior talents are neceſſary to form any kind of ſyſtem of theſe laws. Such a ſyſtem, particularly with regard to dramatic and epic poetry, was deviſed by ſome eminent men of antiquity, and has ſince been almoſt univerſally adopted. It has thrown conſiderable light on ſome of the leading principles of criticiſm; and rules have been eſtabliſhed which were derived from the perception of ſuch beauties as conveyed pleaſure to the reader. Without detracting, however, from the merit of antient critics, it muſt be obſerved, according to our author, that nothing has a greater tendency to check the improvement of any art or ſcience, than too haſtily reducing all its principles into a regular ſyſtem. The great body of mankind cannot think or judge for themſelves. There are a

few

few leading ſpirits whom the reſt muſt follow implicitly. This is one reaſon why ſyſtems are ſo univerſally acceptable. Theſe obſervations are peculiarly applicable to ſyſtems and rules of criticiſm. When conſidered ſolely as aſſiſtances to the exertions of taſte; as unfolding and heightening our diſcernment of beauty, by collecting and arranging the feelings of Nature, they promote the improvement of the fine arts. But, when they are regarded as fixed and eſtabliſhed ſtandards from which there is no appeal; when they impoſe on us the weight of authority, and preſcribe a preciſe line beyond which the works of imagination cannot pretend to paſs; then they are productive of much more harm than good. Of all the powers of the human mind, taſte is the moſt impatient of ſtrict confinement. Some general principles may be inculcated; but it muſt be a fruitleſs attempt to limit the imagination entirely to theſe rules or principles. Beſides, all criticiſm muſt, in a certain degree, be both local and temporary.

Some nations, as well as ſome individuals, are beſt pleaſed with Nature in her faireſt and moſt regular forms; while others admire her in the great, the wild, and the wonderful. In France, elegance, regularity, and ſentiment are the chief objects of their taſte and criticiſm. But the French maxims and rules of criticiſm cannot, with any degree of propriety, be adopted in Britain; for the natural genius and taſte of the people are widely different. In Britain, the grand, the ſublime, the ſurpriſing, and every object which forcibly ſtrikes the imagination, are chiefly regarded and admired. Without theſe, the utmoſt elegance and propriety appear cold and unintereſting. Wherever what is denominated a very *correct taſte* is generally prevalent, genius and invention ſoon languiſh. Delicacy or refinement of taſte is an acquiſition both dangerous and deceitful. It flatters our pride by giving us a conſciouſneſs of ſuperiority, and, by ſpecious promiſes of conferring on us enjoyments of which the common herd of mankind are totally ignorant, not unfrequently deprives us of thoſe pleaſures which

which are attainable by the whole of our ſpecies. Moſt of our internal and external ſenſations, by conſtant indulgence and attention, may be brought to ſuch a degree of diſeaſed acuteneſs as to be diſguſted at almoſt every object. This extreme ſenſibility, though originally founded on affectation and vanity, yet, by habitual indulgence, ſoon becomes real. Nature, however, has ſet bounds to all our pleaſures. Within theſe bounds, we may enjoy them with ſafety. But, if we refine too much upon them, chagrin and diſappointment are the certain conſequences. A delicacy ſo falſe and abſurd, in works of taſte, checks every effort of genius and imagination, enervates the natural powers of language, and gives riſe to that cold mediocrity in compoſition, which does not always diſguſt, but never affords any great degree of pleaſure.

Clearneſs of underſtanding is not the only quality requiſite to form a good critic. Here the heart is as much concerned as the head. In general, it ſeems to be more properly the buſineſs of philoſophical criticiſm to watch the excurſions of fancy at a diſtance, than

than to be continually checking all its unimportant irregularities. The beauties of works of taſte are of different kinds, and ſo are their blemiſhes. The French dramatical writers, by ſtrictly adhering to the general oeconomy and unity of their fable, and the conſtruction of their ſcenes, have univerſally obtained the character of being ſuperior in correctneſs to thoſe of the Engliſh. But, when conſidered in another point of view, we find that the French are much excelled by the Engliſh writers. Even in the beſt French dramatic pieces, there is a want of energy, and often a degree of languor. The ſpeeches are generally too long and declamatory, the ſentiments are over-refined, and the characters enervated. But, in the Engliſh dramas, though not ſo elegant and regular, there is much more fire, force, and ſtrength. The paſſions are expreſſed in a language ſuitable to their reſpective natures; and the characters drawn with, perhaps, a coarſer, but with a more manly pencil. Shakeſpear, by his creative imagination, by his ſtrokes of nature and of paſſion, and by preſerving an uniform

conſiſtency

conſiſtency in his various characters, more than fully compenſates for his tranſgreſſions againſt the fettering rules of time and place, with which the imagination can eaſily diſpenſe. He frequently interrupts the current of the paſſions by introducing low and ridiculous characters, which is a ſtill greater oppoſition to Nature, and the laws of the drama.

Critics have choſen to confine the imagination within the boundaries of probability. But genius and imagination know no ſuch bounds. The ingenious Dr Johnſton, in his Adventurer, remarks, that, to our reaſon, events may appear to be not only improbable, but even abſurd and impoſſible; yet they are often embraced, with facility and delight, by the imagination. It is not very long ago, ſince it was univerſally believed, that inviſible beings, of different ranks and diſpoſitions, intereſted themſelves in human affairs. A belief well calculated to make deep impreſſions on ſome of the moſt powerful principles of our nature. It gratified the love of the marvellous; it dilated

lated the imagination, and gave it a boundleſs range. No wonder, therefore, that, in thoſe days, the old romances were highly eſteemed. Though a belief in the exiſtence of thoſe inviſible powers is now almoſt entirely annihilated; yet it ſtill has conſiderable influence on the imagination. It is from this circumſtance that oriental tales continue to be read and admired by people who have no belief in the exiſtence of Genii, or of any ſimilar ſpirits. In all ſuch works of imagination, we only require an unity and conſiſtency of character. Though the imagination is willingly induced to believe in the exiſtence of beings which reaſon rejects as ridiculous; ſtill events muſt be repreſented in ſuch a regular manner as might be naturally expected to be produced by theſe ſuppoſed intelligences and powers. The facility with which the imagination is deceived appears in a remarkable manner from the effects of a well-acted tragedy. In this caſe, the imagination ſoon becomes too much heated, and the paſſions too much agitated, to permit reaſon to reflect that the diſtreſs exhibited is only feigned.

In

In modern novels, the deception is more complete than in the old romance. But, as it is the chief object of the former to paint Nature and to delineate characters as they really exiſt, the powers of fancy cannot be equally exerted, nor the ſucceſſion of incidents be ſo quick and ſurpriſing. Hence great genius is requiſite to give them that degree of vivacity which is neceſſary to captivate the imagination.

The pleaſures we derive from hiſtory, ariſe, in a great meaſure, from the ſame ſources with thoſe we receive from romance. It is not the mere recital of facts that gives us pleaſure; they muſt be of that important kind which agitate and intereſt the mind. But events of this nature do not frequently occur in hiſtory; nor does it paint thoſe minute features of particular perſons or characters which often engage our affections and influence our paſſions more than the fate of nations. It is not, therefore, ſurpriſing that we often find a difficulty in keeping our attention awake when reading hiſtory, and that few authors have

have been remarkably ſucceſsful in this ſpecies of compoſition. To make hiſtory pleaſant and intereſting, it is ſufficient that it be impartial, that it be written with elegance, and abound with the moſt judicious obſervations. Hiſtory never intereſts us agreeably, unleſs we contract an attachment to ſome important cauſe, or to ſome diſtinguiſhed characters. The fate of theſe engages the attention, and keeps the mind in an anxious but pleaſing ſuſpenſe. Even in hiſtory, we expect a ſort of unity or conſiſtency of character.

The moſt important end of hiſtory is to promote liberty and virtue, to which impartial hiſtory will always be favourable. But, when an hiſtorian pays little or no attention to the principal objects of hiſtory, if he regards it ſolely as a vehicle of amuſement, he may unqueſtionably make his work anſwer a very different purpoſe. The circumſtances which accompany all great events are ſo complicated, and the inconſiſtencies of human characters are ſo various, that a writer of ingenuity is enabled

to

to place them in any point of view he chooſes. Under the plauſible pretence of a regard to truth, and of being ſuperior to vulgar prejudices, he may render the beſt cauſe doubtful, and the moſt reſpectable characters ambiguous. This effect may be produced without any abſolute deviation from truth, by ſuppreſſing ſome circumſtances, and repreſenting others in vivid colours; by taking advantage of the frivolous ſpirit of the age, which derives pleaſure from ſeeing the moſt ſacred and important ſubjects ridiculed; and by inſinuations which the author, from an affected fear of the laws, or a pretended delicacy with regard to eſtabliſhed opinions, ſeems unwilling fully to expreſs. This, of all the methods which have been employed to unhinge the principles of virtue, of liberty, and of human happineſs, is the moſt dangerous and illiberal. We cannot confute a hint, or anſwer an objection, that is not expicitly ſtated.

A lively imagination, eſpecially in poetry, cannot poſſibly be reſtrained in the uſe of

metaphor and imagery, which is the peculiar province of the imagination. In it, the ſoundeſt underſtanding can neither aſſiſt nor judge. As Shakeſpear remarks, the poets eye, as it *glances from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven*, ſees numberleſs ſimilitudes which paſs unnoticed by the reſt of mankind. Between particular external forms in Nature, and certain affections of the mind, there is a correſpondence, which may be felt, but cannot always be explained. The aſſociation may ſometimes be accidental; but it ſeems to be often innate. From this circumſtance, the difficulty of aſcertaining the true *ſublime* chiefly ariſes. In truth, it cannot be limited by any bounds. It is entirely relative, and depends on the livelineſs and warmth of the imagination. Hence it is often very different in different countries. Wherever, for the ſame reaſon, there is a rich profuſion of imagery, which, in ſome kinds of poetry, conſtitutes a principal beauty, obſcurity is generally complained of. This obſcurity is increaſed by thoſe ſudden tranſitions which confound common readers, but are eaſily comprehended by men who

are verſant in poetry. It is a fruitleſs taſk to attempt an accurate ſcrutiny into the propriety of images or metaphors. If not felt at once, it can ſeldom be communicated; for while we endeavour to analyſe it, the impreſſion vaniſhes. The ſame obſervation is applicable to *wit*, or a rapid and unexpected aſſemblage of ideas, which agreeably ſtrike the mind either by their incongruity or reſemblance. Neither is the juſtneſs of *humour* a ſubject that will bear reaſoning. This conſiſts in a lively painting of thoſe weakneſſes of character, which are not of importance enough to raiſe pity or indignation, but only excite mirth and laughter. We muſt have an idea either of the original humouriſt or be affected with the repreſentation of his humour: and if we do not, at once, feel its juſtneſs, we can never perceive it. Hence, moſt works of humour, ſatire, and ridicule, which paint the features and manners of the times, being merely local and tranſient, ſoon loſe their poignancy.

Objects of imagination and taſte can only be viewed with advantage at a certain diſtance,

diſtance, and in a particular light. When too near, the beauty which formerly charmed us appears to be either faded, or diſtorted. Whatever we admire as great or beautiful, is attended with particular circumſtances, which, if examined too minutely, would annihilate our enjoyment, and, in many caſes, create diſguſt. We derive pleaſure from the grandeur of Nature in ſome of her wildeſt forms; from the proſpect of ſtupendous mountains, and other magnificent objects; but, at the ſame time, we are under no neceſſity to conſider the coldneſs and barrenneſs which are ſo generally connected with them. Many paſſages in the Night Thoughts of Dr Young are offenſive to a correct taſte. That work gives a falſe and gloomy repreſentation of human life. The poetry ſometimes ſinks into quaint conceits, or proſaic flatneſs, but oftener riſes into a ſpecies of falſe or turgid ſublime. The reaſoning is frequently weak; and the general plan of the work is both unhappily laid, and ill conducted. This work, however, contains many ſtrokes of ſublimity which few poets have been able to reach; and is full of thoſe pathetic deſcriptions

ſcriptions of Nature and paſſion which moſt tenderly affect the heart. Though the mind is ſometimes diſpoſed to be pleaſed with dark views of human life; yet there are afflictions too deep to bear either reaſoning or amuſement. They may admit of being ſoothed, but cannot be diverted. The gloom of the Night Thoughts correſponds perfectly with this ſtate of mind. It indulges the preſent paſſion, and, at the ſame time, adminiſters thoſe motives of conſolation which alone are capable of making certain griefs ſupportable. There is a ſecret pleaſure which Nature has annexed to all our ſympathetic feelings. We enter into ſcenes of deep diſtreſs and ſorrow with a tenderneſs of heart far more delightful than all the joys which diſſipated mirth can produce.

The diſcovery of many beauties in the works of Nature and of art, which would otherwiſe paſs unnoticed, ought chiefly to be regarded in the cultivation of taſte. Thomſon in his juſtly admired poem, called *the Seaſons*, conveys much pleaſure by the juſtneſs of his painting. But his principal merit is the impreſſing the mind with numerous

merous beauties exhibited by Nature, which did not formerly attract the attention of mankind. To open new ſources of innocent pleaſures, is the moſt uſeful effect of criticiſm; and, it is for this reaſon chiefly that taſte can be eſteemed as a real benefit to ſociety. A good taſte and a good heart have been thought to be ſtrictly aſſociated. But there is a ſpecies of taſte which is perpetually occupied with the diſcovery of blemiſhes and deformity, and, of courſe, can have no good effect either on the temper or the heart. The mind takes a natural tincture from thoſe objects which uſually engroſs its attention. Frequent diſguſt ſours the temper; and a habit of too nice diſcrimination contracts the heart, and, by exhibiting the faults and follies which exiſt in every character, not only checks the generous and benevolent affections, but extinguiſhes all the pleaſant emotions of love and admiration.

In ſubjects of taſte, the dwelling too much on what is ridiculous has alſo a bad effect upon the character, becauſe it produces a ſullen and gloomy pleaſure only, by

by cheriſhing envy and malignity, which are the worſt and moſt painful feelings in human nature. But an intimate acquaintance with the works of Nature and of genius, in their moſt beautiful forms, ſoftens the temper, extends the imagination, and diſpoſes us to embrace the moſt pleaſing views of mankind and of Providence. By contemplating Nature in this light, the heart is dilated, and filled with the moſt benevolent feelings. Then the ſecret ſympathy and the connection between the perceptions of moral and natural beauty, between a good heart and a good taſte, become illuſtriouſly manifeſt.

In the fifth and laſt ſection of the *Comparative View*, Dr Gregory treats of *Religion*; and he conſiders it chiefly as a principle founded in human nature, and treats of the influence it may or actually has on the happineſs of our ſpecies. There is, the Doctor remarks, ſomething peculiarly ſoothing and comfortable in a firm belief that all Nature is ſupported and governed by a good and an omnipotent Being; a belief that we know the means of obtaining his favour; a belief that

that this life is only the infancy of our exiſtence; that we ſhall ſurvive the ſeeming deſtruction of our preſent frame, and have it in our power to ſecure our entrance into a new ſtate of endleſs happineſs. Though the belief of a Deity, however, and of a future exiſtence, has prevailed in all nations and ages; yet it has been too frequently attended with a variety of ſuperſtitions, which have ſometimes rendered it not only uſeleſs but hurtful to the human race. The ſupreme Being has often been repreſented as an object of terror rather than of reverence and eſteem; as executing both preſent and eternal vengeance on the greateſt part of mankind for crimes they never committed, and for not believing doctrines which they never heard. Men have been taught that they did God an acceptable ſervice by withdrawing from all the duties they owed to ſociety, by denying themſelves all the pleaſures of life, and even by voluntarily enduring, and even inflicting on themſelves, the ſevereſt tortures which Nature could ſupport. They have been taught that it was their duty to perſecute, in the

moſt

moſt cruel manner, their fellow creatures, in order to bring them to an uniformity with themſelves in religious tenets; an attempt equally barbarous and impoſſible. In fine, religion has often been uſed as an engine to deprive men of their moſt valuable privileges, and to ſubject them to the moſt deſpotic tyranny.

Some ingenious men, induced by theſe pernicious conſequences, were led to queſtion, whether ſuperſtition or atheiſm were moſt unfavourable to the happineſs of ſociety. But experience has now ſhown, that religion may ſubſiſt in a public eſtabliſhment, diveſted of that pernicious and abſurd ſuperſtition, which was only adventitious, and obviouſly repugnant to its genuine and original ſpirit. To baniſh ſuperſtition entirely from religion, in every individual, is indeed impracticable; becauſe it is impoſſible to make the whole human race think wiſely and properly on any ſubject whatever, where the underſtanding alone is concerned, and much more where the imagination and affections are ſo deeply intereſted. Inde-

pendently of religious belief, mankind are unqueſtionably endued with a ſenſe of right and wrong. But, experience teaches us, that the allurements of pleaſure, and the impetuoſity of paſſion, often prevent man from obeying the dictates of his moral ſenſe, unleſs it be ſupported by the influence which religion has upon the imagination and paſſions. Many of the greateſt enemies of religion, it muſt be allowed, have been diſtinguiſhed for honour and probity. But it ſhould be conſidered, at the ſame time, that ſome virtues as well as vices are in a great meaſure conſtitutional. A cool temper, a dull imagination, and an unfeeling heart, prevent even the deſire of committing many vices. But keen paſſions, a warm imagination, and great ſenſibility of heart, too frequently give riſe to prodigality, debauchery, and ambition. This diſpoſition of mind, however, is accompanied with the ſeeds of all the ſocial and heroic virtues. It carries along with it a check to its conſtitutional vices, by rendering the poſſeſſors peculiarly ſuſceptible of religious impreſſions. It is true, they often

ten appear to be enemies to religion; but that conduct originates entirely from their impatience of its reſtraints. Temperate and chaſte philoſophers have always been the moſt dangerous enemies to religion. Void of paſſion and ſenſibility, they had no vicious appetites to be checked by its influence, and were equally unſuſceptible either of its terrors or pleaſures.

Infidelity in religion, it muſt be owned, is no proof of a defect in the underſtanding, or of a vicious diſpoſition; but it certainly indicates a want of imagination and ſenſibility of heart, as well as a perverted underſtanding. Some philoſophers have been infidels, but few men of taſte and ſentiment. It is ſufficiently evident, however, from the examples of Bacon, Lord Verulam, Mr Locke, and Sir Iſaac Newton, among many others of the moſt eminent philoſophers, that religious belief is perfectly compatible with the cleareſt and moſt enlarged underſtanding. Men who have got the better of religious prejudices, as they are called, affect to treat ſuch as

avow

avow a regard to religion as people of weak minds. The fundamental principles of religion, however, have been generally believed by people diſtinguiſhed for accuracy and acuteneſs of judgment. It is improper to infer, on other ſubjects, the imbecility of a perſon's head from his attachment even to the abſurdities of ſuperſtition. We learn from experience, that, when the imagination is heated, and the affections much intereſted, they overlook, or rather repel, all diſtinctions of the underſtanding. Men of warm, chearful tempers, and who have a ſenſe of religion, are not unfrequently reproached with feebleneſs of mind. But this reproach has no foundation in truth; for ſtrength of mind does not imply a peeviſh temper, nor a hard and inflexible heart. On the contrary, it implies an active and a reſolute ſpirit, which enables a man to act with propriety, and to ſupport the misfortunes of life with dignity and fortitude, which neither atheiſm nor ſcepticiſm are capable of producing. Theſe, on the other hand, chill all the powers of imagination, depreſs the genius, ſour the

temper,

temper, and contract the heart. A high religious ſpirit, and a great veneration for Providence, are exhibited in the writings of the antient Stoics; a ſect which produced the moſt intrepid and virtuous men that ever appeared in the world.

At all periods, immenſe numbers of people exiſt, who have ſurvived the age of youth and vigour, impaired in their health, depreſſed in their fortunes, deprived of their former friends, their children, and perhaps ſtill more endearing connections. What reſources can this world afford to people in ſuch ſituations? It preſents nothing but a dark and dreary waſte. Every deluſive proſpect of pleaſure, or of ambition, is now extinguiſhed. Long experience of the too general conduct of mankind has made the heart almoſt totally incapable of contracting new friendſhips. When we loſe thoſe for whom we laboured, and who ſweetened the toils of life, where can the mind find refuge, but in the conſolations and proſpects offered to us by religion; proſpects of Providence and

of

of futurity, which alone can warm and gratify the heart?

Dr Gregory conſiders religion in three points of view. I. Its doctrines relating to the exiſtence and attributes of God, his moral adminiſtration of the world, and particular communications to mankind by an immediate ſupernatural revelation. II. Its influence as a rule of life and manners. III. He treats of religion as a ſource of particular affections of the mind, which produce either pleaſure or pain, according to the ſpirit of that ſpecies of religion by which they are inſpired.

In the *firſt* of theſe views, which contains the foundation of all religious belief, our author remarks, that our reaſoning powers are chiefly concerned. On this ſubject, the greateſt efforts of genius and of application have been exerted, particularly with regard to thoſe important articles which more immediately affect the intereſt and happineſs of the human ſpecies. But, when our inquiries are puſhed too far, we are humbled by

by the diſcovery, that Providence has ſet bounds to our reaſon, and likewiſe to our capacity of apprehenſion. Our ideas, for example, concerning infinity, and the moral oeconomy of the Deity, are and muſt be extremely limited. Even when we proſecute our inquiries into any part of Nature beyond certain bounds, we ſoon find ourſelves involved in perplexity and darkneſs. But there is a remarkable difference between theſe and religious inquiries. When we inveſtigate natural objects, we always make ſome progreſs in knowledge, and approximate the truth by proper exertions of genius and obſervation. But our inquiries into religious ſubjects are confined within very narrow bounds; nor can any exertion of reaſon or of application enable us to advance one ſtep beyond that impenetrable gulf which ſeparates the viſible from the inviſible world.

The articles of religious belief, which fall within the comprehenſion of mankind, are few and ſimple; but they have been erected by ingenious men into monſtrous ſyſtems of metaphyſical ſubtleties. Various have

have been the pernicious conſequences of ſuch ſyſtems. By attempting to eſtabliſh too much, they have hurt the foundation of the leading principles of religion. The bulk of mankind are taught to believe the peculiar opinions of ſome particular religious ſect, and that theſe are founded on Divine authority, as well as the ſoundeſt reaſoning. Hence their ſyſtem of religion hangs ſo cloſely together, that one part cannot be ſhaken, without endangering the whole. Wherever freedom of inquiry is permitted, the abſurdity of ſome of thoſe opinions, and the uncertainty of others, are ſoon expoſed and derided. The natural conſequence is a general diſtruſt of the whole. The very habit of frequent reaſoning upon religious topics diminiſhes that reverence with which they ſhould always be treated. This is particularly the caſe, when men preſume to make too curious ſcrutinies into the views or deſigns of Providence in the adminiſtration of the world, why the Supreme Being made it as it is, the freedom of his actions, and ſimilar queſtions, which are infinitely above our comprehenſion. But the moſt

hurtful

hurtful effect of this ſpeculative theology has been to withdraw the attention of mankind from its practical and moſt eſſential duties. It conſiſts with daily experience, that thoſe who are diſtinguiſhed by an overzealous attachment to particular tenets in religion, diſcover great coolneſs and indifference with regard to its moral precepts, which ought to be the principal end of all religion.

Beſides, ſpeculative and controverſial theology injure both the temper and the affections. When the mind is perpetually embarraſſed, and can find no firm foundation to reſt upon, the temper becomes gloomy and ſevere, from the chagrin ariſing from diſappointment, as well as from the kind and ſocial affections being blunted, or perhaps extinguiſhed for want of exerciſe. If this evil be exaſperated by oppoſition and diſpute, the conſequences often deſtroy the peace of ſociety; eſpecially when men fancy, that their eſpouſing certain opinions entitles them to the divine favour; and that all thoſe who differ from them are devoted

to eternal damnation. A perſuaſion of this deſtructive nature diſſolves at once all the bonds of ſociety. Tolerating men, whom we conceive to entertain erroneous opinions in religion, are regarded as conniving at their deſtroying, not themſelves only, but all thoſe over whom they happen to have influence. Such infamous and diabolical doctrines give riſe to that cruel ſpirit, which has often diſhonoured humanity, and diſgraced religion. The effects of religious controverſy, however, have ſometimes, though very rarely, been of uſe to mankind. That ſpirit of free inquiry, which, in many nations of Europe, incited what are called moſt juſtly the *Reformers* to break the yoke of eccleſiaſtical tyranny, created proper ideas of civil liberty. Such ſentiments united with that bold enthuſiaſm, and ſeverity of manners by which ſome of the reformed ſects were animated, produced thoſe reſolute men, who alone were capable of maintaining the cauſe of liberty, at a period when the Chriſtian part of the world was enervated both by ſuperſtition and luxury. To thoſe men

we

we are indebted for that liberty we now enjoy.

Dr Gregory *next* conſiders religion as a rule of life and manners. In this reſpect, its influence is both extenſive and beneficial; becauſe, even in its worſt forms, it has an evident tendency to moderate thoſe paſſions which reaſon alone is too weak to conquer. But it is to be regretted, that the application of religion to this beneficial purpoſe has not been attended to with that care which the importance of the ſubject required. The ſpeculative parts of religion have chiefly occupied the minds of ingenious men. All the uſeful and practical arts of life have undergone a ſimilar fate. Philoſophers have a natural averſion againſt every application which does not immediately occupy the active powers of their own minds; for, in acquiring a practical art, a philoſopher muſt ſpend moſt part of his time in employments which afford immediate employment to the active powers of his mind.

Vice

Vice has not ſo much dependence on a perverſion of the underſtanding, as on the effects of the imagination and the paſſions. Vicious men are ſufficiently ſenſible that their conduct is wrong. They know that vice is contrary both to their duty and their intereſt. Hence, it is fruitleſs to employ any proceſs of reaſoning to convince them of theſe truths; becauſe the diſeaſe is not ſeated in the underſtanding, but in the heart. Vice is ſupported by the imagination and the paſſions, and to theſe alone the remedy ſhould be applied. This has been the almoſt univerſal defect of ſermons and other writings which were intended to reform mankind. Ingenious and ſenſible remarks have repeatedly been made on the different duties of religion, and they have been enforced by judicious and ſolid arguments. Performances of this kind may convey pleaſure as well as inſtruction to pious and well diſpoſed people. Even the vicious, when they peruſe books of this deſcription, acknowledge that they contain great and important truths; but the impreſſions they make ſoon vaniſh. Pathetic addreſſes

dreſſes and repreſentations to the imagination and paſſions are the only ſucceſsful modes of making men perceive the deformities of their own characters. In addreſſes to a numerous audience, the great end of reforming mankind is moſt effectually promoted by the union of voice, action, and the other arts of eloquence. Some of thoſe arts, however, are not to be attained by any ſtrength of genius or underſtanding; becauſe they depend upon peculiar gifts of nature; and even theſe gifts muſt be highly cultivated by ſtudy and practice before the proper exerciſe of them can be acquired. It is the buſineſs of art to repreſent Nature in her moſt graceful and amiable forms, unattended with thoſe peculiarities which ſhe exhibits in particular inſtances. It is this difficulty of repreſenting Nature properly, which renders the eloquence of the pulpit, the ſtage, and the bar, accompliſhments ſo uncommon.

Beſide the talents of the preacher himſelf, an intimate acquaintance with Nature will ſuggeſt the neceſſity of paying attention

tion to ſome external circumſtances, which operate ſtrongly in the mind, and prepare it for receiving the impreſſions deſigned to be made; ſuch is the proper regulation of church-muſic, and the ſolemnity of public worſhip. Independently of the effects which circumſtances of this kind have upon the imagination, a juſt taſte, and a ſenſe of propriety and decorum, ſhould recommend them to our attention. They have, indeed, been abuſed, and have given riſe to the moſt groſs ſuperſtition. But this propenſity to carry them to exceſs, is the ſtrongeſt proof that our attachment to them is natural; and, therefore, inſtead of extinguiſhing them, they ought, under proper regulations, to be encouraged. Without any of theſe external ſupports, many of theſe religious ſects have ſupported themſelves for ſome time. But, after the fervour of their firſt zeal has abated, their public worſhip has uniformly been conducted with a remarkable coldneſs and inſipidity. It conſiſts with experience, that thoſe ſects who have diſtinguiſhed themſelves by a religious enthuſiaſm, who deſpiſed all forms, have either

either been of ſhort duration, or terminated in ſcepticiſm. The difficulties which render the art of making religion influence the manners of mankind, by commanding the imagination and paſſions, have made it too generally neglected by clergymen of great learning and good ſenſe. They have rather choſen to follow a tract in which they were ſure to excel by the ſtrength of their own genius, than to attempt a doubtful path where inferior men might outſhine them. Hence religious tenets and principles have chiefly been enforced by men poſſeſſed of lively imaginations and of ſome natural advantages derived from voice and manner. As no art, however, can be extenſively uſeful to mankind, unleſs it be conducted by good ſenſe and genius, it has too frequently happened, that the art of preaching has produced the moſt abſurd fanaticiſm.

In his *third* view of religion, Dr Gregory conſiders it as intereſting the affections, and, of courſe, comprehends its devotional or ſentimental part. The ſpirit of devotion is,

is, in a great meaſure, conſtitutional; for it depends upon a vivacious imagination and a ſenſibility of heart. Accordingly, in warm climates, devotion is moſt prevalent, and riſes to a greater height. Its great dependence on the imagination is obvious from the remarkable attachment it has to poetry and muſic. Muſic conſtitutes a principal part of the paradiſe of every ſect of religion and of every country. The Deity may be ſaid, with much propriety, to dwell in light inacceſſible, when viewed by the cool eye of reaſon. The mind ſtruck with the immenſity of his being, and a ſenſe of its own littleneſs and unworthineſs, admires with that diſtant awe and veneration that rather excludes love. But, when viewed by a warm and devout imagination, he may become an object of great affection. A philoſopher contemplates the Deity in the wiſdom and benignity diſplayed in the works of Nature. A devout man confines his views chiefly to his own connection with the Deity, to many inſtances of his goodneſs he himſelf has already experienced, and the many greater he expects to receive in futurity. The devotional taſte is too often condemned as

a

a weakneſs by thoſe who are ſtrangers to its joys. It muſt be allowed, that too frequent opportunities have been given to turn this ſubject into juſt ridicule. A ſtrongly devout imagination, when not directed by a ſound underſtanding, is apt to run wild, and is often eager to publiſh its extravagances. Devotional writings, however, when executed with judgement and taſte, are highly uſeful and engaging.

A devotional ſpirit, when united to good ſenſe and a chearful temper, gives a peculiar ſupport and ſteadineſs to virtue. It creates a gentleneſs and ſenſibility in the heart, and a mildneſs in the manners; and, what is of ſtill greater importance, it excites an univerſal love to mankind. There is a ſublime and tender melancholy which almoſt univerſally accompanies genius; but it is too apt to degenerate into a gloomy diſpoſition, and not unfrequently into a diſguſt with the world. To ſooth this diſpoſition, by leading the mind to thoſe proſpects of Nature and providence which calm every diſcontented emotion, and diffuſe a

chearfulneſs over many of the dark hours of life, devotion is moſt admirably calculated.

I cannot conclude this analyſis of Dr Gregory's *Comparative View of the State and Faculties of Man with thoſe of the Animal World*, without remarking, that, after peruſing the book, every intelligent reader muſt perceive the little connection between the title and the work itſelf. The idea was ingenious; but it is by no means elucidated, or even followed. An accurate inveſtigation of the mental faculties and diſpoſitions of the inferior animals compared and occaſionally contraſted with thoſe of man, is a great and a fertile ſubject; and it is to be regretted that Dr Gregory did not execute his ſeemingly intended plan; for his genius and abilities would certainly have enabled him to accompliſh a taſk, which would infallibly have both pleaſed and informed the public. He, indeed, makes a few curſory and general remarks on the condition of brute animals. But man is his principal object;

object; and he has considered him in many interesting points of view.

I shall now proceed with the history of this conspicuous and amiable character.

Dr Gregory remained in Aberdeen till the end of the year 1764, when he changed his place of residence, and went to Edinburgh; and, in the year 1766, he was appointed Professor of the Practice of Physic in that University, upon the resignation of the late learned and ingenious Dr Rutherford. Here Dr Gregory continued to lecture to geat numbers of pupils during the years 1767, 1768, and 1769. By agreement with the late Dr Cullen, Professor of the Theory of Medicine, these two eminent men gave alternate courses of the Theory and of the Practice of Physic. As a public speaker, Dr Gregory's manner was simple and animated; and he expressed his ideas with uncommon perspicuity. By the assistance

aſſiſtance of a few notes, he lectured with great facility and elegance. The only lectures which he fully extended in writing were thoſe he read as introductory to his annual courſe. Theſe he publiſhed in the year 1770, under the title of *Lectures on the Duties and Qualifications of a Phyſician.*

Dr Gregory, in this work, has two objects chiefly in view. I. He points out thoſe accompliſhments which qualify a Phyſician for performing the practical duties of his profeſſion. II. He gives rules of inquiry which he thought neceſſary to be obſerved in the ſtudy of Medicine as a branch of natural knowledge. His remarks on the former of theſe ſubjects, and particularly on the delicate attentions neceſſary to thoſe whoſe minds are debilitated by diſeaſe, are reſults of the author's acquaintance with human nature, as well as of that benignity of temper by which all his writings are diſtinguiſhed. Neither does his character appear in a leſs advantageous light from his liberal remarks on the *lucrative* part of his profeſſion. On this topic he expreſſes himſelf

ſelf with conſiderable animation againſt the unworthy artifices and ſervile manners by which it has too often been degraded. In the three firſt lectures, Dr Gregory's remarks on theſe, and other topics highly intereſting to practical Phyſicians, fully juſtify his general inference, "That the profeſſion of Medicine requires a more comprehenſive mind than any other." This will appear to be an unqueſtionable truth to every perſon who conſiders the great variety of ſpeculative knowledge, and of literary accompliſhments which are neceſſarily to be acquired in a medical education; beſide the ſagacity, the addreſs, and the knowledge of mankind, which ought to regulate the Phyſician in the practical part of his art. To all thoſe who knew Dr Gregory, it muſt have been apparent, that the talents and accompliſhments which he deſcribed to his pupils as the gifts of Nature conjoined with education, were actually united in his own perſon.

The three laſt lectures are principally confined to medicine as a branch of natural knowledge.

knowledge. They exhibit more fully than any of our author's other works the extent of his philoſophical views, and from them we have the greateſt reaſon to lament the loſs which the ſcience of medicine ſuſtained by his death. No intelligent reader can poſſibly peruſe them without regretting that his ingenious and benevolent exertions for the improvement of the medical art were ſo early interrupted. Lord Verulam, in his *Novum Organum*, has given many excellent rules with regard, chiefly, to the method of *philoſophiſing*. Though he confines his views principally to Phyſic and Chemiſtry, yet his remarks upon the art of Medicine merit attention. Though no phyſician, Dr Gregory remarks, Lord Verulam poſſeſſed "as juſt and comprehenſive views in medicine as any phyſician who ever wrote."

In the year 1772, Dr Gregory publiſhed *Elements of the Practice of Phyſic, for the uſe of Students*. This work was ſolely intended for his own pupils; and, in his lectures, he commented upon it as a textbook. His deſign was to treat of all the diſeaſes

diſeaſes comprehended in his lectures. But this he did not accompliſh. The book, accordingly, contains only the claſs of Febrile Diſeaſes. In his introductory lectures formerly mentioned, Dr Gregory had delivered his ſentiments with regard to the proper mode of conducting medical inquiries in the preſent imperfect ſtate of that ſcience. He never attempted to miſlead the ſtudents by flattering views of the perfection of the medical art. On the contrary, he anxiouſly pointed out its defects, which he conſidered as a principal ſtep to promote its improvement. He expoſed the futility of thoſe theories and hypotheſes which had been moſt generally received, and inculcated the danger of fabricating ſyſtems upon a limited and often very imperfect knowledge of genuine facts. He conſidered that a rational theory of medicine had never yet been deviſed. For this reaſon, he communicated to his ſtudents the greateſt portion of practical facts, as the only baſis on which ſuch a theory could ever be eſtabliſhed.

When treating of the ſeveral diſeaſes,

Dr

Dr Gregory firſt deſcribed thoſe ſymptoms by which particular maladies are characteriſed. From the general, he proceeded to the more particular ſeries of ſymptoms, together with their occaſional varieties. With great preciſion, he points out the *diagnoſtic* ſymptoms, or thoſe which diſtinguiſh one diſeaſe from others that reſemble it, and marks the prognoſtics which enable a phyſician to form probable conjectures concerning the event of a diſeaſe. He next ſpecified the cauſes of diſeaſes, namely, the prediſpoſing, the occaſional, and the proximate. Finally, he taught the general plan of cure, the proper remedies to be employed, and the cautions requiſite in adminiſtering them. Deſirous of eſtabliſhing the ſcience of medicine upon the ſolid foundation of practice and experience, he uniformly endeavoured, both by his precepts and example, to impreſs on the minds of his pupils the neceſſity of great caution either in admitting or rejecting what are commonly, though often extremely doubtful, called *medical facts* or *caſes*.

Soon

Soon after the death of his wife, and, as he tells us himſelf, for the amuſement of his leiſure-hours, he compoſed that ingenious and amiable little work, entitled, *A Father's Legacy to his Daughters*, which was publiſhed after the death of the author. From this treatiſe it is apparent, that Dr Gregory had peruſed *Rouſſeau's* ſyſtem of education; for from that work he has adopted whatever appeared to him to be valuable. But, in the character of *Sophia*, and in the plan of her education, he perceived both imperfections and abſurdities. The buſineſs of the French philoſopher was to paint imaginary or romantic characters. But the only aim of our author was to deliver to his daughters, in the language of prudence and parental affection, ſuch precepts as he thought would be moſt conducive to their honour and happineſs, and to mark thoſe virtues and accompliſhments which would make them both amiable and reſpectable to the worthieſt part of the other ſex. To him religion appeared to be of eſſential ſervice to females as a great ſupport in perſonal diſtreſs, as a conſolation under family miſ-

fortunes, and a ſalutary reſtraint againſt extravagance and diſſipation. With regard to books written upon religious ſubjects, he judiciouſly recommends thoſe only which are addreſſed to the heart, and which have a tendency to inſpire devout affections; and he cautions the female mind againſt the bigotry of ſyſtem and the hurtful wranglings of controverſy. He conſiders the external forms of religion as of a nature ſo ſubordinate, when compared to its eſſential principles, that, when the latter agree, he regarded all choice in the former as a matter of perfect indifference. He himſelf preferred the forms of the church of Scotland; but, to his daughters, he recommended the worſhip of the church of England, to which their mother was attached.

The *Graces*, in *Lord Cheſterfield's* plan of education, are made ſuperior to every virtue, and indeed to every good talent that can adorn human nature. To theſe Dr Gregory gives their proper importance in female accompliſhments; but he conſiders them as ſubordinate to moral excel-

lence.

lence. He recommends delicacy of ſentiment as the parent of delicacy of manner, and a feeling heart as the genuine ſource of true politeneſs.

After making ſome other pertinent remarks on the important topic of Religion, Dr Gregory proceeds to adviſe his daughters with regard to their *Conduct and Behaviour*. In his eſtimation, "one of the chief beauties in a female character is that modeſt reſerve, that retiring delicacy, which avoids the public eye, and is diſconcerted even at the gaze of admiration.—I would not wiſh you to be inſenſible to applauſe. If you were, you muſt become, if not worſe, at leaſt leſs amiable women." When young women ceaſe to bluſh, they have loſt the moſt powerful charm of beauty. The extreme ſenſibility indicated by bluſhing may be a weakneſs when exhibited by men; but, in the female ſex, it is highly engaging. Bluſhing is ſo far from being a neceſſary attendant on guilt, that it is uſually the companion of innocence. Modeſty naturally diſpoſes young women to be rather ſilent in large

large companies. But people of ſenſe never miſtake this ſilence for dulneſs or ignorance. A perſon may take a ſhare in converſation without uttering one word, as may eaſily be perceived by the expreſſions diſplayed in the countenance.

Females cannot be poſſeſſed of a more dangerous talent than Wit. It ſhould be managed with great diſcretion, otherwiſe it creates many enemies. Wit is perfectly conſiſtent with ſoftneſs and delicacy, but they are ſeldom united. Wit flatters vanity to ſuch a degree, that the poſſeſſors often become intoxicated, and loſe the command of themſelves. Humour is of a different nature. The company of humouriſts is much courted; but it ſhould be cautiouſly indulged. Humour is often a great enemy to delicacy, and a ſtill greater one to dignity of character. It may ſometimes procure applauſe, but never reſpect. "Be even cautious," ſays Dr Gregory, "in diſplaying your good ſenſe. It will be thought you aſſume a ſuperiority over the reſt of the company. But, if you happen to have any learning,

learning, keep it a profound ſecret, eſpecially from the men, who generally look with a jealous and malignant eye on a woman of great parts and a cultivated underſtanding." Men of genius and candour are ſuperior to ſuch weak and even mean ideas. But ſuch characters are ſeldom to be met with. If by accident men of this deſcription ſhould come into your company, ſhow no anxiety to unfold the full extent of your knowledge. They will ſoon diſcover it themſelves; and, if you poſſeſs any advantages of perſon or manner, they will not fail to give you ample credit. The great art of pleaſing in converſation is to make the company pleaſed with themſelves.

The Doctor next cautions them to beware of calumny and detraction. Women are generally accuſed of being addicted to this vice, though perhaps unjuſtly. He recommends particular attention not to injure the characters of other women, eſpecially if they are thought to be rivals. He deſires them to conſider every ſpecies of indelicacy in converſation as not only ſhame-

ful

ful in itſelf, but highly diſguſting to the men. Virgin purity is of ſo delicate a nature, that any looſe converſation cannot be heard without a certain degree of contamination. No man but a fool will inſult a woman with converſation which he perceives is diſagreeable to her, nor will he dare to proceed, if ſhe reſents the injury with proper ſpirit. There is a dignity in conſcious virtue, which repels the moſt ſhameleſs and abandoned of men. The notion, that a woman may allow all innocent freedom, provided her virtue is retained, is both groſsly indelicate and dangerous, and, to many, has been completely fatal.

The Doctor concludes this ſection with the following judicious remarks: "You may perhaps think, that I want to throw every ſpark of nature out of your compoſition, and to make you entirely artificial. Far from it. I wiſh you to poſſeſs the moſt perfect ſimplicity of heart and manners. I think you may poſſeſs dignity without pride,

pride, affability without meanneſs, and ſimple elegance without affectation."

Dr Gregory, in this little work, next treats of *Amuſements*. He properly remarks, that every period of life has amuſements peculiar to itſelf. Some of thoſe highly promote health, as various kinds of exerciſe; others are connected with more diffuſive uſefulneſs, as different kinds of women's work, and the domeſtic cares of a family: Some are elegant accompliſhments, as dreſs, dancing, muſic, and drawing. Such books as tend to improve the underſtanding, and to cultivate the heart, may be regarded in a higher point of view than as mere amuſements. But the Doctor confeſſes that he is at a loſs to mention what particular books he ſhould recommend to the peruſal of his daughters. He mentions the utility of reading hiſtory, or the cultivating any art or ſcience to which their genius or inclination may lead them. He recommends to them the ſtudy of Nature, as affording an infinite variety of uſeful and agreeable entertainment.

In

In females, an attention to dreſs is an important article. The love of ornament and dreſs is natural, and therefore proper and rational. The expence of dreſs ſhould be uniformly regulated by extent of fortune, and other circumſtances. The charms of a fine woman are exhibited to the greateſt advantage when ſhe apparently conceals them. The moſt perfect elegance of dreſs has always the appearance of being the moſt natural. But women ſhould not confine their dreſs to public exhibitions. They ought to accuſtom themſelves to an habitual neatneſs, that in their moſt careleſs undreſs, in their moſt unguarded hours, they may have no reaſon to be aſhamed of their appearance. Women ſeldom think, that men regard their dreſs as expreſſive of their taſte and characters. In dreſs, vanity, levity, ſlovenlineſs, and folly, conſpicuouſly appear. An elegant ſimplicity indicates both taſte and delicacy of ſentiment.

"In *dancing*," Dr Gregory remarks, "the principal points you are to attend to are eaſe and grace. I would have you to dance

dance with ſpirit; but never allow yourſelves to be ſo far tranſported with mirth, as to forget the delicacy of your ſex. Many a girl, dancing in the gaiety and innocence of her heart, is thought to diſcover a ſpirit ſhe little dreams of."

With regard to the *theatre*, Dr Gregory conſiders it as affording great pleaſure to every perſon of ſentiment or humour. But he regrets, that few Engliſh comedies can be repreſented before ladies without ſhocking their delicacy. On ſuch occaſions, men make very unfavourable remarks on the behaviour of the ladies. Virtuous girls often hear indelicate expreſſions and alluſions with unembarraſſed countenances, becauſe, in fact, they ſeldom underſtand the meaning intended to be conveyed. A girl often laughs, with all the ſimplicity of innocence, merely becauſe ſhe is infected by the laughing of other people.

It is unneceſſary, in Dr Gregory's eſtimation, to ſay much about *gaming*; becauſe

it is not a prevalent practice among the ladies of this country. It is both a ruinous and an incurable vice; and, as it cheriſhes all the ſelfiſh and turbulent paſſions, is peculiarly odious in the female ſex. In this, and in all important points of conduct, women ought to ſhow a determined ſteadineſs and reſolution, which are by no means inconſiſtent with an amiable gentleneſs of character. On the contrary, they give that ſpirit to a mild and ſweet diſpoſition, without which it is in danger of degenerating into inſipidity.

After diſcuſſing the ſubject of Amuſements, Dr Gregory treats of *Friendſhip*, *Love*, and *Marriage*. He obſerves, that the luxury and diſſipation which prevail in genteel life corrupt the heart in many ways; and they, in a peculiar manner, render it almoſt incapable of a warm and ſteady friendſhip. A proper choice of friends is of the higheſt conſequence; as their advice and aſſiſtance are frequently neceſſary. Even the mere gratification of friendſhip affords the greateſt pleaſure to an ingenuous mind.

mind. In the choice of friends, a principal regard ſhould be had to fidelity and goodneſs of heart. If they are, at the ſame time, endued with taſte and genius, theſe will render them ſtill more uſeful and agreeable companions. After the acquiſition of friends, they ſhould unboſom themſelves to each other with the moſt unbounded confidence. An open temper, when reſtrained by moderate prudence, makes mankind happier than a cold and ſuſpicious reſervedneſs. But, however open young women may be when they talk of their own affairs, they ſhould never diſcloſe the ſecrets of one friend to another, eſpecially where love is concerned. To a female friend, the heart may be opened; but her honour and ſecrecy ought to be ſuch as may be implicitly relied on. Let her not be a married woman, particularly if ſhe and her huſband live happily together: For, there are certain unguarded moments, in which a woman in that ſituation, though one of the worthieſt of her ſex, may unfold ſecrets to her huſband, which ſhe would by no means do to any other perſon; nor will a huſband feel himſelf

ſelf under the ſame obligation to keep a ſecret of this kind with which he was not originally entruſted. "If your brothers," Dr Gregory remarks, "ſhould have the good fortune to have hearts ſuſceptible of friendſhip, to poſſeſs truth, honour, ſenſe, and delicacy of ſentiment, they are the fitteſt and moſt unexceptionable confidants. By placing confidence in them, you will receive every advantage which you could hope for from the friendſhip of men, without any of the inconveniencies that attend ſuch connections with our ſex."

Dr Gregory recommends to his daughters never to make confidants of their ſervants. Dignity, when not properly underſtood, readily degenerates into pride, which admits of no friendſhip, becauſe it ſuffers no equal, and is ſo intoxicated with flattery, as willingly to receive it even from ſervants and dependents. Hence the moſt intimate confidants of the proud are valets and waiting women. He adviſes his daughters to ſhow the utmoſt humanity to ſervants, and make their ſituation as comfortable

table as poſſible, but never to make them confidants; for ſuch a conduct both debaſes the miſtreſs and ſpoils the ſervants. The temper and diſpoſitions of females make them more readily and warmly contract friendſhips than men. Their natural propenſity to it is ſo ſtrong, that they often form raſh intimacies, of which they have ſoon reaſon to repent; and this is one reaſon why their friendſhips are ſo ſhort and fluctuating. To this may be added the great claſhing of their intereſts in the purſuits of love, ambition, or vanity. There is a weakneſs which is peculiarly apparent in vain women, and ought to be carefully avoided: They conceive every man to be a lover who takes particular notice of them, though, perhaps, ſuch an idea never entered his brain. Among women, it is a prudent maxim, That ſymptoms of love ſhould not be firſt exhibited by them, but ought to be the conſequence of men's previous and evident attachment.

Nature has not beſtowed on women ſuch an unlimited choice as men enjoy. But, ſhe

ſhe has wiſely aſſigned to them a greater flexibility of taſte in this moſt important buſineſs. A man of taſte and of delicacy, marries a woman becauſe he loves her. A woman of equal taſte and delicacy receives his addreſſes becauſe ſhe eſteems him, and becauſe he gives her that preference to others. If a man be ſo unfortunate as to become enamoured of a woman whoſe heart is pre-engaged, his attachment, inſtead of meeting with a favourable return, is perfectly offenſive; and, if he perſiſts, he renders himſelf both the object of her ſcorn and averſion.

Among men, the effects of love are greatly diverſified by their different tempers. An artful man may counterfeit every one of them, and eaſily deceive a young woman of an open and feeling heart, unleſs ſhe be extremely cautious. In ſuch girls, the fineſt parts are not always ſufficient for their ſecurity. The dark and crooked paths of cunning are inſcrutable, and not to be conceived by an honourable mind. Among men, the moſt genuine effects of real affection

tion to women are very difficult to be counterfeited. Men of delicacy often diſcover their paſſion by too great anxiety to conceal it, eſpecially when their hopes of ſucceſs are not great. Real love renders a man not only reſpectful, but even timid, in his behaviour to the woman whom he adores. To conceal his awe, he may ſometimes affect pleaſantry, but he ſoon relapſes into his former ſerioufneſs. His imagination magnifies all her genuine qualities; and he is either blind to her imperfections, or regards them as beauties. Like perſons who are conſcious of guilt, he thinks that every eye obſerves the ſituation of his mind. To avoid this diſagreeable feeling, he ſhuns all the little attentions of common gallantry. His attachment will improve both his heart and his character. His manners will be rendered more gentle, and his converſation more agreeable. But, in the company of his miſtreſs, diffidence and embarraſſment will give him always a diſadvantageous appearance.

In the ſame ſenſible ſtrain, the Doctor adviſes his daughters, when the marks of affection above deſcribed are apparent, and the gentleman's attachment is agreeable, to follow nature, good ſenſe, and delicacy. If the love be reciprocal, never diſcover the full extent of your regard. Marriage ſufficiently marks your preference. A woman may juſtifiably play the coquet, when a man purpoſely declines to make his addreſſes till he thinks he has inſured her conſent. A moſt deſpicable vanity is the only motive of ſuch a conduct. It is of great importance to diſtinguiſh whether a gentleman delays to diſcover his intention explicitly from the motive juſt mentioned, or from a diffidence created by a real attachment. In the one caſe, he deſerves to be treated with contempt; in the other, he ſhould be uſed with tenderneſs, and, as ſoon as poſſible, be informed that his addreſſes cannot be favourably received. Women of ſuperior taſte and ſenſe ſometimes employ the moſt artful coquetry to engage the affections of a man whom both themſelves and the world eſteem, though they are determined never

to

to marry him. But they are amuſed by his converſation, and his attachment is a high gratification to their vanity. A woman of ſenſe has it always in her power, if ſhe cannot give him her affections, to convert a diſappointed lover into a ſteady friend. If ſhe explains herſelf to him with a generous freedom, he muſt feel the ſtroke as a man; but he will alſo bear it as a man.

Male coquetry, though rare in this country, is more inexcuſable, as well as more pernicious than female. Few men take the trouble of gaining a woman's affections, unleſs they have views either of an honourable or diſhonourable nature. That ambiguity of behaviour, which keeps people in ſuſpenſe, is the great ſecret of coquetry in both males and females.

From motives of propriety, Dr Gregory declines pointing out to his daughters what particular perſons he would have them to marry; but, with great confidence and affection, deſcribes characters which they

ought not to marry. He adviſes them to avoid a companion who may entail any hereditary diſeaſe on their poſterity, and particularly madneſs, that moſt horrible of all human calamities. Neither marry a fool; for he is the moſt untractable of all animals. He is entirely governed by caprice and paſſion, and is incapable of liſtening to the voice of reaſon. But, the worſt circumſtance attending a fool is his perpetual jealouſy, leſt his wife ſhould be thought to govern him; and he is conſtantly doing abſurd and diſagreeable things, merely to ſhew that he dares do them. Never marry a rake: He is always a ſuſpicious huſband; becauſe he has aſſociated with the moſt worthleſs women only. He likewiſe often entails on his wife and children the worſt of diſeaſes.

Dr Gregory likewiſe adviſes his daughters, if they have a ſenſe of religion themſelves, not to think of huſbands who have none. If they happen to be weak men, they will continually teaze and vex you about your religious principles. If you have

have children, you will ſuffer the greateſt diſtreſs, by ſeeing all your endeavours to form their minds to virtue and piety, all your efforts to ſecure their preſent and future happineſs, abortive and turned into ridicule.

The Doctor concludes this ſmall but valuable tract in the following manner: "I have thus given you my opinion on ſome of the moſt important articles of your future life, chiefly calculated for that period when you are juſt entering the world. I have endeavoured to avoid ſome peculiarities of opinion, which, from their contradiction to the general practice of the world, I might reaſonably have ſuſpected were not ſo well founded. But, in writing to you, I am afraid my heart has been too full, and too warmly intereſted, to allow me to keep this reſolution. This may have produced ſome embarraſſment, and ſome ſeeming contradictions. What I have written has been the amuſement of ſome ſolitary hours, and has ſerved to divert ſome melancholy reflections.—I am conſcious I undertook a

taſk

taſk to which I was very unequal; but I have diſcharged a part of my duty.—You will at leaſt be pleaſed with it, as the laſt mark of your father's love and attention."

Good ſenſe was the moſt conſpicuous feature in the mind of Dr Gregory; but, what is by no means always the caſe, it was united with genius and acuteneſs of intellect. From his 18th year, he had been occaſionally afflicted with the gout, which he inherited from his mother, who, in the year 1770, died ſuddenly, when ſitting at table. Dr Gregory went to bed on the 9th of February 1773, apparently in good health; but was found dead next morning.

In his perſon, the Doctor was above the ordinary ſize. His limbs were not very active; he ſtooped a little in his gait; and his countenance, from a fullneſs of feature and a heavineſs of eye, exhibited no marks of ſuperior powers of mind. But, in converſation, his features became animated, and his eye expreſſive. He had a warmth of tone and of geſture, which were highly intereſting.

intereſting. United with this animated manner, he diſcovered a mildneſs and ſimplicity, which were more attractive than the moſt artificial addreſs. In the company of literary men, his converſation flowed with eaſe; and, on whatever ſubject, he delivered his ſentiments without affectation or reſerve. His benevolent affections were ſtrong, and, in the line of his profeſſion, they were moſt peculiarly exerted.

With regard to his pupils, he confined not himſelf to a faithful diſcharge of his profeſſional duties. Many of theſe were far removed from all thoſe who had a natural intereſt in their happineſs. To young men ſo ſituated, it was a great conſolation to find a friend who was of eaſy acceſs, and always ready to aſſiſt them with his advice and protection. To his intimate friends, by whom he was highly beloved, his ſpirit of philanthropy peculiarly endeared him.

In the latter period of his life, when he reſided in Edinburgh, he lived in habits of great intimacy with moſt of the Scottiſh Literati;

Literati; ſuch as, Doctors Robertſon and Blair, David Hume, John Home, Lord Monboddo, Lord Kames, and the elder Mr Tytler. He left three ſons,—James Gregory now Profeſſor of the Theory of Medicine, the reſpectable and ingenious ſucceſſor of his father; William Gregory, M. A. of Baliol College, Oxford, Rector of St Mary Breadman, and one of the Six Preachers in the Cathedral Church of Canterbury; John, who died in the year 1783: And two daughters,—Dorothea, wife of the Rev. Mr Archibald Aliſon of Baliol College, and Anne-Margaret, married to John Forbes, Eſq; of Blackford, in the county of Aberdeen.

Upon the whole, whether he is conſidered as a man of genius and of the world, or with regard to his conduct in the line of his profeſſion, few human characters will be found to equal that of the late Dr JOHN GREGORY.

THE

THE

LIFE

OF

HENRY HOME, LORD KAMES.*

MR HOME never mentioned the time of his birth; but, from many circumſtances known to his relations and friends, it appears that he was born in the courſe of the year 1696. He was deſcended of a very honourable and antient family. Lord Kames's grandfather, Henry Home, was a younger ſon of Sir John Home of Renton, who held the high office of Lord Juſtice Clerk, or chief criminal judge of Scotland, in the year 1663. Mr Home received the eſtate of Kames from his uncle, George, brother

* The AUTHOR intended to have made this Life much more complete, by introducing many private and intereſting anecdotes, but his death prevented him from executing his intention.—It was originally written for the Dictionary of *Arts and Sciences* of Edinburgh.

brother to the then Lord Juſtice Clerk. The family of Renton is deſcended from that of the Earls of Home. The county of Berwick in Scotland has the honour of having given birth to this great and uſeful member of ſociety. In early youth he was lively, and eager in the acquiſition of knowledge. He never attended a public ſchool; but was inſtructed in the antient and modern languages, as well as in ſeveral branches of mathematics, and the arts neceſſarily connected with that ſcience, by Mr Wingate, a man of conſiderable parts and learning, who ſpent many years as preceptor or private tutor to Mr Home.

After ſtudying, with acuteneſs and diligence at the Univerſity of Edinburgh, the civil law, and the municipal law of his own country, Mr Home early perceived that a knowledge of theſe alone was not ſufficient to make an accompliſhed lawyer. The forms and practical buſineſs of courts, and eſpecially of the ſupreme court, as a member of which he was to ſeek for fame and emolument, he conſidered as eſſentially neceſſary

ceſſary to qualify him to be a complete barriſter. He accordingly attended, for ſome time, the chamber of a Writer to the Signet, where he had an opportunity of learning the ſtyles of legal deeds, and the modes of conducting different ſpecies of buſineſs. This wiſe ſtep, independently of his great genius and unwearied application, procured him, after his admiſſion to the bar, peculiar reſpect from the court, and proportional employment in his profeſſion of an advocate. Whoever peruſes the law-papers compoſed by Mr Home, when a young man, will perceive an uncommon elegance of ſtyle, beſides great ingenuity of reaſoning, and a thorough knowledge of the law and conſtitution of his country. Theſe qualifications, together with the ſtrength and vivacity of his natural abilities, ſoon raiſed him to be an ornament to the Scottiſh bar; and, on the ſecond day of February 1752, he was advanced to the bench as one of the judges of the Court of Seſſion, under the title of *Lord Kames*; and as a Lord of Juſticiary on the 15th April 1763.

Before this period, however, notwith-

ſtanding the unavoidable labours of his profeſſion, he favoured the world with ſeveral valuable and ingenious works. In the year 1728, Mr Home publiſhed *Remarkable Deciſions of the Court of Seſſion from* 1716 *to* 1728, in one volume folio.

In 1732 appeared *Eſſays upon Several Subjects in Law, viz. Jus tertii; Beneficium cedendarum actionum; Vinco Vincentem; and Preſcription*, in one volume 8vo. This firſt produce of his original genius, and of his extenſive views, excited not only the attention, but the admiration of the judges, and of all the other members of the College of Juſtice.

This work was ſucceeded, in the year 1741, by *Deciſions of the Court of Seſſion from its firſt inſtitution to the year* 1740, *abridged and digeſted under proper heads, in form of a Dictionary*, in two volumes folio. Upon the ſame plan, at the inſtigation of Lord Kames himſelf, who was then far advanced in years, a third volume was added to the *Dictionary of Deciſions* by the ingenious Alexander Fraſer Tytler, Eſq; Advocate,

Profeſſor

Profeſſor of Civil Hiſtory in the Univerſity of Edinburgh. This laborious work is of the greateſt utility to every practical lawyer.

In 1747 appeared *Eſſays upon Several Subjects concerning Britiſh Antiquities, viz. I. Introduction of the Feudal Law into Scotland. II. Conſtitution of Parliament. III. Honour, Dignity. IV. Succeſſion or Deſcent; with an Appendix upon hereditary and indefeaſible Right, compoſed anno* 1745, and publiſhed, 1747, in one volume 8vo. In a preface to this work, Lord Kames informs us, that, in the years 1745 and 1746, when the nation was in great ſuſpenſe and diſtraction, he retired to the country; and, in order to baniſh, as much as poſſible, the uneaſineſs of his mind, he contrived the plan, and executed this ingenious performance. Though not in the order of time, we ſhall continue the liſt of all our author's writings on law, before we proceed to his productions on other ſubjects.

In 1757, Lord Kames publiſhed *The Statute Law of Scotland abridged, with Hiſtorical*

torical Notes, in one volume 8vo, a moſt uſeful and laborious work.

In the year 1759, our author preſented to the public a new work under the title of *Hiſtorical Law Tracts*, in one volume 8vo. It contains fourteen intereſting tracts, viz. *Hiſtory of the Criminal Law.—Hiſtory of Promiſes and Covenants.—Hiſtory of Property.—Hiſtory of Securities upon Land for Payment of debt.—Hiſtory of the Privilege which an Heir Apparent in a Feudal Holding has to continue the Poſſeſſion of his Anceſtor.—Hiſtory of Regalities, and of the Privilege of Repledging.—Hiſtory of Courts.—Hiſtory of Brieves.—Hiſtory of Proceſs in Abſence.—Hiſtory of Execution againſt Moveables and Land for Payment of Debt.—Hiſtory of Perſonal Execution for Payment of Debt.—Hiſtory of Execution for obtaining Payment after the Death of the Debtor.—Hiſtory of the Limited and Univerſal Repreſentation of Heirs.—Old and New Extent.*

Concerning this work the Monthly Reviewers

vi wers remark, "Our author not only points out the defects which are often visible in treatises of law; he sets an example of writing on that subject in a more rational and instructive manner. He possesses, in a high degree, all the talents requisite for doing so: His knowledge of human nature is just and profound: His acquaintance with the history of mankind, and with the progress of society, is accurate and extensive. Those principles in our constitution on which laws are founded; those passions which render them necessary, are appealed to and explained with great ingenuity. The gradual advances of mankind towards perfection and refinement in government are traced with great care; and the ideas naturally arising from those circumstances, which, in different ages, dictated laws and regulated the opinions of judges, are observed with minute attention; and by such investigation, customs and institutions, which formerly appeared to be inexplicable, accidental, or capricious, are seen to be the natural effects of powerful causes. But though researches of this kind

be

be neceſſarily intricate and profound, our author writes with remarkable perſpicuity, and in a vigorous and manly ſtile. A ſubject ſeemingly dry and abſtruſe becomes, in his hands, not only inſtructive but amuſing."

In 1760, he publiſhed, in one volume folio, *The Principles of Equity*, a work which ſhews both the fertility of the author's genius and his indefatigable application.

"It is with real ſatisfaction," the Critical Reviewers remark with much liberality of ſentiment, "we behold the rapid progreſs our neighbours of North Britain are making to the higheſt pinacle of glory, in arms and in letters. It increaſes our ſatisfaction, when we perceive that their generous efforts excite no mean jealouſies, no narrow prejudices to damp the riſing ſpirit of loyalty and learning; and that thoſe very perſons, who once denied them every kind of merit, are now the foremoſt in twining garlands of ivy and laurel to adorn their temples. Long may this harmony, ariſing from

from congenial ſentiments, continue! May all the future rivalſhip between Engliſhmen and Scotchmen be, which ſhall moſt promote the welfare of their country, and the honour of their king! May every party diſtinction be forgot, and all unite in the glorious endeavour of tranſmitting to poſterity this reign as the moſt complete in valour, in learning, in patriotiſm, and in every public and private virtue, of any other in the annals of Great Britain! Be it, in the mean time, our care to avoid all national attachments, to pay to each the juſt tribute of his merit, not to be dazzled by a name, or miſled by falſe colours, but critically to review every ſentiment which may tend to the prejudice or the perfection of this great end, at leaſt as far as our own ability, and the imbecillity of human nature will admit.

"There could be no undertaking of more general utility, than the object of the ingenious volume before us. To reduce the crabbed intricacies of the law to the level of common underſtandings, and unveil the hidden myſteries of this deity to the view

of

of the ſtudious in general, is a work equally new in the deſign, and difficult in the execution."

In 1766, he gave to the public another volume in folio of *Remarkable Deciſions of the Court of Seſſion*, from 1730 to 1752.

In 1777, appeared our author's *Elucidations reſpecting the Common and Statute Law of Scotland* in one volume 8vo. This book contains many curious and intereſting remarks upon ſome intricate and dubious points which occur in the law of Scotland.—In 1780, he publiſhed a volume in folio of *Select Deciſions of the Court of Seſſion from* 1752 *to* 1768.

From this ſketch of Lord Kames's compoſitions and collections, with a view to improve and elucidate the laws of Scotland, the reader may form ſome idea of his great induſtry, and of his anxious deſire to promote the honour and welfare of his country. It remains to be remarked, that, in our ſupreme court, the law-writings of Lord

Kames

Kames are held in equal eſtimation, and quoted with equal reſpect, as thoſe of Coke or Blackſtone in the courts of England.

Lord Kames's mind was very much inclined to metaphyſical diſquiſitions. When a young man, in order to improve himſelf in his favourite ſtudy, he correſponded with the famous Berkeley, Biſhop of Cloyne, Dr Butler author of that wonderful book, *The Analogy between Natural and Revealed Religion*, Dr Samuel Clark, and many other ingenious and learned men both in Britain and Ireland. The letters of correſpondence, I am happy to learn, have been carefully preſerved by his ſon and heir George-Home Drummond, Eſq; of Blair-Drummond.

The year 1751 gave birth to the firſt fruits of his Lordſhip's metaphyſical ſtudies, under the title of *Eſſays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, in two parts.* Though a ſmall volume, it was replete with ingenuity and acute reaſoning, excited general attention, and gave riſe to much controverſy. By the boldneſs of his genius,

he ſeemingly departed from a few commonly received opinions. Some perſons, whoſe zeal exceeded their knowledge, accuſed him of heterodox notions with regard to religion. The Eſſay on *Liberty and Neceſſity* was the chief object of their reſentment, though, by ſome writings publiſhed at the time, it was clearly ſhown, that Lord Kames's doctrine nearly coincided with that of the famous Calvin, whoſe tenets are generally conſidered as the ſtandard of orthodoxy in Scotland. One clergyman, whoſe name was *Anderſon*, a man of a warm and violent temper, wrote a whole volume againſt the *Moral Eſſays*; in which he treats the learned author, who was then a Senator of the College of Juſtice, with an unbecoming degree of rudeneſs and aſperity. Not ſatisfied with this abuſe, Anderſon afterwards brought a formal charge of hereſy againſt his Lordſhip before the preſbytery of Edinburgh. But the preſbytery diſmiſſed the accuſation with that contempt which it ſo juſtly merited. This injurious attack, however, gave Lord Kames an opportunity of exhibiting a remarkable proof of his candour and liberality.

In

In a ſecond edition, after conſidering the ſubject more maturely, he acknowledged his miſtake, and retracted ſome ingenious notions, which, contrary to his intention, had given offence. How few philoſophers are capable of ſuch greatneſs and generoſity of mind!

In 1761, Lord Kames publiſhed an *Introduction to the Art of Thinking*, in one volume 12mo. This ſmall, but valuable book, was originally intended for the inſtruction of his own family. The plan of it is both curious, amuſing, and highly calculated to catch the attention, and to improve the minds of youth. It conſiſts of maxims collected from Rochefoucault and many other authors. To illuſtrate theſe maxims, and to rivet their ſpirit and meaning in the minds of young perſons, his Lordſhip has added to moſt of them beautiful ſtories, fables, and hiſtorical anecdotes.

In the department of belles lettres, his *Elements of Criticiſm* appeared in 1762 in three

three volumes 8vo. In this valuable work, his Lordſhip diſcovers profound erudition and taſte in every ſpecies of compoſition, both antient and modern. It is the firſt and a moſt ſucceſsful attempt to ſhow that the art of criticiſm is founded on the principles of human nature. Such a plan, it might be thought, ſhould have produced a dry and phlegmatic performance. Lord Kames, on the contrary, from the ſprightlineſs of his manner of treating every ſubject he handled, has rendered the Elements of Criticiſm not only highly inſtructive, but one of the moſt entertaining books in our language. Before this work was publiſhed, Rollin's *Belles Lettres*, a dull book, from which a ſtudent could derive little advantage, was univerſally recommended as a ſtandard. But, after the Elements of Criticiſm were preſented to the public, Rollin inſtantly vaniſhed, and gave place to greater genius and greater utility. With regard to real inſtruction and genuine taſte in compoſition of every kind, a ſtudent, a gentleman, or a ſcholar, can, in no language, find ſuch a fertile field of information.

tion. Lord Kames, accordingly, had the happineſs of ſeeing the good effects of his labours, and of enjoying for twenty years a reputation which he ſo juſtly merited.

To give the reader a ſtill farther proof of the genius and various purſuits of this active mind, Lord Kames, in the year 1772, publiſhed a work in one volume 8vo, under the title of *The Gentleman Farmer, being an attempt to improve Agriculture, by ſubjecting it to the teſt of rational principles.* With regard to this book, it muſt be remarked, that all the intelligent farmers in Scotland uniformly declare, that, after peruſing Young, Dickſon, and a hundred other writers on agriculture, Lord Kames's *Gentleman Farmer* contains the beſt practical and rational information on the various articles of huſbandry which can any where be obtained. As a practical farmer, Lord Kames has given many obvious proofs of his ſkill. After he ſucceeded, in right of his Lady, to the ample eſtate of Blair-Drummond in the county of Perth, he formed a plan for turning a large moſs, conſiſting of at leaſt

1500 acres, into arable land. His Lordſhip had the pleaſure, before he died, to ſee the plan ſucceſsfully, though but partially, executed. The ſame plan is now carrying on, in a much more rapid manner, by his ſon George Drummond, Eſq.

In the year 1773, Lord Kames favoured the world with *Sketches of the Hiſtory of Man* in two vols. 4to*. This work conſiſts of a

* *Letter, William Smellie to Lord Kames.*

"My Lord, *Edin. April 23d.* 1774.

"I have peruſed the Sketches. No book ever afforded me ſo much entertainment and inſtruction. The curious remarks and hints are innumerable, and conveyed in ſo light and ſo eaſy a manner, that women and children, if they pleaſe, may become philoſophers with little expence of thought; and the philoſopher, at the ſame time, has ſo much food for thought and reflection, that a few pages would require a volume of commentary. This I take to be the ſummum bonum of good-writing. I hope your Lordſhip's example will give an effectual check to thoſe myſtical, I might ſay, thoſe nonſenſical writers on human nature, who involve themſelves in clouds of obſcurity, and expect their readers to underſtand what they themſelves cannot explain. Of this ſtamp is the Treatiſe of——

——, and

a great variety of facts and obſervations concerning the nature of man, the produce of much and profitable reading. In the courſe of his ſtudies and reaſonings, he had amaſſed a vaſt collection of materials. Theſe, when conſiderably advanced in years, he digeſted under proper heads, and ſubmitted them to the conſideration of the public. He intended that this book ſhould be equally intelligible to women as to men; and, to accompliſh this end, when he had occaſion to quote antient or foreign books, he uniformly tranſlated the paſſages. The *Sketches* contain much uſeful information; and, like all his Lordſhip's other performances, are lively

——, and ſome later publications are liable to the ſame exception.

"Your Lordſhip's views of natural hiſtory will, I hope, lead the attention of naturaliſts to the only thing valuable in that ſcience. I have read this part with great delectation, and ſhall ſoon write a ſhort commentary, which will be ſent for your Lordſhip's peruſal.

"I have the honour to be, &c.

"WILLIAM SMELLIE."

lively and entertaining.—This work has been both blamed and commended. We ſhall, however, quote a paſſage from the Edinburgh Magazine and Review, a publication not much famed for dealing deep in *panegyric*. "There are few writers," the Reviewer remarks, "to whom Scotland is more indebted than to the author of the preſent performance. At a period when literature was neglected, and the public ear unrefined, he applied himſelf to enlighten his fellow citizens, and to accommodate his compoſitions to an Engliſh ſtandard. His example was contagious. It ſeemed that the natives of Scotland, though at a diſtance from the court, could attain a propriety and a purity of expreſſion. The peculiarities of the Scottiſh idiom wore away; looſe and inaccurate modes of diction were reprobated. Men, ſtudious to excel, became ſkilled in the delicacies of a language which they could not ſpeak; and their remains not, perhaps, an obſtruction to retard a moſt general diffuſion of a correct and an elegant taſte in this quarter of the iſland,

iſland, but that anomalous jargon, which ſtill diſgraces the courts of Law.

" We mean not, however, to inſinuate that the language of this author conſtitutes his greateſt merit. To a curious obſerver, it may yet ſeem to retain ſomewhat of the ruſt which had tarniſhed literature and ſcience when he began to illuſtrate them. It may want elevation, and poliſh, and variety. But it is every where perſpicuous. Phraſes and expreſſions may have been admitted, which approach perhaps too near to the familiar tone of converſation; yet, if it flows not with uniform majeſty, it is often manly and forcible, and cannot juſtly be cenſured as deficient in grammatical preciſion.

" But neither in this ſtricture on the ſtile of our author, nor in any obſervations we may make with reſpect to ſome ſmall defects in his reaſoning or information, do we intend to detract from his conſpicuous merit. The public ſpirit, which has animated all his reſearches, his various erudi-

tion, the freedom with which he propoſes his ſentiments, the extenſiveneſs of his views, and the perſevering induſtry which he has exerted for the inſtruction of the preſent age and poſterity, amidſt the duties of an important function, and the multiplied occupations of an active private life, entitle him, on the whole, to the moſt honourable applauſe."

We now come to Lord Kames's laſt work, to which he modeſtly gives the title of *Looſe Hints upon Education, chiefly concerning the Culture of the Heart.* It was publiſhed in the year 1781, in one volume 8vo, when the venerable and aſtoniſhing author was in the 85th year of his age. Though his Lordſhip choſe to call them *Looſe Hints*, the intelligent reader will perceive in this compoſition an uncommon activity of mind, at an age ſo far advanced beyond the uſual period of human life, and an earneſt deſire to form the minds of youth to honour, to virtue, to induſtry, and to a veneration of the Deity.

Beſide

Beſide the books we have enumerated, Lord Kames publiſhed many temporary and fugitive pieces in different periodical works. In the *Eſſays Phyſical and Literary*, publiſhed I may ſay by this ſociety, we find compoſitions of his Lordſhip *on the Laws of Motion.—On the Advantages of Shallow ploughing—and on Evaporation;* all of which exhibit evident marks of genius and originality of thinking.

Upon reflecting on the ſtudiouſneſs of Lord Kames's diſpoſition, and his numerous literary productions, the reader will naturally recal to his mind a ſtriking ſimilarity between his Lordſhip and the laborious Pliny the Elder. In a letter from Pliny the Younger to Macer, the following paſſage occurs which is equally applicable to both. *Nonne videtur tibi, recordanti quantum legerit, quantum ſcripſerit, nec in officii ſullis, nec in amicitia principum fuiſſe?* which is thus tranſlated by Melmoth: "When you reflect on the books he has read, and the volumes he has written, are you not inclined to ſuſpect that he never was engaged in the

the affairs of the public, or the ſervice of his prince?"

To give a proper delineation of the public and private character of Lord Kames, would far exceed the limits I have preſcribed to myſelf. As, however, I had the honour of an intimate acquaintance* with this great

* *WHEN the AUTHOR was an apprentice to a printer in Edinburgh, the ſecond edition of the* Elements of Criticiſm *was printing at the preſs of his maſter. He took the liberty of making obſervations on that work; and ſent them to Lord Kames. His Lordſhip, in conſequence of this, returned the following letter, which was the beginning of* WILLIAM SMELLIE'S *acquaintance with* LORD KAMES.

"*To the Perſon who has made obſervations on the* Elements, *and likewiſe on the proof ſheets of that work.*

SIR, *Edinburgh, December* 6. 1764.

"THE manuſcript you ſent me, and which I here return, gave me pleaſure; and I am not a little obliged to you for it. I could have wiſhed for more time to conſider it deliberately; but as I would avoid the leaſt ſuſpicion of neglect, I have choſen to return my anſwer as ſoon as you could poſſibly expect it.

"IN

great and good man for more than twenty years, I muſt be indulged in mentioning a few

"In general I like your obſervations; they muſt flow from one who has read with attention and with judgement. At the ſame time, the nature of my performance will not allow me to make much uſe of them. In the Elements, I keep altogether to general views; and it would ſwell the work beyond bounds if I were to follow theſe general views through all their conſequences. This work I leave to the reader, who I ſuppoſe will be better pleaſed to have theſe conſequences left to himſelf than to be led by the hand, as it were, in every ſtep. There are beſides ſeveral obſervations that, according to the plan of the work, cannot come in properly in thoſe parts of the book that are referred to; and which are taken in, in ſubſtance at leaſt, under other heads.

"It is both difficult and tedious to explain all in writing. I ſhall, however, proceed to a few particulars to clear my meaning.

"You obſerve very rightly, that to make a compoſition orderly and connected, it is not alone ſufficient that the thoughts be connected, &c. But then you'll conſider that I am here only treating in general of perceptions and ideas in a train; and I fancy you'll find that I have omitted nothing which was proper to be brought in, in that general view. At the ſame time, you'll remark, that it is no part of the deſign of that chapter to handle

few facts which fell under my own obſervation.

Lord Kames was remarkable for public ſpirit, to which he conjoined activity and great

dle all the requiſites of a complete diſcourſe or compoſition: Theſe, or the moſt of them, may be picked out from different Chapters.

"WITH reſpect to the ſympathetic emotion of virtue, I am of opinion that the principle upon which it is founded may produce pleaſant emotions from many agreeable objects; and probably had this occurred at the time, it would have been added. But the ſympathetic emotion of virtue was ſufficient for my purpoſe; and I think it better to be modeſt in my additions, to prevent an ugly ſuſpicion of a deſign to force a man to buy the ſame book twice.

"WITH reſpect to the affection a man bears to his children, I had occaſion to give it in the place cited as an example of the communication of paſſion. But you'll remark that it could not be my deſign there to give a diſſertation upon the love of Parents to Children; and if that could make part of my work, I ſhould thankfully adopt ſeveral of your obſervations. At the ſame time, I have not ſaid, or at leaſt did not intend to ſay, that the love of Parents to Children is entirely reſolveable

great exertion. He, for a long tract of time, had the principle management of all our Societies and Boards for promoting the trade, fiſheries, and manufactures in Scotland.

reſolveable into this communication of paſſion. I am not certain, becauſe that part of the book is at the preſs; but if there be any ſuch unwary expreſſion, there is yet time to correct it.

"WHAT you obſerve of grandeur fairly accounts for the difference of taſte about it. I was born and bred in a flat country; and the firſt time I ſaw a ſmall round hill, perhaps not above 40 feet perpendicular, it made a ſtronger impreſſion upon my mind, than the greateſt mountain I have ſeen ſince that time. But ſuch particular obſervations, though pretty, are too minute for a general plan; and, in order to preſerve the unity of deſign, I often denied myſelf the ſatisfaction of introducing them.

"WITH reſpect to what is obſerved upon volume 2d page 92, the theory is pretty, but I doubt of it's being ſolid.

"I ſhall be glad to ſee more of your obſervations; though I cannot find any neceſſity for this ſort of blind intercourſe. You have no reaſon to be aſhamed of your obſervations; and the Author of the Elements will

land. As conducive to thoſe ends, he was a ſtrenuous advocate for making and repairing turnpike roads through every part of the country. He had likewiſe a chief lead in the diſtribution and application of the funds ariſing from the eſtates in Scotland which had unfortunately been annexed to the crown. He was no leſs zealous in ſupporting, both with his writings and perſonal influence, literary aſſociations. He was, in ſome meaſure, the parent of what was called the *Phyſical and Literary Society*. This ſociety was afterwards incorporated into the *Royal Society of Edinburgh*, which received a charter from the crown, and which is daily producing marks of genius, as well as works of real utility.

As

will be glad of the acquaintance of a Gentleman who ſtudies to ſo good purpoſe a work that he thought worthy to ſee the light.

I am, Sir,

Your obliged humble ſervant,

" HENRY HOME."

As a private and domeſtic gentleman, Lord Kames was admired by both ſexes. The vivacity of his wit and of his animal ſpirits, even when advanced in years, rendered his company not only agreeable, but greatly ſolicited by the literati, and courted by ladies of the higheſt rank and accompliſhments. Inſtead of being jealous of rivals, the characteriſtic of little minds, Lord Kames foſtered and encouraged every ſymptom of merit that he could diſcover in the ſcholar, or in the loweſt mechanic. Before he ſucceeded to the eſtate of Blair-Drummond, his fortune was ſmall. Notwithſtanding this circumſtance, he, in conjunction with Mrs Drummond, his reſpectable and accompliſhed ſpouſe, did much more ſervice to the indigent than moſt families of greater opulence. If the preſent neceſſity was preſſing, they gave money. They did more. When they diſcovered that male or female petitioners were capable of performing any art or labour, both parties exerted themſelves in procuring that ſpecies of work which the poor people could perform. In caſes of this kind, which were very fre-

quent, the lady took charge of the women, and his Lordſhip of the men. From what has been ſaid concerning the various and numerous productions of his genius, it is obvious that there could be few idle moments in his long protracted life. His mind was inceſſantly employed; either teeming with new ideas, or purſuing active and laborious occupations. At the ſame time, with all this intellectual ardour, one great feature in the character of Lord Kames, beſides his literary talents, and his public ſpirit, was a remarkable innocency of mind. He not only never indulged in detraction, but when any ſpecies of ſcandal was exhibited in his company, he either remained ſilent, or endeavoured to give a different turn to the converſation. As natural conſequences of this amiable diſpoſition, he never meddled with polities, even when parties ran to indecent lengths in this country; and, what is ſtill more remarkable, he never wrote a ſentence, notwithſtanding his numerous publications, without a direct and a manifeſt intention to benefit his fellow creatures. In his temper he was naturally warm,

warm, though kindly and affectionate. In the friendſhips he formed, he was ardent, zealous, and ſincere. So far from being inclined to irreligion, as ſome ignorant bigots inſinuated, few men poſſeſſed a more devout habit of thought. A conſtant ſenſe of Deity, and a veneration for Providence dwelt upon his mind. From this ſource aroſe that propenſity, which appears in all his writings, of inveſtigating final cauſes, and tracing the wiſdom of the Supreme Author of Nature.

Two days before his death, Lord Kames, who had uniformly retained the firmeſt belief in the future exiſtence of human ſouls, told the late celebrated Dr Cullen, that he earneſtly wiſhed to be away, becauſe he was exceedingly curious to learn the nature and manners of another world. He added, "Doctor, as I never could be idle in this world, I ſhall willingly perform any taſk that may be impoſed upon me." But here we muſt ſtop. Lord Kames, to the great regret of the public, died on the 27th day of December 1782. As he had no marked diſeaſe,

diſeaſe, but the debility neceſſarily reſulting from extreme old age, a few days before his death, he went to the Court of Seſſion, addreſſed all the judges ſeparately, told them he was ſpeedily to depart, and took a ſolemn and an affectionate farewell.

THE

THE

LIFE

OF

DAVID HUME, Esq.

It is an arduous taſk to give an impartial account of an author who has been the object of ſo much praiſe and of ſo much obloquy as Mr Hume: Yet the attempt muſt be made.

Mr Hume was born at Edinburgh on the 26th of April 1711, old ſtyle. He was deſcended of reſpectable families both on the father and mother's ſide. His father's family was a branch of the Earl of Hume's, and his mother was a daughter of Sir David Falconer, preſident of the College of Juſtice.

tice. His family, however, was not opulent; and he being a younger brother, his patrimony was, of courſe, very trifling. His father died when Mr Hume was an infant; and he, along with a ſiſter and an elder brother, were left to the care of their mother, who devoted her whole attention to the rearing and educating of her children. Mr Hume paſſed through the ordinary courſes of education with great ſucceſs, and very early diſcovered an uncommon paſſion for literature. This laſt circumſtance ſuggeſted to his friends the idea that the profeſſion of the law would be a proper employment for him; but young Hume had an inſuperable averſion to every thing but the purſuits of philoſophy and of general learning; and he tells us, that, when he was ſuppoſed to be ſtudying Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil were the authors which he was ſecretly devouring.

This plan, however, his narrow fortune was unable to ſupport. He, therefore, made an attempt to enter upon a more active ſcene of life. With this view, in the year

year 1734, he went to Briſtol, and had recommendations to ſome of the moſt eminent merchants in that city. In a few months, he diſcovered that this ſpecies of buſineſs was irkſome and diſagreeable to him. In order to proſecute his ſtudies with the greater ſucceſs, as well as to enable him to live upon his ſmall fortune, he went to a country retreat. His chief reſidence was at La Fleche, in Anjou, where he compoſed his *Treatiſe of Human Nature*, which, after returning to London, he publiſhed in the year 1738. "Never literary attempt," Mr Hume remarks, "was more unfortu-
"nate than my Treatiſe of Human Nature.
"It fell *dead-born from the preſs*, without
"reaching ſuch diſtinction as even to ex-
"cite a murmur among the *zealots* *."

This complaint is curious, and confirms the old adage, that an author is the worſt judge of the merit or demerit of his own works. Mr Hume's *Treatiſe of Human Nature*, as he himſelf informs us, excited no attention, either of praiſe or of cenſure, from

* Vide his own Life, p. 8.

from the public. No wonder! When much younger, I read that book with great ardour, and with great application. Some parts of it I perceived to be both ingenious and brilliant, and others ſo involved in obſcurity, that I found it impoſſible to comprehend the meaning. At that period of life, I naturally attributed this ſeeming obſcurity to my own inability, and was often aſhamed, for that reaſon, to acknowledge that I had read it, becauſe I could not give any diſtinct account of the book. When older, I peruſed it a ſecond time, and then perceived an ingenious literary *trick*, if I may uſe ſuch an expreſſion. Mr Hume, when he begins an eſſay, or turns the *corner* of any argument, moſt artfully lays down a ſeemingly ſimple poſition, to which almoſt every reader gives a ready aſſent. From that moment, however, the reader is moſt completely bewildered: For, whenever theſe plauſible poſitions are admitted, or inadvertently paſſed over, ſuch is the force of Mr Hume's reaſonings, and ſuch the beauty and energy of his eloquence, that no reader can reſiſt the torrent. Dean

Swift

Swift ſays, that the beſt way to conquer a woman, is to catch her by the *tail*. But the only ſucceſsful mode of conquering Mr Hume is to catch him by the *noſe*.

In the year 1742, Mr Hume publiſhed at Edinburgh the firſt part of his Eſſays. This work met with a more favourable reception from the public, and gave him ſome conſolation for his former diſappointment. In 1745, he was invited by the Marquis of Annandale, who was then indiſpoſed both in mind and in body, to come and live with him in England, where Mr Hume continued during twelve months; and, by his appointments in that ſtation, was enabled to make a conſiderable addition to his ſmall fortune. He then received an invitation from General St Clair to attend him as ſecretary to an expedition againſt Canada, but which ended in an incurſion on the coaſt of France. In 1747, Mr Hume was again invited by General St Clair to attend him in the ſame ſtation in his embaſſy to the courts of Vienna and Turin. He then wore the uniform of an officer; and, in the character of aid-de-camp

to the General, was introduced into theſe courts. Theſe two years, he tells us, were almoſt the only interruptions he met with to his ſtudies during the courſe of his life. But he paſſed them agreeably; and his appointments, joined to his own frugality, ſoon enabled him to amaſs near a thouſand pounds.

Mr Hume imagined that his *Treatiſe of Human Nature* had failed of ſucceſs more from the manner of writing than from the matter. He, therefore, to uſe his own expreſſion, *caſt* the firſt part of that work anew in his *Inquiry concerning Human Underſtanding*, which was publiſhed while he was at Turin. But, at firſt, this piece was not much more ſucceſsful than the former. Mr Hume, however, though he muſt have felt thoſe diſappointments, was not altogether diſcouraged. In the 1749, he came down from London to Scotland, and lived at his brother's country-houſe, where he compoſed the ſecond part of his Eſſay, which he called *Political Diſcourſes*, and likewiſe his *Inquiry concerning the Principles*

ciples of Morals, which, he tells us, in another part of his *Treatiſe*, that he *caſt* anew. Soon afterwards, he was informed by Mr A. Millar, his London bookſeller, that his former publications, except his unfortunate Treatiſe, were beginning to be the ſubject of converſation; that the ſale of them was gradually increaſing; and that new editions were become neceſſary to anſwer the demands of the public. "Anſwers," he archly remarks, "by Reverends and Right Re-"verends, came out two or three in a year; "and I found, by *Dr Warburton's railing*, "that the books were beginning to be eſ-"teemed in *good company* *."

Mr Hume, in the year 1751, removed from the country, and came to Edinburgh, which he emphatically terms the *true ſcene for a man of letters* †. In 1752, he publiſhed his *Political Diſcourſes*, the firſt work of his which was ſucceſsful at the outſet. In the ſame year appeared his *Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, "which is," ſays he, "of all my writings, hiſtorical, "philoſophical,

* Mr Hume's own Life, p. 10. † Ibid. p. 11.

"philoſophical, or literary, incomparably "the beſt *." But the public were of a contrary opinion; for the book was either totally neglected, or treated with contempt.

In the ſame year, he was appointed by the Faculty of Advocates their Librarian, from which office he received only a trifling emolument; but it gave him the command of a great collection of books and manuſcripts. When this Library falls naturally to be mentioned, it would be unpardonable not to tell a truth of which every man of letters in Edinburgh has daily experience. The collection, eſpecially of printed books, exceeds greatly that of any library in Britain; and free acceſs to the peruſal of them is cheerfully and politely allowed. On this ſubject, I muſt go farther. The occaſional uſe of books or manuſcripts in a public library is a moſt valuable privilege. The Faculty of Advocates, however, not only grant this privilege, but any member of that Faculty can, by his ſignature, oblige his friends with ſuch books as he

* Mr Hume's own Life, p. 11.

he chuſes out of doors for a reaſonable time; and ſuch requeſts, on all proper occaſions, are moſt liberally granted. The Faculty do more. Literary gentlemen, by giving bond for a certain ſum, often acquire the privilege of taking out books upon their own receipts. To this noble collection, joined to the generoſity of its proprietors, Scotland, for theſe hundred years paſt, has been indebted for the many productions of genius and of learning which have enabled her ſons, within that period, to make ſuch a diſtinguiſhed figure in almoſt every department of ſcience. I muſt not, however, omit her powerful auxiliaries. The libraries of the Univerſity of Edinburgh, and of the College of Phyſicians, are very great, and particularly enriched with books of Medicine, of Anatomy, and of Natural Hiſtory. The acceſs to theſe libraries is equally eaſy as to that of the Faculty of Advocates. But, to return.—In this moſt favourable ſituation, where he had an opportunity of conſulting almoſt every authentic reſource, Mr Hume formed the plan of writing the *Hiſtory of England.*

land. He commenced with the acceſſion of the Houſe of Stuart, and afterwards obſerved a kind of retrograde motion. Of the ſucceſs of this work, he acknowledges his expectations were ſanguine. "But," ſays he, "miſerable was my diſappointment: I "was aſſailed by one cry of reproach, diſ- "approbation, and even deteſtation; Eng- "liſh, Scotch, and Iriſh, Whig and Tory, "Churchman and Sectary, Freethinker and "Religioniſt, Patriot and Courtier, united "in their rage againſt the man who had "preſumed to ſhed a generous tear for the "fate of Charles I. and the Earl of Straf- "ford; and, after the ebullitions of their "fury were over, what was ſtill more mor- "tifying, the book ſeemed to ſink into ob- "livion *."

Some time afterwards, he publiſhed at London his *Natural Hiſtory of Religion.* "Its public entry," he remarks, "was ra- "ther obſcure, except only that Dr Hurd "wrote a pamphlet againſt it, with all the "illiberal petulance, arrogance, and ſcurri- "lity,

* His own Life, p. 11, and 12.

"lity, which diſtinguiſh the Warburtonian "ſchool. This pamphlet gave me ſome "conſolation for the otherwiſe indifferent "reception of my performance *."

Two years after the miſcarriage of the firſt volume, viz. in 1756, he publiſhed the ſecond volume of his Hiſtory of England, which included the period from the death of Charles I. to the Revolution. This performance gave leſs umbrage to the Whigs, and was more favourably received by the public. "It not only roſe itſelf," ſays he, "but helped to buoy up its unfortunate "brother †." In the year 1759, Mr Hume publiſhed his *Hiſtory of the Houſe of Tudor*. The clamour excited by this work was nearly equal to that againſt the Hiſtory of the two firſt Stuarts. The reign of Elizabeth was particularly offenſive. "But," he tells us, "I was now callous againſt the impreſ- "ſions of public folly, and continued very "peaceably and contentedly in my retreat at "Edinburgh, to finiſh, in two volumes, the "more early period of the Engliſh Hiſtory, "which

* His own Life, p. 11, and 12. † Ibid.

"which I gave to the public in 1761, with "tolerable, and but tolerable, ſucceſs *."

Notwithſtanding, however, a very general clamour and many rude attacks, Mr Hume's writings gradually acquired more and more reputation; and he received from the bookſellers higher copy-money than had been given to any other author in Britain before that period. He now found himſelf not only independent, but opulent; and, therefore, he retired to his native country of Scotland, with a deſign never to leave it again. At that time, he was turned of fifty years, when, in the year 1763, he received an invitation from the Earl of Hertford to attend him on his embaſſy to Paris, with a near proſpect of being his ſecretary. This offer, however, Mr Hume at firſt declined, on account of his age, and the reluctance he felt againſt mingling again with the gay company of the French metropolis. But, upon his Lordſhip's repeating the invitation, Mr Hume at laſt conſented. He was afterwards appointed ſecretary to the embaſſy.

* His own Life, p. 13.

embaſſy. In ſummer 1765, Lord Hertford was called home to be Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, and Mr Hume was left *chargé d'affaires* till the arrival of the Duke of Richmond about the end of the ſame year. In the beginning of the year 1766, Mr Hume left Paris, and next ſummer went to Edinburgh with the view of enjoying an agreeable retreat among philoſophical friends, with which that city, though not large, peculiarly abounds. Mr Amyat, King's Chymiſt, a moſt ſenſible and agreeable Engliſh gentleman, reſided in Edinburgh for a year or two. He one day ſurpriſed me with a curious remark. There is not a city in Europe, ſaid he, that enjoys ſuch a ſingular and ſuch a noble privilege. I aſked, What is that privilege? He replied, Here I ſtand at what is called the *Croſs of Edinburgh*, and can, in a few minutes, take fifty men of genius and learning by the hand. The fact is well known; but to a native of that city, who has all his days been familiarized with it, and who has not travelled into other countries, that circumſtance, though very remarkable, paſſes un-

noticed: Upon ſtrangers, however, it makes a deep impreſſion. In London, in Paris, and other large cities of Europe, though they contain many literary men, the acceſs to them is difficult; and, even after that is obtained, the converſation is, for ſome time, ſhy and conſtrained. In Edinburgh, the acceſs to men of parts is not only eaſy, but their converſation and the communication of their knowledge are at once imparted to intelligent ſtrangers with the utmoſt liberality. The philoſophers of Scotland have no noſtrums. They tell what they know, and deliver their ſentiments without diſguiſe or reſerve. This generous feature was conſpicuous in the character of Mr Hume. He inſulted no man; but, when the converſation turned upon particular ſubjects, whether moral or religious, he expreſſed his genuine ſentiments with freedom, with force, and with a dignity which did honour to human nature.

In the year 1767, Mr Hume was invited by Mr Conway to be under Secretary, which both the character of the perſon, and his

his connections with Lord Hertford, prevented him from declining. He returned to Edinburgh in 1769 very opulent; for he then poſſeſſed a revenue of 1000l. a-year; and, though pretty far advanced in life, he was in good health, and had the proſpect of long enjoying eaſe, and ſeeing the increaſe of his reputation.

In ſpring 1775, he began to be afflicted with a diſorder in his bowels, which at firſt did not alarm him; but he ſoon afterwards apprehended that a mortification, and, of courſe, a ſpeedy diſſolution, were to enſue. Still, however, his cheerfulneſs and uſual alacrity, notwithſtanding the great decline of his body, did not deſert him. He conſidered, that a man of ſixty-five, by dying, cuts off only a few years of infirmities, and perhaps of peeviſhneſs and anxiety. Mr Hume concludes his life with a ſhort ſketch of what he apprehended to be his own character and diſpoſitions: "I am, or rather was," ſays he, "a man of mild diſpoſition, of command of temper, of an open, ſocial, and cheerful humour, capable

of

of attachment, but little ſuſceptible of enmity, and of great moderation in all my paſſions. Even my love of literary fame, my ruling paſſion, never ſoured my temper, notwithſtanding my frequent diſappointments. My company was not unacceptable to the young and careleſs, as well as to the ſtudious and literary; and, as I took a particular pleaſure in the company of modeſt women, I had no reaſon to be diſpleaſed with the reception I met with from them*."

Though Mr Hume believed the diſeaſe which afflicted him was to carry him off the ſtage of life, as we are informed by a letter from the late moſt ingenious and excellent Dr Adam Smith to William Strahan, Eſq; (of the latter of whom he had ſuch a favourable opinion, that he left him the charge, with diſcretionary powers, of all his manuſcripts, ſome of which, and particularly that of his own life, were afterwards publiſhed;) yet he was prevailed upon, by the entreaties of his friends, to try what might be the effects of a long journey. He, accordingly, about the end of April

* His own Life, p. 15.

April 1776, ſet out for London; and when he came the length of Morpeth, he met with Dr Adam Smith, and Mr John Home*, a gentleman well known for his poetical genius, and particularly for his theatrical writings. Theſe two gentlemen were on their road from London expecting to find Mr Hume at Edinburgh. Mr Home returned with him, and "attended him," Mr Smith tells us, "during the whole of his ſtay in England, with that care and attention which might be expected from a temper ſo perfectly friendly and affectionate †."

Mr Hume's diſeaſe ſeemed to yield a little to exerciſe and change of air; for, when he arrived in London, he was apparently in much better health than when he left Edinburgh. He was adviſed to go to Bath and drink the waters, which, for ſome time, had ſo good an effect upon him, that he began to have ſome hopes of recovering his health. His former ſymptoms, however,

* The AUTHOR often mentioned as a curious circumſtance, that he had the honour of being acquainted with all the literary men, of his time, in Scotland, except the ingenious Mr JOHN HOME.

† Dr Smith's Letter to Mr Strahan.

ever, returned with their uſual violence. From that moment, he relinquiſhed all hopes of the continuation of life, and of eaſe. But he ſubmitted to his fate with the utmoſt cheerfulneſs and complacency. When he returned to Edinburgh, though he found himſelf much weaker, his ſpirits never failed him. His cheerfulneſs was ſo great, and his converſation and amuſements continued ſo much in their accuſtomed ſtrain, that, notwithſtanding many bad ſymptoms, few of his friends could believe his diſſolution to be ſo faſt approaching. Doctor Dundas, when taking leave of Mr Hume one day, ſaid to him, "I ſhall tell your friend Colonel Edmonſtone, that I left you much better, and in a fair way of recovery."—Doctor," Mr Hume replied, "as I believe you would not chuſe to tell any thing but the truth, you had better tell him, that I am dying as faſt as my enemies, if I have any, could wiſh, and as eaſily and cheerfully as my beſt friends could deſire *."

Soon afterwards, Colonel Edmonſtone went to ſee Mr Hume, and to take a laſt farewell

* Dr Smith's Letter to Mr Strahan.

farewell of him. But, on his way home, he could not refrain from writing a letter, bidding him once more an eternal adieu. Such were Mr Hume's magnanimity and fortitude of mind, that his moſt intimate and affectionate friends knew they hazarded no offence in talking or writing to him as a-dying man. Mr Adam Smith happened to call upon Mr Hume when he was reading Colonel Edmonſtone's letter, which he immediately ſhowed to Mr Smith. After peruſing this letter, Mr Smith remarked, that appearances were againſt Mr Hume; ſtill, however, he ſaid, your cheerfulneſs is ſo great, and your ſpirit of life ſo ſtrong, that I muſt entertain ſome faint hopes of your recovery. Mr Hume anſwered, "Your hopes are groundleſs. An habitual *diarrhoea*, of more than a year's ſtanding, would be a very bad diſeaſe at any age. At my age, it is a mortal one. When I lie down in the evening, I feel myſelf weaker than when I roſe in the morning; and, when I riſe in the morning, weaker than when I lay down in the evening. I am ſenſible, beſides, that ſome of my vital parts are affected,

fected, ſo that I muſt ſoon die*." Mr Smith replied, "If it muſt be ſo, you have at leaſt the ſatisfaction of leaving all your friends, your brother's family in particular, in great proſperity†." Mr Hume ſaid, he felt that ſatisfaction ſo ſenſibly, that, a few days before, when reading Lucian's Dialogues of the Dead, among all the excuſes which are uſually made to Charon by ſouls who are backward to be ferried in his boat over the river Styx, he could not find one that ſuited him. He had no houſe to furniſh, no children to provide for, nor any enemies upon whom he wiſhed to be revenged. "I could not well imagine," ſaid he, "what excuſe I could make to Charon, in order to obtain a little delay. I have done every thing of conſequence which I ever meant to do, and I could at no time expect to leave my relations and friends in a better ſituation than that in which I am now likely to leave them: I, therefore, have all reaſon to die contented."

He then amuſed himſelf with inventing ſome

* Ibid. † Ibid.

ſome whimſical excuſes, which he ſuppoſed he might make to Charon, and with imagining the ſurly anſwers which it might ſuit the character of Charon to return to them. "Upon further conſideration," ſaid he, "I thought I might ſay to him, Good Charon, I have been correcting my works for a new edition. Allow me a little time that I may ſee how the public receives the alterations." But Charon would anſwer, "When you have ſeen the effect of theſe, you will be for making other alterations. There will be no end of ſuch excuſes; ſo, honeſt friend, pleaſe ſtep into the boat." But Mr Hume ſaid, I might ſtill urge, "Have a little patience, good Charon, I have been endeavouring to open the eyes of the public. If I live a few years longer, I may have the ſatisfaction of ſeeing the downfal of ſome of the prevailing ſyſtems of ſuperſtition." But Charon would then loſe all temper and decency.—"You loitering rogue, that will not happen theſe many hundred years. Do you fancy I will grant you a leaſe for ſo long a term? Get into the boat this inſtant, you lazy loitering rogue *."

* Ibid.

Though Mr Hume frequently talked of his approaching diſſolution with great eaſe, he never affected to make a parade of his magnanimity. He never mentioned the ſubject but when the converſation naturally ſuggeſted it. Mr Hume had now become ſo weak, that the company of his moſt intimate companions fatigued him; for his cheerfulneſs was ſtill ſo great, his complaiſance and ſocial diſpoſition were ſtill ſo entire, that, when any friend was with him, he could not refrain from talking more, and with greater exertion, than the weakneſs of his body could eaſily ſuſtain. Mr Smith, therefore, agreed, at Mr Hume's deſire, to leave Edinburgh, and go to live in Kirkcaldy with his mother, who then reſided in that town. The ingenious and well known Dr Black, profeſſor of chymiſtry in the Univerſity of Edinburgh, undertook occaſionally to write Mr Smith an account of the ſtate of his friend's health. Accordingly, on the 22d day of Auguſt, Dr Black wrote Mr Smith the following letter: "Since my laſt, Mr Hume has paſſed his time pretty eaſily, but is much weaker. He ſits up, goes

goes down ſtairs once a-day, and amuſes himſelf with reading, but ſeldom ſees any body. He finds, that even the converſation of his moſt intimate friends fatigues and oppreſſes him; and it is happy that he does not need it, for he is quite free from anxiety, impatience, or low ſpirits, and paſſes his time very well with the aſſiſtance of amuſing books."

The next day, Mr Smith received a letter from Mr Hume himſelf, of which what follows is an extract.

"*My deareſt friend*, *Edin. Aug.* 23. 1776.

I am obliged to make uſe of my nephew's hand in writing to you, as I do not riſe to-day. I go very faſt to decline, and laſt night had a ſmall fever, which I *hoped* might put a *quicker period* to this tedious illneſs, but unluckily it has, in a great meaſure, gone off."

Three days after, Mr Smith received the following letter from Dr Black.

"Dear

" Dear Sir, *Edin. Aug.* 26. 1776.

Yeſterday, about four o'clock afternoon, Mr Hume expired. The near approach of his death became evident in the night between Thurſday and Friday, when his diſeaſe became exceſſive, and ſoon weakened him ſo much, that he could no longer riſe out of his bed. He continued to the laſt perfectly ſenſible, and free from much pain or feelings of diſtreſs. He never dropped the ſmalleſt expreſſion of impatience; but, when he had occaſion to ſpeak to the people about him, always did it with affection and tenderneſs. I thought it improper to write to bring you over, eſpecially as I heard that he had dictated a letter to you, deſiring you not to come.—When he became very weak, it coſt him an effort to ſpeak, and he died in ſuch a happy compoſure of mind, that nothing could exceed it."

" Thus died," ſays Mr Smith, in his letter to Mr Strahan, " our moſt excellent and never to be forgotten friend, concerning whoſe philoſophical opinions men will no doubt judge variouſly, every one approving,

proving, or condemning them, according as they happen to coincide or diſagree with his own; but concerning whoſe character and conduct there can ſcarce be a difference of opinion. His temper, indeed, ſeemed to be more happily balanced, if I may be allowed ſuch an expreſſion, than that, perhaps, of any other man I have ever known. Even in the loweſt ſtate of his fortune, his great and neceſſary frugality never hindered him, on proper occaſions, from exerciſing acts both of charity and generoſity. It was a frugality founded not upon avarice, but upon the love of independency. The extreme gentleneſs of his nature never weakened either the firmneſs of his mind, or the ſteadineſs of his reſolutions. His conſtant pleaſantry was the genuine effuſion of good nature and good humour, tempered with delicacy and modeſty, and without even the ſlighteſt tincture of malignity, ſo frequently the diſagreeable ſource of what is called wit in other men. It never was the meaning of his raillery to mortify; and, therefore, far from offending, it ſeldom failed to pleaſe and delight even thoſe who were

were the objects of it. To his friends, who were frequently the objects of it, there was not, perhaps, any one of all his great and amiable qualities, which contributed more to endear his converſation. And that gaiety of temper, ſo agreeable in ſociety, but which is ſo often accompanied with frivolous and ſuperficial qualities, was in him certainly attended with the moſt ſevere application, the moſt extenſive learning, the greateſt depth of thought, and a capacity in every reſpect the moſt comprehenſive. Upon the whole, I have always conſidered him, both in his lifetime and ſince his death, as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wiſe and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit. I am, &c.

ADAM SMITH."

Thus far have I proceeded in giving a biographical account of this great literary and worthy man. Hitherto this account has been chiefly derived from printed authorities. I ſhall now conclude with adding

ing a few anecdotes from my own perſonal knowledge, joined to ſome other well known facts, which Mr Hume, in *his Own Life*, has not recorded.

His own Life, as well as Mr Adam Smith's *letter* to *Mr Strahan*, are written with great candour and truth. Mr Hume, like perhaps every man of genius, had a *keenneſs* of temper, which he happily balanced by a ſtrong and deciſive mode of reaſoning. His works met with ſo many and often ſo rude attacks from a variety of authors, that, though he did not deign to anſwer them in writing; yet, in converſation, he frequently diſcovered the reſentments which he felt from the indelicate and often ignorant inſults of inferior ſcholars. In all caſes of this kind, his forcible mode of expreſſion, the brilliant quick movements of his eyes, and the geſtures of his body, diſcovered the acuteneſs of his feelings, and the higheſt marks of contempt as well as of averſion.

One

One author, however, Dr Campbell, Profeſſor of Morals in the Univerſity of Aberdeen, a learned, a worthy, and an ingenious man, wrote a pretty large book againſt Mr Hume's *Eſſay on Miracles*, in ſuch a ſtyle and manner, and ſo much like a gentleman, that Mr Hume never ſpoke of him but with the utmoſt reſpect; and often ſaid, that, of all his opponents, Doctor Campbell was not only the moſt acute, but wrote with the beſt temper, and in the mildeſt, though forcible and elegant terms. In the firſt edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, which was publiſhed at Edinburgh in the year 1771, under the word *Abridgement*, as an example of what I then thought to be the beſt and moſt uſeful mode of abridging books, I gave a ſhort view of Mr Hume's *Eſſay on Miracles*, and of Dr Campbell's *anſwer* to it. I ſtill think, that, as the article is ſhort, a tranſcript of it may be of ſome value, eſpecially to young readers.

"*Abridgement*, in literature, a term ſignifying the reduction of a book into a ſmaller compaſs. The art of conveying much ſentiment

ſentiment in few words, is the happieſt talent an author can be poſſeſſed of. This talent is peculiarly neceſſary in the preſent ſtate of literature; for many writers have acquired the dexterity of ſpreading a few tritical thoughts over ſeveral hundred pages. When an author hits upon a thought that pleaſes him, he is apt to dwell upon it, to view it in different lights, to force it in improperly, or upon the ſlighteſt relations. Though this may be pleaſant to the writer, it tires and vexes the reader. There is another great ſource of diffuſion in compoſition. It is a capital object with an author, whatever be the ſubject, to give vent to all his beſt thoughts. When he finds a proper place for them, he is peculiarly happy. But, rather than ſacrifice a thought he is fond of, he forces it in by way of digreſſion, or ſuperfluous illuſtration. If none of theſe expedients anſwer his purpoſe, he has recourſe to the margin, a very convenient apartment for all manner of pedantry and impertinence. There is not an author, however correct, but is more or leſs faulty in this reſpect. An abridger, however, is

not ſubject to theſe temptations. The thoughts are not his own; he views them in a cooler and leſs affectionate manner; he diſcovers an impropriety in ſome, a vanity in others, and a want of utility in many. His buſineſs, therefore, is to retrench ſuperfluities, digreſſions, quotations, pedantry, &c. and to lay before the public only what is really uſeful. This is by no means an eaſy employment: To abridge ſome books requires talents equal, if not ſuperior, to thoſe of the author. The facts, ſpirit, manner, and reaſoning, muſt be preſerved; nothing eſſential, either in argument or illuſtration, ought to be omitted. The difficulty of the taſk is the principal reaſon why we have ſo few good abridgements. Wynne's abridgement of Locke's Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding is, perhaps, the only unexceptionable one in our language. Theſe obſervations relate ſolely to ſuch abridgements as are deſigned for the public. But,

"When a perſon wants to ſet down the ſubſtance of any book, a ſhorter and leſs laborious

laborious method may be followed. It would be foreign to our plan to give examples of abridgements for the public: But, as it may be uſeful, eſpecially to young people, to know how to abridge books for their own uſe, after giving a few directions, we ſhall exhibit an example or two, to ſhew with what eaſe it may be done.

"Read the book carefully; endeavour to learn the principal view of the author; attend to the arguments employed: When you have done ſo, you will generally find, that what the author uſes as new or additional arguments, are, in reality, only collateral ones, or extenſions of the principal argument. Take a piece of paper, or a common-place book, put down what the author wants to prove, ſubjoin the argument or arguments, and you have the ſubſtance of the book in a few lines. For example, in his Eſſay on Miracles, Mr Hume's deſign is to prove, That miracles, which have not been the immediate objects of our ſenſes, cannot reaſonably be believed upon the

the teſtimony of others. Now, his argument (for there happens to be but one) is,

"That experience, which in ſome things is variable, in others uniform, is our *only* guide in reaſoning concerning matters of fact. A variable experience gives riſe to probability only; an uniform experience amounts to a proof. Our belief of any fact from the teſtimony of eye-witneſſes is derived from no other principle than our experience in the veracity of human teſtimony. If the fact atteſted be miraculous, here ariſes a conteſt of two oppoſite experiences, or proof againſt proof. Now, a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and, as a firm and unalterable experience has eſtabliſhed theſe laws, the proof againſt a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as complete as any argument from experience can poſſibly be imagined; and, if ſo, it is an undeniable conſequence, that it cannot be ſurmounted by any proof whatever derived from human teſtimony."

"In Dr Campbell's Diſſertation on Miracles,

racles, the author's principal aim is to ſhew the fallacy of Mr Hume's argument; which he has done moſt ſucceſsfully by another ſingle argument, as follows:

"The evidence ariſing from human teſtimony *is not ſolely* derived from experience; on the contrary, teſtimony hath a natural influence on belief antecedent to experience. The early and unlimited aſſent given to teſtimony by children gradually contracts as they advance in life: It is, therefore, more conſonant to truth, to ſay, that our *diffidence* in teſtimony is the reſult of experience, than that our *faith* in it has this foundation. Beſides, the uniformity of experience, in favour of any fact, is not a proof againſt its being reverſed in a particular inſtance. The evidence ariſing from the ſingle teſtimony of a man of known veracity will go far to eſtabliſh a belief in its being actually reverſed: If his teſtimony be confirmed by a few others of the ſame character, we cannot with-hold our aſſent to the truth of it. Now, though the operations of nature are governed by uniform

form laws, and though we have not the teſtimony of our ſenſes in favour of any *violation* of them, ſtill if, in particular inſtances, we have the teſtimony of *thouſands* of our fellow-creatures, and thoſe too men of ſtrict integrity, ſwayed by no motives of ambition or intereſt, and governed by the principles of common ſenſe, That they were actually eye-witneſſes of theſe violations, the conſtitution of our nature obliges us to believe them."

"Theſe two examples contain the ſubſtance of about 400 pages.—Making private abridgements of this kind has many advantages; it engages us to read with accuracy and attention; it fixes the ſubject in our minds; and, if we ſhould happen to forget, inſtead of reading the books again, by glancing a few lines, we are not only in poſſeſſion of the chief arguments, but recall, in a good meaſure, the author's manner and method."

Dr Campbell having ſent the manuſcript of his book againſt Mr Hume's *Eſſay on Miracles* to Dr Hugh Blair of Edinburgh, for

for his opinion of the work, Dr Blair propoſed to ſend the manuſcript to Mr Hume himſelf, which was accordingly done; and Mr Hume returned it to the Doctor accompanied with the following letter.

"SIR,

"I have peruſed the ingenious performance, which you was ſo obliging as to put into my hands, with all the attention poſſible; though not perhaps with all the ſerioufneſs and gravity which you have ſo frequently recommended to me. But the fault lies not in the piece, which is certainly very acute; but in the ſubject. I know you will ſay, it lies in neither, but in myſelf alone. If that be ſo, I am ſorry to ſay that I believe it is incurable.

"I could wiſh that your friend had not choſen to appear as a controverſial writer, but had endeavoured to eſtabliſh his principles in general, without any reference to a particular book or perſon; though I own he does me a great deal of honour, in thinking that any thing I have wrote deſerves his

his attention. For beſides many inconveniencies, which attends that kind of writing, I ſee it is almoſt impoſſible to preſerve decency and good manners in it. This author, for inſtance, ſays ſometimes obliging things of me much beyond what I can preſume to deſerve; and I thence conclude that in general he did not mean to inſult me: yet I meet with ſome other paſſages more worthy of Warburton and his followers than of ſo ingenious an author.

"But as I am not apt to loſe my temper, and would ſtill leſs incline to do ſo with a friend of your's, I ſhall calmly communicate to you ſome remarks on the argument, ſince you ſeem to deſire it. I ſhall employ very few words; ſince a hint will ſuffice to a gentleman of this author's penetration.

"Sect. I. I would deſire the author to conſider, whether the medium, by which we reaſon concerning human teſtimony be different from that which leads us to draw any inferences concerning other human actions; that is, our knowledge of human nature from

from experience? Or why it is different? I ſuppoſe we conclude an honeſt man will not lie to us, in the ſame manner as we conclude that he will not cheat us. As to the youthful propenſity to believe, which is corrected by experience; it ſeems obvious, that children adopt blindfold all the opinions, principles, ſentiments, and paſſions of their elders, as well as credit their teſtimony: nor is this more ſtrange, than that a hammer ſhould make an impreſſion on clay.

"Sect. II. No man can have any other experience but his own. The experience of others becomes his only by the credit which he gives to their teſtimony; which proceeds from his own experience of human nature.

"Sect. III. There is no contradiction in ſaying, that all the teſtimony which ever was really given for any miracle, or ever will be given, is a ſubject of deriſion; and yet forming a fiction or ſuppoſition of a teſtimony for a particular miracle, which

might not only merit attention, but amount to a full proof of it. For inſtance, the abſence of the ſun during 48 hours; but reaſonable men would only conclude from this fact, that the machine of the globe was diſordered during the time.

" Page 28. I find no difficulty to explain my meaning, and yet ſhall not probably do it in any future edition. The proof againſt a miracle, as it is founded on invariable experience, is of that *ſpecies* or *kind* of proof, which is full and certain when taken alone, becauſe it implies no doubt, as is the caſe with all probabilities; but there are degrees of this ſpecies, and when a weaker proof is oppoſed to a ſtronger, it is overcome.

" Page 29. There is very little more delicacy in telling a man he ſpeaks nonſenſe by implication than in ſaying ſo directly.

" Sect. IV. Does a man of ſenſe run after every ſilly tale of witches or hobgoblins or fairies, and canvaſs particularly the evidence? I never knew any one, that examined and deliberated

deliberated about nonſenſe who did not believe it before the end of his inquiries.

" Sect. 5. I wonder the author does not perceive the reaſon why Mr John Knox and Mr Alexander Henderſon did not work as many miracles as their brethren in other churches. Miracle working was a Popiſh trick, and diſcarded with the other parts of that religion. Men muſt have new and oppoſite ways of eſtabliſhing new and oppoſite follies. The ſame reaſon extends to Mahomet. The Greek prieſts, who were in the neighbourhood of Arabia, and many of them in it, were as great miracle-workers as the Romiſh; and Mahomet would have been laught at for ſo ſtale and ſimple a device. To caſt out devils, and cure the blind, where every one almoſt can do as much, is not the way to get any extraordinary aſcendant over men. I never read of a miracle in my life, that was not meant to eſtabliſh ſome new point of religion. There are no miracles wrought in Spain to prove the goſpel, but St. Francis Xavier wrought a thouſand well atteſted ones for that purpoſe

poſe in the Indies. The miracles in Spain, which are alſo fully and completely atteſted, are wrought to prove the efficacy of a particular crucifix or relict, which is always a new point, or, at leaſt, not univerſally received.

" Sect. 6. If a miracle proves a doctrine to be revealed from God, and conſequently true, a miracle can never be wrought for a contrary doctrine. The facts are therefore as incompatible as the doctrines.

" I could wiſh your friend had not denominated me an infidel writer, on account of ten or twelve pages which ſeem to him to have that tendency; while I have wrote ſo many volumes on hiſtory, literature, politics, trade, morals, which, in that particular at leaſt, are entirely inoffenſive. Is a man to be called a drunkard, becauſe he has been ſeen fuddled once in his life time?

" Having ſaid ſo much to your friend, who

is

is certainly a very ingenious man, though a little too zealous for a philoſopher; permit me alſo the freedom of ſaying a word to yourſelf. Whenever I have had the pleaſure to be in your company, if the diſcourſe turned upon any common ſubject of literature or reaſoning, I always parted from you both entertained and inſtructed. But when the converſation was diverted by you from this channel towards the ſubject of your profeſſion; though I doubt not but your intentions were very friendly towards me, I own I never received the ſame ſatisfaction: I was apt to be tired, and you to be angry. I would therefore wiſh for the future, wherever my good fortune throws me in your way, that theſe topics ſhould be forborn between us. I have, long ſince, done with all inquiries on ſuch ſubjects, and am become incapable of inſtruction; though I own no one is more capable of conveying it than yourſelf.

"After having given you the liberty of com-

communicating to your friend what part of this letter you think proper, I remain,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient

humble ſervant,

DAVID HUME*.

In

* *The following letter was ſent by* MR HUME *to the Author of the Delineation of the Nature and Obligation of Morality.*

"SIR,

"WHEN I write you, I know not to whom I am addreſſing myſelf; I only know he is one who has done me a great deal of honour, and to whoſe civilities I am obliged. If we be ſtrangers, I beg we may be acquainted as ſoon as you think proper to diſcover yourſelf; if we be acquainted already, I beg we may be friends; If friends, I beg we may be more ſo. Our connection with each other, as men of letters, is greater than our difference as adhering to different ſects or ſyſtems. Let us revive the happy times, when Atticus and Caſſius the Epicureans, Cicero the Academic, and Brutus the Stoic, could, all of them, live in unreſerved friendſhip together, and were inſenſible to all thoſe diſtinctions, except ſo far as they furniſhed agreeable matter to diſcourſe and converſation. Perhaps you are a young man, and being full of thoſe ſublime ideas, which you have ſo well expreſt, think there can be no virtue upon a more confined ſyſtem. I am not an old one; but being

In the year 1762, Mr Hume wrote the following letter to Dr Campbell, which does much honour to the writer.

" Dear

ing of a cool temperament, have always found, that more ſimple views were ſufficient to make me act in a reaſonable manner; νηφε, και μεμνησω απιστειν; in this faith have I lived, and hope to die.

" Your civilities to me ſo much over-balance your ſeverities, that I ſhould be ungrateful to take notice of ſome expreſſions, which, in the heat of compoſition, have dropt from your pen. I muſt only complain of you a little for aſcribing to me the ſentiments which I had put into the mouth of the Sceptic in the Dialogue. I have ſurely endeavoured to refute the Sceptic with all the force of which I am maſter; and my refutation muſt be allowed ſincere, becauſe drawn from the capital principles of my ſyſtem. But you impute to me both the ſentiments of the Sceptic and the ſentiments of his antagoniſt, which I can never admit of. In every Dialogue, no more than one perſon can be ſuppoſed to repreſent the author.

" Your ſeverity on one head, that of Chaſtity, is ſo great, and I am ſo little conſcious of having given any juſt occaſion to it, that it has afforded me a hint to form a conjecture, perhaps ill grounded, concerning your perſon

" I

" Dear Sir, *Edin. Jan.* 7. 1762.

" It has ſo ſeldom happened that controverſies in philoſophy, much more in theology, have been carried on without producing a perſonal quarrel between the parties, that I muſt regard my preſent ſituation as ſomewhat extraordinary, who have reaſon

" I hope to ſteal a little leiſure from my other occupations, in order to defend my philoſophy againſt your attacks. If I have occaſion to give a new edition of the work, which you have honoured with anſwer, I ſhall make great advantage of your remarks, and hope to obviate ſome of your criticiſms.

" Your ſtyle is elegant, and full of agreeable imagery. In ſome few places, it does not fully come up to my ideas of purity and correctneſs. I ſuppoſe mine falls ſtill further ſhort of your ideas. In this reſpect, we may certainly be of uſe to each other. With regard to our Philoſophical ſyſtems, I ſuppoſe we are both ſo fixt, that there is no hope of any converſions betwixt us; and for my part, I doubt not but we ſhall both do as well to remain as we are.

" I am, Sir,
With great regard,
Your moſt obliged
humble ſervant,
" DAVID HUME."

Edin. 15*th March* 1753.

ſon to give you thanks for the civil and obliging manner in which you have conducted the diſpute againſt me, on ſo intereſting a ſubject as that of miracles. Any little ſymptoms of vehemence, of which I formerly uſed the freedom to complain, when you favoured me with a ſight of the manuſcript, are either removed or explained away, or atoned for by civilities which are far beyond what I have any title to pretend to. It will be natural for you to imagine, that I will fall upon ſome ſhift to evade the force of your arguments, and to retain my former opinion in the point controverted between us; but it is impoſſible for me not to ſee the ingenuity of your performance, and the great learning which you have diſplayed againſt me.

"I conſider myſelf as very much honoured in being thought worthy of an anſwer by a perſon of ſo much merit; and, as I find that the public does you juſtice, with regard to the ingenuity and good compoſition of your piece, I hope you will have no reaſon to repent engaging with an anta-

goniſt, whom perhaps, in ſtrictneſs, you might have ventured to neglect. I own to you that I never felt ſo violent an inclination to defend myſelf as at preſent, when I am thus fairly challenged by you, and I think I could find ſomething ſpecious at leaſt to urge in my defence; but, as I had fixed a reſolution, in the beginning of my life, always to leave the public to judge between my adverſaries and me, without making any reply, I muſt adhere inviolably to this reſolution, otherwiſe my ſilence on any future occaſion would be conſtrued to be an inability to anſwer, and would be matter of triumph againſt me.

" It may perhaps amuſe you to learn the firſt hint which ſuggeſted to me that argument which you have ſo ſtrenuouſly attacked. I was walking in the cloyſters of the Jeſuits College of La Fleche, a town in which I paſſed two years of my youth, and was engaged in a converſation with a Jeſuit of ſome parts and learning, who was relating to me, and urging ſome nonſenſical miracle performed lately in their Convent, when I

was

was tempted to diſpute againſt him; and, as my head was full of the topics of my Treatiſe of Human Nature, which I was at that time compoſing, this argument immediately occurred to me, and I thought it very much gravelled my companion; but at laſt he obſerved to me, that it was impoſſible for that argument to have any ſolidity, becauſe it operated equally againſt the Goſpel as the Catholic miracles; which obſervation I thought proper to admit as a ſufficient anſwer. I believe you will allow that the freedom at leaſt of this reaſoning makes it ſomewhat extraordinary to have been the produce of a Convent of Jeſuits, though perhaps you may think that the ſophiſtry of it favours plainly of the place of its birth."

In the year 1762, Mr Hume attached himſelf to the celebrated Rouſſeau, when the latter was about to be impriſoned, by an *arrêt* of the Parliament of Paris, for publiſhing his famous romance called *Emile*. Mr Hume was then in Edinburgh. A perſon, as he ſays, of merit, but whoſe name he does not mention, wrote him from Paris, that

that M. Rouſſeau intended to come to Britain to procure an aſylum from perſecution in a land where freedom reigns, and genius and literature of every ſpecies are eminently encouraged. M. Rouſſeau, at the ſame time, aſked Mr Hume's patronage and recommendation when he ſhould arrive in London. Mr Hume, accordingly, wrote to ſeveral of his friends in London, in favour of this famous exile; and likewiſe wrote to himſelf, aſſuring him of his zeal and ſtrong deſire of doing every thing in his power to ſerve him. Mr Hume, at the ſame time, ſolicited Rouſſeau to come to Edinburgh, and offered him a ſecure retreat in his own houſe as long as he ſhould chuſe. Mr Hume's principal motives for making this offer were the celebrity of Rouſſeau's genius and talents, and particularly the perſecution he ſuffered from the bigots of his own country, joined to the weak and deceaſed ſtate of his body, occaſioned by the paſſing of blood through his urethra. This diſorder, like moſt chronical diſtempers, rendered his mind peeviſh, and, of courſe, made his temper and his actions frequently

bizarre

bizarre and diſagreeable, eſpecially to ſtrangers. Mr Hume ſeems, in ſome parts of the controverſy, not to have made ſufficient allowance for the weak and painful condition of his antagoniſt's body. Pain, when long continued, not only induces general debility, but frets and diſturbs the mind, and makes it ſuſpicious and impatient. This circumſtance, it is probable, was the principal cauſe of the rupture that happened between theſe two learned and moſt ingenious men. Mr Hume, however, through the whole controverſy, treats M. Rouſſeau with humanity and reſpect. He, indeed, defends himſelf ſtrenuouſly againſt the calumnies and inſinuations of his illuſtrious opponent; and he was fully entitled to do ſo.

At the inſtigation of Mr Hume, Rouſſeau arrived in England in Spring 1766; and Mr Hume procured a pleaſant reſidence for him in a country houſe belonging to Mr Davenport, a gentleman diſtinguiſhed by his birth, by his fortune, and by his merit. This villa is ſituated in the county of Derby, and is called *Wooton*. As ſoon as Rouſ-

ſeau

ſeau arrived at Wooton, he was charmed with the ſituation of the place, as well as with the adjacent country; and wrote Mr Hume, in the moſt polite and grateful terms, how much he eſteemed his friendſhip and patronage.

When on their route to Britain, one evening at Calais, Mr Hume aſked Rouſſeau, if he would accept a penſion from the King of Britain, provided it ſhould be obtained? Rouſſeau replied, that he found ſome difficulty in anſwering the queſtion; but that he would refer the affair to Lord Marſhall, who was a great friend to Rouſſeau. Encouraged by this reſponſe, Mr Hume, as ſoon as he arrived in London, applied to General Conway, then Secretary of State, and likewiſe to General Graeme, Secretary and Chamberlain to the Queen, aſking a penſion to Rouſſeau, which was readily granted, on the ſole condition that the affair ſhould be kept ſecret. This condition was highly agreeable to Rouſſeau, who loved to conceal ſuch favours as he occaſionally received, and particularly in what related to money-matters, becauſe he thought they

they degraded that ſpirit of independency which he always, at leaſt, pretended to poſſeſs. But Mr Hume had, for ſome time, anxiouſly attended to the eaſe and intereſt of M. Rouſſeau, who continually complained both of bodily pain and of poverty, diſcovered with aſtoniſhment, that the laſt complaint of extreme poverty was falſe. He employed this laſt artifice (for the firſt was no artifice), Mr Hume remarks, to render himſelf, as a man of genius, more intereſting, and to excite the compaſſion of the public.

The time which Mr Hume ſpent with M. Rouſſeau gradually enabled him to unfold his real character. I at laſt perceived, ſays he, with infinite pain, that this ingenious man was born for tumult and ſtorms; but, as Mr Hume had done every thing to accommodate Rouſſeau, and to render his ſituation comfortable, he never dreamed that he himſelf was to become a victim of his rage and peeviſhneſs. The origin of the rupture between theſe two great men took its riſe from a ridiculous circumſtance.

Mr

Mr Horace Walpole, who, it would appear, was no great friend to Rouſſeau, wrote a letter, under the fictitious deſignation of *Frederic King of Pruſſia*, inviting him to come and reſide in his Court at Berlin. Of this affair Mr Hume had no knowledge. But Rouſſeau, from what circumſtances it is difficult to conjecture, imagined that Mr Hume had written and circulated that letter with a view to perplex and burleſque him. Mr Hume, in this more than fooliſh affair, excuſes Mr Walpole by calling it an innocent *plaiſanterie*. But, when the genius, the temper, and the diſeaſed ſtate of Rouſſeau's body are conſidered, inſtead of a *plaiſanterie*, it was a direct *cruelty*, and had, by a natural miſtake, the unhappy effect of converting two cordial and celebrated friends into mortal enemies.

M. Rouſſeau, though Mr Hume procured him a grant of a penſion from his Majeſty, actuated by ſome whimſical ideas of independency, and a notion that his beſt friend meant to betray him, refuſed to accept of it. Mr Hume, by friendly letters, preſſed

preſſed Rouſſeau to accept of the penſion; but the latter obſtinately perſiſted in his denial, and even reproached Mr Hume, in terms the moſt indecent, for ſo ſucceſsfully endeavouring to ſerve him, and to render his circumſtances eaſy for life.

The ſuppoſititious letter, written in the name of the King of Pruſſia, after copies of it had been circulated over Europe, was at laſt publiſhed in the *St James's Chronicle*. It was in that News-paper which Rouſſeau firſt ſaw this imprudent and ill-judged production. M. Rouſſeau immediately wrote to the Editors of the St James's Chronicle complaining bitterly of the impoſture, and indirectly inſinuating that the pretended letter was compoſed by Mr Hume. When Mr Hume learnt that he was ſuſpected by M. Rouſſeau to be the author and publiſher of this letter, it gave him much uneaſineſs. Mr Hume remarks, that, after the great attention and beneficent ſervices he had, with unremitting perſeverance, beſtowed on M. Rouſſeau, he was ſuddenly become the object of his reſentment and obloquy, upon

no other foundation than a fooliſh and even abſurd ſuſpicion. Mr Hume, notwithſtanding this unhappy affair, continued to protect and cheriſh Rouſſeau by friendly letters as well as by good offices. But, ſoon afterwards, Rouſſeau threw off every maſk, and accuſed Mr Hume openly as a traitorous enemy, without aſſigning any reaſons but what were evidently capricious, frivolous, and contemptible. I ſhall mention one example only. The firſt night after theſe two remarkable men left Paris, in their way to Britain, they both ſlept in the ſame chamber. M. Rouſſeau, in the laſt letter he ever wrote to Mr Hume, which is of an enormous length, ſays, that during the night, Mr Hume, ſeveral times, called out, with unuſual vehemence, *Je tiens J. J. Rouſſeau.* He, however, acknowledges, that he knew not whether Mr Hume was ſleeping or waking. The expreſſion, in the French language, is ſtrong; but, like many verbs, *tenir* is frequently uſed in very different and even oppoſite ſenſes. Rouſſeau interpreted the expreſſion thus: *I have Rouſſeau in my poſſeſſion*, or, *I hold him faſt.*

Every

Every time theſe words were repeated, Rouſſeau tells us that he trembled with terror. This and ſome ſimilar inſignificant circumſtances gave riſe to a complete rupture between thoſe too great men.

When the periodical paper called the *Edinburgh Magazine and Review* was publiſhing in the year 1773, the late Rev. Dr Henry, then one of the miniſters of this city, a moſt laborious clergyman, as well as a facetious and good-humoured companion, brought forth the ſecond volume of his *Hiſtory of Great Britain*. Dr Henry, it was ſaid, applied, in the moſt earneſt manner, to Mr Hume to give an account of that volume in the Review, to which Mr Hume gave his aſſent. When the manuſcript appeared, after reading it, the praiſes appeared to be ſo high-ſtrained, that the Reviewers, in my preſence, agreed that Mr Hume's account was meant as a burleſque upon the author. It was, therefore, committed to the farther conſideration of one of their number, who ſtill continued to be of the ſame opinion, and, accordingly, raiſed the encomiums ſo high,

high, that no perſon could miſtake the ſuppoſed meaning of the writer. The types of the Manuſcript, in this laſt form, were compoſed, and proof-ſheets ſent to Mr Hume for his peruſal and corrections. To the aſtoniſhment of the Reviewers, Mr Hume wrote them an angry letter, complaining, in the higheſt terms, of the freedoms they had uſed with his manuſcript, and declaring that in the account he had given of Dr Henry's Hiſtory, he was perfectly ſincere. Upon which, Mr Hume's review was cancelled, and another was written by a member of the Society, condemning the book in terms perhaps too ſevere; ſo that Mr Hume's intention of ſerving Dr Henry was not only abortive, but produced an oppoſite effect.

Another circumſtance in the life of Mr Hume muſt not be omitted. When a young man, he applied to be made *Profeſſor of Moral Philoſophy* in the Univerſity of Edinburgh. The Scottiſh clergy took an alarm. They repreſented that Mr Hume, in his principles, was an *Atheiſt*, or at leaſt

a

a *Deiſt*; and, conſequently, that he was very ill-qualified to teach morals to youth in a Chriſtian country. Their remonſtrances were effectual; and Mr Hume's application was rejected. From that moment, as was natural, he conceived a rooted antipathy to the generality of Scottiſh clergymen. This antipathy was not, however, indiſcriminate; for he was in intimate habits of friendſhip and ſociality with ſeveral of the miniſters of the Church of Scotland; as the celebrated Dr Robertſon, Dr Blair, Dr Wallace, Mr Jardine, Dr Wiſhart, Dr Dryſdale, Mr Home, the author of the ingenious and popular tragedy of *Douglas*, and many others. Theſe reverend and learned gentlemen, however much they differed from Mr Hume in religious or philoſophical opinions, were fully ſenſible of his Genius as an Author, and of his Worth as a Man.

I ſhall mention another anecdote.—One ſummer evening, I went to ſup with *Lord Kames*. Soon after, Dr John Warden, a worthy, a reſpectable, and an uſeful clergyman

man of this City, came to Lord Kames's houſe with the ſame intention. Lord Kames was then dictating to his clerk. When his Lordſhip had finiſhed, he led us to a drawing room, which was ſituated to the north, becauſe the night was remarkably warm. Here we had converſed for ſome time, when Mr Hume joined the party. The converſation went on in the moſt agreeable manner. A ſermon had juſt been publiſhed by a Mr Edwards with the ſtrange title of the *Uſefulneſs of Sin*. Dr Warden told us, that he had read this ſermon. Mr Hume repeated the words: The *Uſefulneſs of Sin!* I ſuppoſe, ſays he, Mr Edwards adopts the ſyſtem of Leibnitz, that *all is for the beſt; but*, added he, with his uſual keenneſs of eye and forcible manner of expreſſion, *What the Devil does the fellow make of hell and damnation?* Upon Mr Hume's pronouncing theſe words, for what reaſon I could never conjecture, Dr Warden took his hat and left the room. Lord Kames followed him, and preſſed him with anxiety to return, but he obſtinately refuſed.

After

After a very tedious illneſs, Mr Hume expired at Edinburgh on the 25th day of Auguſt 1776, in the 65th year of his age. —Some particulars relating to his death I have already given to my Readers in the letters of Dr Black to Dr Smith on that occaſion.

Some time after Mr Hume's death, two Eſſays, aſcribed to him, were publiſhed at London; the one on *Suicide*, and the other on the *Immortality of the Soul*. Theſe eſſays, from the mode of writing and of reaſoning, appear evidently to be genuine productions of Mr Hume. I once intended, in this life of Mr Hume, to give an abridged view of the arguments in theſe two ingenious and plauſible Eſſays. But, after more mature reflection, as I conſidered the ſophiſtry of the reaſoning, and the injurious effects it might have on ſociety; and as an abridgement of them would only be another mode of adminiſtering the poiſon they contain, I ſhall now relinquiſh that part of my ſubject, and conclude with a few general remarks.

Upon

Upon the whole, Mr Hume was one of thoſe extraordinary characters which ſometimes, but rarely, appear, like luminous meteors, in almoſt every civilized country in Europe. For elegance of compoſition, for dexterous and forcible reaſoning, for good humour and pleaſantry in converſation, and for uniformity of temper and conduct, he was not to be excelled. Before his death, Mr Hume had written his laſt will, in which, beſide other appointments, he allotted a certain ſum for building his tomb, which he ordered to be erected in the Calton burying-ground, which is ſituated on a pretty high hill almoſt within the City of Edinburgh. Like himſelf, his tomb is built of maſſy but unadorned ſtones, with this ſimple inſcription, DAVID HUME, ESQ. After the tomb was finiſhed, one ſummer day, I was ſauntering on the Caltonhill, in company with the late well-known Dr Gilbert Stuart, and Dr John Brown, author of what is called the *Brownonian Syſtem of Phyſic*. Dr Brown, who was a man of rough and coarſe manners, obſerved to a maſon, who was hewing a pavement ſtone,

" Friend,"

"Friend," ſaid he, "this is a ſtrong and maſſy building; but how do you think the honeſt gentleman can get out at the reſurrection?" The maſon archly replied, "Sir, I have ſecured that point; for I have put the *key under the door*."

THE

LIFE

OF

ADAM SMITH, L. L. D.

ADAM SMITH was born of very reſpectable parents at Kirkcaldy, a town in the county of Fife, on the 5th day of June 1723. During infancy, his conſtitution was feeble and ſickly. When about three years of age, a ſingular accident happened to him. When amuſing himſelf one day alone at the door of his uncle Mr Douglas's houſe, at Strathenry, he was ſtolen and carried off by a gang of vagrants, known in Scotland by the appellation of *tinkers*. His uncle, with ſome aſſiſtants, purſued the banditti, and overtook them in Leſlie-wood.

Thus

Thus was young Smith reſcued from obſcurity, who was deſtined afterwards to enlighten the world by his teaching, as well as by his ingenious and learned compoſitions. Mr Smith, very early in youth, attracted notice by his keen application to ſtudy, and by an uncommonly retentive memory. Among his companions, though he was prevented from ſharing their more active exerciſes, yet his good humour and placid manners procured from them the moſt affectionate attachment. Even at that period of life, he had contracted ſome innocent habits which never departed from him. When alone, he often ſpoke aloud to himſelf as he proceeded along the ſtreets. He was frequently *abſent*, as it is termed, or inattentive to the converſation which was going on while in company.

In the year 1737, he was ſent from the grammar ſchool of Kirkcaldy to the Univerſity of Glaſgow, where he continued at his ſtudies till the year 1740, when he went to Baliol College, Oxford, as an exhibitioner. After reſiding at Oxford ſeven years,

years, he returned to Kirkcaldy, where he ſived two years with his mother. Here he engaged in ſtudy with his uſual ardour, but had not yet determined what plan of life or profeſſion he was to follow. His relations had originally intended him for the Church of England, and, with that view, he had been ſent to the Univerſity of Oxford; but not reliſhing eccleſiaſtical employments, he conſulted his own inclination in preference to that of his friends; and, in the year 1748, read lectures on rhetoric and belles lettres, under the particular patronage of the late moſt ingenious, friendly, and patriotic Lord Kames. Mr Smith, in the year 1751, was called to the Profeſſorſhip of Logic in the Univerſity of Glaſgow, where he continued to teach for thirteen years. In the exerciſe of this profeſſion, he ſoon perceived that his pupils could derive little or no advantage from the ancient logic and metaphyſics of the ſchools. He, therefore, gave enough to gratify the curioſity of his pupils on theſe ſubjects, and ſpent the reſt of the courſe in delivering a ſyſtem of rhetoric and belles lettres.

Mr

Mr Smith was afterwards removed from the Logic claſs, and appointed Profeſſor of Morals in the ſame Univerſity. He divided his courſe of lectures into four branches: I. Natural Theology; in which he conſidered the proofs of the being and attributes of God, and the general principles of religion. II. Ethics, which conſiſted chiefly of the ideas which he afterwards publiſhed in his ingenious Theory of Moral Sentiments. III. That branch of morality which relates to juſtice. IV. He concluded his lectures with an examination of thoſe political arrangements which are founded, not upon *juſtice* ſtrictly ſo called, but upon *expediency*, and are calculated to augment the riches and the proſperity of a ſtate. In this branch of his ſubject, he gave a view of thoſe political inſtitutions which relate to commerce, to finances, and to the affairs of the church and of the military. In his lectures, he delivered the ſubſtance of that juſtly celebrated work, intituled, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Cauſes of the Wealth of Nations*. Theſe lectures he delivered almoſt without the aid of writing or reading.

His

His mode of elocution was always plain and unaffected. But, upon any favourite or intereſting topics, his manner was highly animated, and his expreſſion fluent, unembarraſſed, and ſuch as commanded attention. His great reputation as a Profeſſor, joined to his extenſive erudition and gentle and affectionate manners, brought a multitude of ſtudents, from a great diſtance, to the Univerſity.

I ſhall now give a ſhort account of the writings of this illuſtrious author.

In the beginning of the year 1759, Mr Smith publiſhed his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. It underwent ſix editions before the author's death, which happened in the month of July 1790. It is a fundamental principle of Mr Smith's Theory, that the actions of other men are the primary objects of our moral perceptions; and that the judgments we form with regard to our own conduct are only applications to ourſelves of theſe opinions we have previouſly entertained concerning the conduct of others. He divides this work into two parts.

The

The firſt contains an explanation how we learn to judge concerning the behaviour of thoſe with whom we aſſociate; and the laſt, in what manner we acquire a ſenſe of duty by the application of theſe judgments to ourſelves. With reſpect to our own conduct, and that of others, our moral judgments contain two ſeparate perceptions: I. The perception of right and of wrong. II. The perception of propriety or impropriety in the actions of other perſons. To the word *rectitude*, ſo generally employed by moraliſts, Mr Smith ſubſtitutes the term *propriety*. His principles and doctrines on this ſubject, he comprehends in the ſubſequent propoſitions.

I. From our own experience ſolely we are enabled to acquire any ideas of what is occupying the mind of another perſon. By ſuppoſing ourſelves in the ſame ſituation in which any perſon is placed, and, of courſe, thinking how we ſhould be affected in the ſame or ſimilar circumſtances, is the only mode we can employ of conceiving ſuch ideas. From this imaginary mutation of

place

place with other men, that intereſt we take in their good or bad fortunes is chiefly derived. Mr Smith elucidates this poſition by many well-known facts. "When we ſee a ſtroke aimed," he remarks, "and juſt ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another perſon, we naturally ſhrink and draw back our own leg or our own arm; and when it does fall, we feel it in ſome meaſure, and are hurt by it as well as the ſufferer. The mob, when they are gazing at a dancer on the ſlack rope, naturally writhe and twiſt and balance their own bodies, as they ſee him do, and as they feel that they themſelves muſt do if in his ſituation." Mr Smith farther remarks, that the ſame thing happens when our attention is excited to the condition of our neighbour. "Whatever is the paſſion which ariſes from any object in the perſon principally concerned, an analogous emotion ſprings up, at the thought of his ſituation, in the breaſt of every attentive ſpectator. In every paſſion of which the mind of man is ſuſceptible, the emotions of the by-ſtander always correſpond to what, by bringing the caſe home to himſelf, he

imagines ſhould be the ſentiments of the ſufferer."

This principle of human nature Mr Smith diſtinguiſhes by the epithets of *ſympathy* or *fellow-feeling*.

II. Sympathy between different perſons is always agreeable to both. When in ſituations which excite particular paſſions, it is attended with a peculiar pleaſure to perceive that the ſpectators are, by ſympathy, affected in the ſame manner with ourſelves.

III. When a ſpectator of another man's ſituation feels himſelf affected in the ſame manner as the principal, he approves of the paſſion or affection of that perſon as juſt and proper. Mr Smith remarks, that the exceptions that may be made to this obſervation are only apparent, and by no means ſolid. "A ſtranger, for example," ſays he, "paſſes by us in the ſtreet with all the marks of the deepeſt affliction; and we are immediately told, that he has juſt received the

the news of the death of his father. It is impoſſible that, in this caſe, we ſhould not approve of his grief; yet it may often happen, without any defect of humanity on our part, that, ſo far from entering into the violence of his ſorrow, we ſhould ſcarce conceive the firſt movements of concern upon his account. We have learned, however, from experience, that ſuch a misfortune naturally excites ſuch a degree of ſorrow; and we know that, if we took time to examine his ſituation fully and in all its parts, we ſhould, without doubt, moſt ſincerely ſympathize with him. It is upon the conſciouſneſs of this conditional ſympathy that our approbation of his ſorrow is founded, even in thoſe caſes in which that ſympathy does not actually take place; and the general rules derived from our preceding experience of what our ſentiments would commonly correſpond with, correct upon this, as upon many other occaſions, the impropriety of our preſent emotions."

Hence,

Hence, by the propriety of any paſſion, or affection, exhibited by another perſon, we are to underſtand its ſuitableneſs to the object by which it is excited. We can judge of this ſuitableneſs ſolely by the coincidence of the affection with that which we feel, when we conceive ourſelves to be placed in the ſame circumſtances; and, upon the perception of this coincidence, the ſentiment of *moral approbation* is founded.

IV. Sympathetic affections, though they naturally ariſe in the mind of a ſpectator, bear a ſmall proportion only, in degree of vivacity, to what is felt by the perſon himſelf. To procure, therefore, the pleaſure of mutual ſympathy, the ſpectator is ſtimulated by nature to raiſe his emotion, as nearly as he can, to the ſame height as the object itſelf would really produce. On the other hand, ſhe prompts the perſon whoſe paſſion this object has excited, to bring it down to a level with that of the ſpectator.

V. Different ſpecies of virtues are founded upon theſe two mutual efforts. The effort

effort of the ſpectator to partake of the feelings of the perſon principally concerned, and to raiſe his ſympathetic emotions to the ſame degree as thoſe of the actor, gives riſe to the mild and amiable virtues. Upon the efforts of the principal to depreſs his own emotions, with a view to make them correſpond with thoſe of the ſpectator, are founded the great and reſpectable virtues, as thoſe of humility, of ſelf-government, and of that command of the paſſions which ſubjects all our determinations to what the dignity, the honour, and the propriety of our conduct, in the complicated affairs of life, require. In farther illuſtration of this ſubject, Mr Smith treats of the degrees of the different paſſions which are conſiſtent with propriety; and ſhows, that it is always indecent or decent to expreſs a paſſion ſtrongly, according as men are diſpoſed or not diſpoſed to give it their ſympathy. For example, it is improper to expreſs any paſſions which originate from a particular condition of the body; becauſe our neighbour, who is not in the ſame condition, cannot be ſuppoſed to ſympathize with them. To

cry

cry out with bodily pain is unbecoming; becauſe the ſympathy of the ſpectator is greatly diſproportioned to the acuteneſs of the ſufferer's feelings.

When indulging the unſocial, rather hoſtile, paſſions of hatred and reſentment, the ſpectators ſympathy is divided between the perſon who feels the paſſion, and the perſon who is its object: "We are concerned for both, and our fear for what the one may ſuffer damps our reſentment for what the other has ſuffered." From this circumſtance ariſe that imperfect manner by which we ſympathize with ſuch paſſions, and, when under their influence, the propriety of moderating their expreſſion to a greater degree than any other emotions require. In all the ſocial and benevolent affections, the reverſe takes place. The ſpectator's ſympathy with the perſon who feels them, coincides with the intereſt he takes in the perſon who is the object of them. This redoubled ſympathy makes theſe affections peculiarly agreeable and reſpectable.

Mr

Mr Smith next inquires how far the judgments of men, concerning the propriety of human actions, are liable to be affected by the proſperous or adverſe circumſtances of the agent. On this ſubject, he endeavours to ſhew, that, when no envy exiſts, our propenſity to ſympathize with joy is much ſtronger than with that of ſorrow; and, of courſe, that we more readily receive the approbation of mankind when we are in proſperity than when we are in adverſity. He derives the origin of ambition, or the deſire of ſuperior rank, from the ſame principle. The great object of ambition is, to attain that degree of preeminence over his countrymen or fellow citizens, which places him in a conſpicuous view, and, of courſe, excites general ſympathy and attention, and beſtows on him a dominion over the affections of other men.

After finiſhing the analyſis of our perception of propriety and impropriety, Mr Smith proceeds to examine our ſenſe of merit and demerit, which he derives from the ſame

ſame ſource, not from our own characters, but from the characters of thoſe with whom we have intercourſe. The terms *propriety* and *impropriety*, as formerly remarked, are meant to expreſs the ſuitableneſs or unſuitableneſs of the affection to the *cauſe* by which it is excited. The words *merit* and *demerit* always refer to the *effect* which the affection has a tendency to produce. When the tendency of any affection is beneficial, the agent appears to be an object of reward; when it has an oppoſite tendency, he appears to be deſerving of puniſhment. Gratitude and reſentment are the chief principles in human nature which ſtimulate us to reward and to puniſh. It muſt, however, be remarked, that we do not altogether ſympathize with the gratitude of one man to another, ſolely becauſe the latter has been the cauſe of the former's good fortune, or ſucceſs, in any deſirable object, unleſs that cauſe has proceeded from motives of which we entirely approve. The ſame remark is applicable to our ſenſe of demerit. Mr Smith infers, from theſe principles, that the only actions which appear to merit reward,

ward, are thoſe which have a beneficial tendency, and, at the ſame time, derive their origin from benevolent motives; and the only actions which ſeem to deſerve puniſhment are thoſe of a hurtful tendency, and proceed from improper or ſiniſter motives. Theſe and ſimilar obſervations led Mr Smith to anticipate ſome inconſiderable parts of the ſecond principal diviſion of his work, by a brief inquiry concerning the origin of the ſenſe of juſtice as applicable to the conduct of individuals, as well as of the ſentiments of remorſe, and of ſelf-approbation.

By means of the principle of ſympathy, he endeavours to account for our ſenſe of juſtice, and every other moral ſentiment. When we attend ſolely to the feelings of our own minds, individual happineſs intereſts us more than that of all other human beings. But we are likewiſe conſcious, that, in this exceſſive preference, other men refuſe us their ſympathy, and that to them we appear only as part of the vulgar crowd, in whom we take little or no intereſt. Hence, if we wiſh to procure their appro-

bation and ſympathy, we ſhall find it neceſſary to conſider our own happineſs, not in the light which it appears to ourſelves, but in that light in which it appears to the generality of mankind. If we receive an unprovoked injury, we know, from experience, that ſociety will ſympathize with our reſentment; but, if we hurt the feelings or intereſts of another perſon, merely becauſe they ſtand in oppoſition to our own, we inſtantly perceive that ſociety will ſympathize with his reſentment, and that we ſhall become the objects of general indignation and contempt. When we are led to neglect theſe conſiderations, by the violence of paſſion, and to act from motives purely ſelfiſh, we naturally incur the puniſhment of remorſe. After our paſſion is gratified, we can no longer enter into the ſame motives to which it gave riſe. We perceive it to have been improper; we regret the effects produced by it; we pity the ſufferer whom we have injured; and we feel ourſelves to be objects of general reſentment. "Such," Mr Smith remarks, "is the nature of that ſentiment which is properly called *remorſe*. It is made up of ſhame from the

ſenſe

ſenſe of the impropriety of paſt conduct; of grief for the effects of it; and of the dread and terror of puniſhment from the conſciouſneſs of the juſtly provoked reſentment of all rational creatures."

The contrary behaviour of a man who, from laudable motives, has performed a generous action, excites the oppoſite ſentiment of conſcious merit.

Mr Smith finiſhes his Theory by ſhowing how we acquire the *ſenſe of duty*, by applying to ourſelves the judgments we had previouſly formed concerning the conduct of other men. He begins with a well-known fact, that we are conſcious of merited praiſe or blame. He likewiſe informs us, that the great object of a virtuous man is to act in ſuch a manner as to ſecure a *juſt* approbation of thoſe with whom he is converſant, as well as with mankind in general. Though this circumſtance may ſeem to imply the exiſtence of a moral feeling independently of any external incitements, he maintains, that our moral ſenti-

ments

ments have uniformly a reference to what are, or ought to be, the feelings of others. If it were poſſible, he remarks, that a man could arrive at maturity without having any communication with his own ſpecies, he would be equally unable to form any judgment of his own conduct, as of the beauty or deformity of his countenance. He allows, however, that there is a tribunal in our own minds, which judges of all our thoughts and actions, and frequently depreſſes us amidſt the applauſes, and ſupports us when labouring under the cenſures, of our ſpecies. When young and unexperienced, we are apt to indulge the impoſſible project of obtaining the approbation and even the affection of every perſon with whom we have any intercourſe. But we ſoon diſcover the impoſſibility of attaining this deſirable end. Our conduct, though perfectly equitable, not unfrequently ſtands in oppoſition to the intereſts or inclinations of particular men, who are ſeldom ſo candid as to acknowledge the propriety of our motives, or to perceive that this conduct, however diſagreeable to them, is perfectly

conſonant

conſonant to our preſent ſituation. To defend ourſelves againſt ſuch partial judgments, we erect a judge in our own breaſts, whoſe office it is to decide every queſtion that occurs between ourſelves and thoſe with whom we aſſociate in the affairs of life. To accompliſh this ſalutary end, we conceive an imaginary, but impartial ſpectator to be always preſent, and to witneſs all our actions; of courſe, we endeavour to act in a manner which we think will receive the approbation of this ſuppoſed judge of our thoughts and of our conduct.

Two motives induce us to ſelf-examination. 1ſt, Before we reſolve to act; and, 2d, After we have acted. When about to act, the force and precipitancy of the prevailing paſſion does not allow us to conſider what men of candour are to think of our conduct. After the action is performed, and the paſſions which ſtimulated us to perform it have ſubſided, though we ſympathize with the ſentiments of the ſpectator much more coolly than before; it is, however, ſo irkſome to diſapprove of ourſelves, that we turn aſide

ſuch

ſuch circumſtances as might render our judgment unfavourable.—From this ſource is derived that ſelf-deceit which gives riſe to many miſchiefs and calamities in this aſtoniſhing world. To guard againſt the deluſions of ſelf-conceit, nature leads us, from daily obſervations on the conduct of others, to form general rules regarding what actions are proper to be performed or avoided. Some actions ſhock all our natural ſentiments. When we ſee other people affected in a ſimilar manner, our belief in the juſtneſs of our diſapprobation is confirmed. Hence we conclude, as a general rule, that certain actions are improper, becauſe they have a direct tendency to make us odious and contemptible. By reflection, however, we endeavour to fix this rule in our minds, with a view to correct the miſrepreſentations of ſelf-love. Men who indulge the feelings of anger and reſentment, if they were to obey the dictates of their paſſions, would conſider the deſtruction of their ſuppoſed enemies as a ſmall compenſation for a trivial injury. But their remarks on the conduct of others have ſhewn them how unreaſonable

reaſonable and horrid is ſuch ſanguinary revenge. Ideas and experiences of this kind eſtabliſh their authority, check the impetuoſity of paſſion, and correct the motives ſuggeſted by ſelf-love. According to Mr Smith, a regard to ſuch general laws of morality conſtitutes what is denominated the *ſenſe of duty*.

The whole of Mr Smith's doctrine is comprehended in the few following ſentences: "When we approve of any character or action, the ſentiments which we feel are derived from four different ſources. *Firſt*, We ſympathize with the motives of the agent. *Secondly*, We enter into the gratitude of thoſe who receive the benefit of his actions. *Thirdly*, We obſerve that his conduct has been agreeable to the general rules by which thoſe two ſympathies generally act. And, *laſtly*, When we conſider ſuch actions as making a part of a ſyſtem of behaviour which tends to promote the happineſs either of the individual or of ſociety, they appear to derive a beauty from this utility, not unlike that which we

aſcribe

aſcribe to any well-contrived machine." Theſe different ſentiments, in Mr Smith's eſtimation, completely exhauſt the compounded ſyſtem of moral approbation. With regard to the nature of virtue, he thinks it always involves the idea of propriety, or of the ſuitableneſs of the affection to the object by which it is excited, which ſuitableneſs can only be determined by the ſympathy of impartial ſpectators with the motives of the agent. This account of virtue, however, he acknowledges to be ſomewhat incomplete: Beſide propriety, actions of beneficence poſſeſs another quality; for they not only obtain our approbation, but ſeem to merit recompenſe, and to create a ſuperior degree of eſteem, occaſioned by a double ſympathy, viz. with the motives of the agent, and with the gratitude of thoſe who are the objects of affection. According to this view, beneficence appears to Mr Smith to be diſtinguiſhed from the cooller virtues of prudence, circumſpection, temperance, vigilance, conſtancy, and firmneſs, which always obtain our approbation, but excite no ideas of ſuperior merit.

I have

I have now given a ſhort account of Mr Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*; which is univerſally allowed to be a work of ſingular invention and ingenuity. Though this theory may not receive the approbation of every moral ſpeculatiſt, the author has the undoubted merit of calling the attention of philoſophers to a view of human nature which, till this publication appeared, had almoſt entirely eſcaped their obſervation. Of the ſound reaſoning exhibited in this theory, its perſpicuouſneſs and plauſibility afford ſufficient evidence; for, as remarked by the author himſelf, no ſyſtem of morals can obtain a general aſſent unleſs it makes near approaches to truth. But the merit of Mr Smith's performance is not limited to ſo narrow a compaſs. No work, perhaps, whether ancient or modern, exhibits ſo complete and ſo perſpicuous a picture of thoſe facts which regard our moral perceptions, and which it is one great object of this ſcience to refer to general laws. The theoretical doctrines of the work are always interſperſed with the moſt ele-

vated and correct maxims regarding the practical conduct of human life.

To the ſecond edition of his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Mr Smith ſubjoined a ſhort, but ingenious tract, to which he gives the title of *Conſiderations concerning the firſt Formation of Languages, and the different Genius of original and compounded Languages.*

In this tract, Mr Smith naturally ſuppoſes, that the denomination of particular objects, or what are termed *ſubſtantive nouns*, was one of the firſt attempts towards the formation of language. A few ſavages, who had never had any intercourſe with other men, would ſoon begin to form a language, or to utter ſounds denoting particular objects. Thoſe objects only with which they were moſt immediately connected would have particular names aſſigned to them. The cave which ſheltered them from the weather, the tree the fruit of which allayed their hunger, the fountain whoſe water extinguiſhed their thirſt, would

be

be denominated by the words *cave*, *tree*, *fountain*, or by other ſynonymous appellations. Theſe ſavages, after greater experience had led them to obſerve other caves, trees, and fountains, would naturally call them by the ſame names by which they had been accuſtomed to expreſs the ſimilar objects with which they were firſt acquainted. The new objects had no peculiar names, but each of them reſembled exactly the other objects which had received appellations. Thoſe ſavages could never behold the new objects without recollecting the appearances of the old ones, as well as their names. Hence, when they wiſhed to point out any of the new ones, they would naturally expreſs the name of the correſpondent old one, the idea of which muſt have preſented itſelf in the moſt lively colours. In this manner words, which were originally the proper names of individual ſubſtances, would each of them become gradually the common name of a multitude. When children are juſt beginning to ſpeak, they call every perſon who comes into the houſe their *papa* or *mama*; and, of courſe, apply

to

to the whole ſpecies thoſe appellations which they had been taught to appropriate to two individuals only. "I have known a clown," ſays Mr Smith, "who did not know the proper name of the river which ran by his own door. It was *the river*, he ſaid, and he never heard any other name for it. His experience, it ſeems, had not led him to obſerve any other river." The general word *river*, it would appear, was, in his acceptation, a proper name, denoting an individual object only. Mr Smith gives a number of ſimilar examples, which, in this ſummary view, it is unneceſſary to repeat.

Mr Smith farther remarks, that this application of the name of an individual object to a multitude, the reſemblances of which recall the idea of that individual, as well as of its name, has given riſe to the formation of thoſe claſſes which have long been diſtinguiſhed by the appellation of *genera* and *ſpecies*. According to Mr Smith, "What conſtitutes a ſpecies is merely a number of objects, bearing a certain degree of reſemblance to one another; and, on that

that account, denominated by a ſingle appellation, which may be applied to expreſs any one of them."

When many viſible objects had been in this manner arranged under proper genera and ſpecies, and diſtinguiſhed by ſuch general names, the greater part of that almoſt infinite number of individuals comprehended under each genus could not poſſibly have peculiar names appropriated to every individual. Hence, whenever particular objects were to be pointed out, it was neceſſary to diſtinguiſh them from the other objects comprehended under the ſame general name, either by its peculiar qualities, or by the peculiar relation in which it ſtood to other things. From theſe circumſtances neceſſarily aroſe two claſſes of words, the one expreſſing *quality* and the other *relation*. Adjective nouns are words which denote qualities, or are, to uſe the language of the antient ſchoolmen, in concrete with ſome particular ſubject. Thus the word *green* expreſſes a certain quality in the object to which it is referred. Appellations of

of this kind diſtinguiſh particular objects from others comprehended under the ſame generic word. For example, the words *green tree* diſtinguiſh a particular tree from others that are blaſted or withered.

In the ſame manner, *prepoſitions* are words which expreſs *relation* in concrete with a co-relative object. Thus the prepoſitions *of*, *to*, *for*, *with*, *by*, *above*, *below*, *&c.* denote a certain relation which ſubſiſts between the objects expreſſed by the words between which any prepoſition is placed. Words of this kind diſtinguiſh particular objects from others belonging to the ſame ſpecies, when theſe objects cannot, with equal propriety, be characteriſed by any qualities peculiar to them. For example, when we ſay, *the green tree of the meadow*, we ſingle out a particular tree, not by the quality only which belongs to it, but likewiſe by the relation in which it ſtands to another object. As neither relation nor quality can have any exiſtence in abſtract, or as ſeparated from the ſubſtances they qualify, or to which they have a relation, we

we muſt ſuppoſe that the words by which they are denoted, when conſidered in concrete, were more early invented than thoſe which expreſs them in abſtract, a form in which we never could ſee them. The words *green* and *blue* would be ſooner invented than thoſe of *greeneſs* and *blueneſs*, and the words *above* and *below* than thoſe of *ſuperiority* and *inferiority*. The invention of words of this latter kind requires a greater effort of abſtraction than to invent thoſe of the former: Hence, it is probable that ſuch abſtract terms would be of much later inſtitution. Their etymologies, accordingly, ſhow that, in general, they are ſo; for moſt of them are derived from thoſe which are concrete.

Though the invention, however, of adjective nouns be more natural and eaſy than that of the abſtract nouns ſubſtantive derived from them, it would, notwithſtanding, require a conſiderable degree of abſtraction and generalization. Thoſe men who invented the words *green*, *blue*, *red*, and the other names of colours, muſt have compared

compared a great number of objects, marked their reſemblances and diſſimilitudes with regard to the quality of colour, and arranged them into different claſſes and kinds, according to thoſe reſemblances and diſſimilitudes. Adjectives are general, and, in ſome meaſure, abſtract words, and preſuppoſe the ideas of a particular ſpecies or arrangement of objects, to each of which it may with propriety be equally applied. The word *green* could not have been the original appellation of an individual, and afterwards become the name of a ſpecies. *Green* does not denote the name of a particular ſubſtance; but a quality peculiar to a ſubſtance. This appellation muſt, therefore, have been a general denomination equally applicable to any ſubſtance poſſeſſed of the ſame quality. He who firſt diſtinguiſhed an object by the epithet *green*, muſt have remarked other objects which were not *green*, and accordingly ſeparated them by this appellation. Hence the inſtitution of this name ſuppoſes compariſon, and likewiſe a degree of abſtraction. The perſon who invented the adjective *green* muſt

muſt have diſtinguiſhed the quality from the object to which it adhered: The mental operations of claſſing, of compariſon, and of abſtraction, muſt have been uſed, even before the names of colours, which are the leaſt metaphyſical of all nouns adjective. From this reaſoning, Mr Smith infers, that, when languages were beginning to be formed, adjective nouns would not be the words of the moſt early invention.

We have another mode of expreſſing the qualities of different ſubſtances. It requires neither abſtraction, nor any conceived ſeparation of the quality from the ſubject, and it ſeems to be more natural than the invention of nouns adjective, and which could hardly fail, in the firſt formation of language, to be thought of before them. This mode or expedient was the making ſome variations upon the nouns ſubſtantive themſelves, according to the different qualities with which they are endowed. Thus, for example, in many languages, the qualities of ſexes and of the total want of ſex, are expreſſed by different terminations in the

nouns ſubſtantive; as, in Latin, *lupus*, *lupa*; *equus*, *equa*; *juvencus*, *juvenca*; &c. denote the qualities of males and females to which thoſe animals belong, without the neceſſity of employing any adjectives. But the words *forum*, *pratum*, *plauſtrum*, by their peculiar terminations, denote the total abſence of ſex in the ſubſtances to which they are applied. In all the antient languages, by means of the maſculine, feminine, and neuter genders, the moſt important of all diſtinctions, that of ſubſtances into animated and inanimated, and that of animals into males and females, have been ſufficiently characteriſed without the aſſiſtance of adjectives.

Nouns ſubſtantive could not poſſibly, however, without loſing entirely their original form, admit of ſo many variations as were ſufficient to expreſs that immenſe variety of qualities, by which, upon different occaſions, it might be neceſſary to diſtinguiſh them. Hence, though the different formation of nouns ſubſtantive might, for ſome time, anticipate the neceſſity of inventing

venting nouns adjective; yet this neceſſity could never be totally foreſtalled. When nouns adjective were invented, it was natural to form them with ſome ſimilarity to the ſubſtantives to which they were to ſerve as qualifications or epithets. Men would be led to give the ſame terminations with the ſubſtances to which they were firſt applied, and, from that love of ſimilar ſounds, which is the origin of analogy in all languages, they would be led to vary the termination of the ſame adjective, according as they applied it to a maſculine, to a feminine, or to a neutral ſubſtantive. Hence, they would ſay, *magnus lupus*, *magna lupa*, *magnum pratum*, when they meant to denote a great *he-wolf*, a great *ſhe-wolf*, a great *meadow*. Theſe variations in the terminations of adjective nouns, correſponding to the genders of ſubſtantives, which take place in all antient languages, ſeem to have been introduced chiefly for the ſake of a certain ſimilarity of ſound, or of rhyme, which is always agreeable to the human ear. Gender cannot properly belong to an adjective noun, the ſignification of which

is uniformly the ſame, to whatever ſubſtantives it may be applied. When we ſay, *a great man*, *a great woman*, the epithet *great* has exactly the ſame meaning in both inſtances, and the difference of ſex in the ſubſtantives to which we apply it makes not the ſmalleſt difference in its ſignification. In the ſame manner, *magnus*, *magna*, *magnum*, are words which expreſs the very ſame quality, and the change of termination is accompanied with no variation in the meaning. Gender and ſex are qualities which belong to ſubſtances alone. No quality, when conſidered in concrete, can poſſibly be the ſubject of any other quality. Hence, no adjective can qualify another adjective. A *great good man*, implies a man who is both *great* and *good*. In this inſtance, both adjectives qualify the ſubſtantive, but they do not qualify each other. On the other hand, when we ſay, the *great goodneſs* of a man, the appellation *goodneſs* denotes a quality conſidered in abſtract, which may itſelf be the ſubject of other qualities, and is, therefore, capable of being qualified by the word *great*.

If

If the invention of adjective nouns was ſo difficult, that of *prepoſitions* would be ſtill more difficult. Every prepoſition, as formerly remarked, denotes ſome relation in concrete with a related object. For example, the prepoſition *above* points out the relation of ſuperiority, not in abſtract, but in concrete with ſome co-relative object. In the phraſe, *the tree above the cave*, the word *above* expreſſes a certain relation between the *tree* and the *cave*, and it marks this relation in concrete with the co-relative object, *the cave*. In order to complete the ſenſe, a prepoſition requires ſome other word to come after it. Hence the invention of ſuch words would require a ſtill greater effort of abſtraction and generalization than that of adjective nouns. 1. A relation is a more metaphyſical object than a quality. Qualities are generally objects of our external ſenſes; but relations never are. Hence, the one claſs of objects are much more eaſily comprehended than the other. 2. Prepoſitions denote relations only. Before men, however, could invent words which ſignified relations ſimply, they muſt have

have been able, in ſome degree, to have contemplated this relation abſtractedly from the objects related; for the idea of thoſe objects does not, in any manner, enter into the meaning of the prepoſitions. To invent words of this kind, therefore, required a great degree of abſtraction. 3. A prepoſition is a general word, which may be applied to denote any ſimilar relations. He who invented the word *above*, muſt not only have perceived the relation of *ſuperiority*, among different objects, but diſtinguiſhed this relation from many others, ſuch as, from the relation of *inferiority*, expreſſed by the word *below*, from that of *juxta-poſition*, denoted by the word *beſide*, &c. Hence, whatever difficulties attended the invention of nouns adjective, many more muſt have embarraſſed that of prepoſitions. In the firſt formation of languages, therefore, if man, for ſome time, did not perceive the neceſſity of adjective nouns, by varying the terminations of the names of ſubſtances, they would much more find themſelves diſpoſed to evade, by ſome ſimilar contrivance, the ſtill more difficult

cult invention of prepoſitions. In the antient languages, the different caſes of nouns were preciſely the ſame ſpecies of contrivance. In Greek and Latin, the genitive and dative caſes ſupply the place of prepoſitions. For example, *fructus arboris*, *the fruit of a tree*; *ſacer Herculi*, *ſacred to Hercules*. Here the variations made in the co-relative words, *arbor* and *Hercules*, expreſs the ſame relations which, in Engliſh, are denoted by the prepoſitions *of* and *to*.

The number of caſes varies in different languages. In the Greek there are five, and, in the Latin, ſix. It is not unworthy of remark, that thoſe prepoſitions, which, in modern languages, ſupply the place of the antient caſes of nouns, are, of all others, the moſt general and abſtract, and, of courſe, would be the laſt invented. The prepoſitions *above*, *below*, and ſimilar ones, denote none of thoſe relations which, in the antient languages, were expreſſed by caſes. But the prepoſition *of*, denotes the ſame relation, which, in theſe languages, is expreſſed by the genitive caſe. *Of* denotes relation

tion in general. It marks, that the noun ſubſtantive, which goes before it, is related to that which comes after it, without aſcertaining, as is done by the prepoſition *above*, the peculiar nature of that relation. Hence, we often apply it to expreſs oppoſite relations; becauſe the moſt oppoſite relations agree ſo far that each of them comprehends in it the general idea or nature of a relation. We can ſay, for example, *the father of the ſon*, or *the ſon of the father*; *the fir-trees of the foreſt*, or *the foreſt of the fir-trees*. Here it is evident, that the relation in which the father ſtands to the ſon, is directly oppoſite to that in which the ſon ſtands to the father; and that in which the parts ſtand to the whole, is likewiſe oppoſite to that in which the whole ſtands to the parts. However, the word *of* denotes all thoſe relations, becauſe it denotes not, in itſelf, any particular relation, but relation in general only.

After his ingenious remarks on the prepoſition *of*, Mr Smith proceeds, and endeavours to ſhow, that what he had ſaid concerning that prepoſition was, in ſome meaſure,

ſure, equally applicable to the prepoſitions *to*, *for*, *with*, *by*, and to every other prepoſition employed, in modern languages, to ſupply the place of the antient caſes, or flections of nouns; though none of theſe latter is ſo abſtract and general as *of*. The prepoſitions *above*, *below*, *near*, *within*, *without*, *againſt*, &c. are much more rarely uſed, in modern languages, than the prepoſitions *of*, *to*, *for*, *with*, *from*, *by*. A prepoſition of the former kind will not twice occur in the ſame page; but we can hardly compoſe a ſingle ſentence without employing one or two of the latter.

Even in the earlieſt ſtages of ſociety, men muſt have had frequent occaſion of mentioning multitudes as well as ſingle objects; it was, therefore, neceſſary that they ſhould have ſome mode of conveying the idea of number to each other. Number may be expreſſed either by ſingle words which intimate numbers in general, as *many*, *more*, &c. or by a variation upon the words which expreſs the objects numbered. In the firſt formation of languages, mankind,

it is probable, would have recourſe to this laſt expedient. They would naturally make a diſtinction when they talked of a ſingle, and when they intimated a multitude of objects, not by metaphyſical adjectives, ſuch as the Engliſh *a*, *an*, *many*, but by a change on the termination of the word which denoted the objects numbered. From this ſource, in all the antient languages, originated the ſingular and plural numbers; and the ſame diſtinction is likewiſe obſerved in moſt modern languages. All primitive and unmixed languages ſeem to have a dual, as well as a plural number, as the Greek, the Hebrew, the Gothic, and many others. In the rude commencement of ſociety, *one*, *two*, and *more*, would, perhaps, for ſome time, be all the numeral diſtinctions which mankind had occaſion to uſe. They would perceive that it was more natural, as well as more eaſy, to expreſs theſe by certain variations upon the nouns ſubſtantive, than by ſuch abſtract and general terms, as *one*, *two*, *three*, *four*, &c. Theſe and ſimilar words, which ſubſiſt in all languages with which we are acquainted, though cuſtom has

has rendered them familiar, expreſs, perhaps, the moſt ſubtile abſtractions which the human mind is capable of forming. For example, let any man conſider what is meant by the word *three*, which ſignifies neither three men, nor three horſes, nor three ſhillings, nor three pence, but *three* in general, a term equally applicable to any object, or being, which admits of number.

As the ſame relations which ſubſiſt between ſingle, may likewiſe ſubſiſt between numerous objects, it is evident, that a neceſſity would be perceived for employing the ſame number of caſes both in the dual and plural, as in the ſingular numbers. From this ſource aroſe, in the antient languages, the intricacy and complexneſs of the declenſions. In the Greek language, there are five caſes in each of the three numbers. The nouns adjective varied in their terminations according to the gender of the ſubſtantives to which they were applied, as well as to the caſe and number. Hence, in the Greek, every noun adjective, having three genders, and three numbers,

and

and five caſes in each number, may be conſidered as having five and forty variations. The firſt framers of language ſeem to have varied the termination of the adjective, according to the number and caſe of the ſubſtantive, for the ſame reaſon which induced them to vary it according to the gender, namely, the love of analogy, and of a regularity of ſound. Notwithſtanding adjectives vary their terminations, according to caſes, numbers, and genders, yet their meaning is always the ſame.—*Magnus vir*, *magni viri*, *magnorum virorum*; *a great man*, *of a great man*, *of great men*. In theſe and ſimilar expreſſions, the words *magnus*, *magni*, *magnorum*, and likewiſe the Engliſh word *great*, have preciſely the ſame import, though the ſubſtances to which they may be applied are as numerous as the objects which nature preſents to our contemplation.

If the *declenſions* of antient languages are complex, much more ſo are the *conjugations* of their *verbs*. The complexneſs of the former originates from the ſame principle with that of the latter, *viz.* the difficulty

of

of inventing, in the firſt formation of languages, general and abſtract terms. *Verbs*, it is evident, muſt have been coeval with the firſt attempts towards the formation of any language. No affirmation can be made, either approving or condemning, &c. without the aſſiſtance of ſome verb. Impersonal verbs, which expreſs a complete event or fact by a ſingle word, would probably be the firſt invented ſpecies of verbs. *Pluit*, it rains; *ningit*, it ſnows; *tonat*, it thunders; *turbatur*, *there is a confuſion*, &c. each of them expreſs a complete affirmation, the whole of an event, with that ſimplicity and unity with which our minds conceive it in nature. The phraſes, on the contrary, *Alexander ambulat*, *Alexander walks*; *Petrus ſedet*, *Peter ſits*, divide, in ſome meaſure, the event into two parts, the perſon or ſubject, and the attribute or matter of fact affirmed concerning that ſubject. In nature, however, the idea of Alexander walking, is as perfectly one ſimple conception as that of Alexander not walking. Hence, the diviſion of this event into two parts is purely artificial, and an effect of the imperfection

of

of language, which, on this as well as many other occaſions, ſupplies, by ſeveral words, the want of one, which might expreſs the whole matter of fact that was intended to be affirmed. There is obviouſly much more ſimplicity in the natural expreſſion, *pluit*, than in the artificial ones, *imber decidit*, *the rain falls*; *or*, *tempeſtas eſt pluvia*, *the weather is rainy*. In the two laſt examples, the ſimple event is ſplit, the firſt into two, and the ſecond into three parts. In both, the event is denoted by a grammatical circumlocution, and the ſignification is derived from a metaphyſical analyſis of the component parts of the idea expreſſed by the word *pluit*. Hence, the firſt verbs, and, perhaps, even the firſt words, employed in the formation of every original language, would probably be imperſonal verbs. In the Hebrew language, the radical words, from which the others derive their origin, are all imperſonal verbs.

It is not difficult to conceive how, in the natural progreſs of language, ſuch imperſonal verbs ſhould be converted into perſonal.

ſonal. The word *venit*, *it comes*, for inſtance, was originally an impersonal verb. It then did not, as at preſent, denote the coming of ſomething in general, but the coming of a particular object, as *the Lion*. The firſt ſavage inventors of a language may be ſuppoſed, when they ſaw this ferocious animal approaching, to have called out to each other, *venit*, that is, *the lion comes*. Hence, this word, at that period, expreſſed a complete event, without the aid of any other. When theſe ſavages had afterwards begun to aſſign names to particular ſubſtances, if they obſerved the approach of any other terrible object, they would naturally join the name of that object to the word *venit*, and cry out, *venit urſus*, *venit lupus*. In proceſs of time, *venit* would come to ſignify the approach of any terrible object whatever. Having become more general in its ſignification, it could no longer repreſent any particular event without the aſſiſtance of a noun ſubſtantive, to determine its preciſe meaning. In this ſtate of things, it had already become a perſonal, inſtead of an impersonal, verb. In the farther progreſs of

of ſociety, we may eaſily conceive how this verb might grow ſtill more general in its ſignification, and come to denote, as at preſent, the approach of any object whatever, without regard to the qualities of good, bad, or indifferent.

In a ſimilar manner, it is probable, that moſt verbs have become perſonal, and that men have, by ſlow degrees, learned to ſplit almoſt every event into a great number of metaphyſical diviſions, which are expreſſed by the different parts of ſpeech, variouſly combined in the members of every phraſe and ſentence. The ſame kind of progreſs ſeems to have taken place in the art of ſpeaking as in that of writing. When men firſt attempted to expreſs their ideas by writing, every character, or rather picture, repreſented an entire word, and, in ſome caſes, a whole ſentiment. The number of words, however, being immenſe, the memory became quite overloaded with the multitude of characters which it found neceſſary to be retained. Hence neceſſity obliged them to divide words into their elements, and to in-

vent

vent characters which ſhould repreſent, not the words themſelves, but the elements of which they were compoſed. It was a conſequence of this invention, that every word came to be delineated, not by a ſingle character, but by a number; and the expreſſion of it in writing became more intricate and complex than by the former method. Though particular words, however, were, in this manner, repreſented by a greater number of characters, the whole language was delineated by a much ſmaller; for it was diſcovered, that about twenty-four letters were ſufficient to ſupply the place of that immenſe multitude of characters which were formerly requiſite.

As the event, or matter of fact, expreſſed by a verb, may be affirmed either of the perſon who ſpeaks, or of the perſon who is ſpoken to, as well as of ſome third perſon or object, it was neceſſary to invent a method of expreſſing theſe two relations of the event. This is commonly done, in the Engliſh language, by affixing perſonal pronouns to the general word which de-

notes the event affirmed: *I came*, *you came*, *he* or *it came*. In theſe phraſes, the event of having come is, in the firſt, affirmed of the ſpeaker; in the ſecond, of the perſon ſpoken to; in the third, of ſome other perſon, or object. It is probable, that the firſt formers of language might have proceeded in a ſimilar manner, and, by prefixing the two firſt perſonal pronouns to the ſame termination of the verb which denoted the third perſon ſingular, might have ſaid, *ego venit*, *tu venit*, as well as *ille* or *illud venit*. And they certainly would have done ſo, if, when they firſt found it neceſſary to expreſs relations of the verb, their language had ſuch words as *ego* and *tu*. It is extremely improbable, however, that, in this language, any ſuch words ſhould exiſt. Both of them, though rendered familiar by habit, expreſs ideas of an extremely metaphyſical and abſtract nature. *I*, for example, is a word of a very peculiar kind. Whatever being is endowed with the faculty of ſpeech may denote itſelf by this perſonal pronoun. Hence *I* is a general word, and capable of being predicated of an im-

menſe

menſe variety of objects. It differs, however, from all other general words; for the objects of which it may be predicated do not form any particular or diſtinct ſpecies of objects. Like the word *man*, *I* does not denote a peculiar claſs of objects ſeparated from all others. It is ſo far from being the name of a ſpecies, that, whenever the word is employed, it uniformly denotes a diſtinct individual, the particular perſon who then ſpeaks.

Perſonal pronouns, it is well known, are among the laſt words which children learn to uſe. Speaking of itſelf, a child ſays, *Billy walks*, *Billy ſits*, inſtead of *I walk*, *I ſit*. Hence, in the beginning of language, mankind ſeem to have neglected the invention of the more abſtract prepoſitions, and to have expreſſed the ſame relations by varying the terminations of the co-relative terms. They would likewiſe naturally attempt to evade the neceſſity of thoſe more abſtract pronouns by varying the terminations of their verbs, according as the events which they expreſſed were intended to be affirmed

affirmed of the firſt, ſecond, or third perſon. Accordingly this ſeems to have been the univerſal practice in all the antient languages. In Latin, *veni*, *veniſti*, *venit*, denote, without any addition, the different events expreſſed by the Engliſh phraſes, *I came*, *you came*, *he*, *or it came*. For the ſame reaſon, the termination of the verb would be varied, according as the event was intended to be affirmed of the firſt, ſecond, or third perſons plural; and what is expreſſed by the Engliſh phraſes, *we came*, *ye came*, *they came*, would be denoted by the Latin words, *venimus*, *veniſtis*, *venerunt*. Thoſe primitive languages, too, which, on account of the difficulty of inventing numeral names, had introduced a dual, as well as a plural number, into the declenſion of their ſubſtantive nouns, would, it is probable, obſerve the ſame practice in the conjugations of their verbs. Thus, in all thoſe original languages, it was to be expected, that we might find ſix, if not eight or nine, variations in the termination of every verb, according as the event which it denoted was intended to be affirmed of the firſt, ſecond,

or

or third perſons ſingular, dual, or plural. Again, thoſe variations being repeated, along with others, through all its different tenſes, moods, and voices, muſt, of courſe, have rendered their conjugations ſtill more intricate and complex than their declenſions.

In this ſimple ſtate, the language of any country would probably have always remained, had it not been rendered more complex by the intermixture of other languages, occaſioned by the accidental commixture of different nations by means of war, emigration, and other circumſtances. But when two nations, from whatever cauſes, were mixed with one another, the ſtate of language in each would ſoon undergo conſiderable alterations. In order to make themſelves intelligible to thoſe with whom they were obliged to converſe, each of the two blended nations would be under the neceſſity of learning the language of the other. Hence individuals, in learning the new language, not by ſtudying its firſt principles, but from what they heard in converſation, would be extremely perplexed by the intricacy

intricacy of its declenſions and conjugations. They would, therefore, endeavour to ſupply their ignorance of theſe by every means which the language afforded them. They would naturally ſupply their ignorance of the declenſions by employing prepoſitions. A Lombard, when attempting to ſpeak Latin, and wiſhing to expreſs that ſuch a man was a citizen *of*, or a benefactor *to*, Rome, if he was unacquainted with the genitive and dative caſes of the word *Roma*, would naturally ſupply that defect by prefixing the prepoſitions *ad* and *de* to the nominative. Hence, inſtead of *Romae*, he would ſay, *ad Roma* and *de Roma*. Accordingly, *al Roma* and *di Roma*, is the mode by which the modern Italians, who are the deſcendants of the antient Lombards and Romans, expreſs this and ſimilar relations. In this manner, prepoſitions ſeem to have been introduced in the room of the antient declenſions. The ſame change has been produced in the Greek language ſince the conqueſt of Conſtantinople by the Turks. The words are nearly the ſame as formerly; but the grammar is entirely altered, by

ſubſtituting

ſubſtituting prepoſitions in the place of the antient declenſions. This change unqueſtionably ſimplifies the language, both with regard to rudiments and principle. Inſtead of a great variety of declenſions, it ſubſtitutes one univerſal declenſion, which is the ſame in every word, whatever be its termination, gender, or number.

By a ſimilar contrivance, men were enabled, in the circumſtances above-mentioned, to obviate the intricacies of conjugations. In every language, there is a particular verb, called *a ſubſtantive verb*. In Latin, it is *ſum*; in Engliſh, *I am*, &c. By this verb, not only the *exiſtence* of any particular event, but *exiſtence* in general, is denoted. It is, therefore, the moſt abſtract of all verbs. When, however, it was invented, as it had all the tenſes and moods of other verbs, by being joined with the paſſive, it was capable of ſupplying the whole paſſive voice, and of rendering this part of their conjugations as ſimple and uniform, as the uſe of prepoſitions had rendered their declenſions. A Lombard, who wiſhed to ſay, *I am loved*, but

but could not recollect the word *amor*, naturally ſupplied his ignorance, or want of memory, by ſaying *ego ſum amatus*. *Io ſono amato*, is the preſent Italian expreſſion, which correſponds exactly with the above Engliſh phraſe. Another verb is likewiſe common to all languages, and is diſtinguiſhed by the appellation of *the poſſeſſive verb*. In Latin, it is *habeo*; in Engliſh, *I have*. When this verb, which is alſo very abſtract and metaphyſical, was invented, its application to the paſſive participle ſupplied a great part of the active voice, in the ſame manner as the ſubſtantive verb ſupplied the whole of the paſſive. A Lombard, when he wanted to ſay, *I had loved*, but could not recollect the word *amaveram*, would naturally ſupply its place by ſaying, *ego habebam amatum*, or, *ego habui amatum*; *Io avevâ amato*, or, *Io ebbi amato*, are, at preſent, in the Italian language, correſpondent expreſſions. Thus, by the intermixture of different nations, the conjugations, by the aſſiſtance of auxiliary verbs, made a near approach to the uniformity and ſimplicity of the declenſions.

The

The Greek is, in a great meaſure, a ſimple, unmixed language, and was conſtructed from the primitive jargon of the antient Hellenians and Pelaſgians, from whom the Greek nation is ſaid to have been deſcended. In the Greek language, all the words are derived from about three hundred primitives; a certain evidence, that the Greeks formed their language almoſt entirely among themſelves; and that, when they required the uſe of a new word, they did not, like the moderns, borrow it from other languages, but formed it by compoſition, or derivation from ſome other word, or words, in their own. Hence, the declenſions and conjugations of the Greek are much more complex than thoſe of any other European language. The Latin is compounded of the Greek and antient Tuſcan languages. Its declenſions and conjugations are, of courſe, much leſs complicated than thoſe of the Greek. It never adopted the dual number. They have no optative mood, and one future only. They have no aoriſt diſtinct from the preterite-perfect; they have no middle voice, and even many of their

tenſes in the paſſive voice are aſſiſted or produced, in the ſame manner as in modern languages, by joining the ſubſtantive verb to the paſſive participle. In the Latin, the number of infinitives and participles, in both voices, is much fewer than in the Greek.

Both the Italian and French languages are compounded, the former of the Latin and that of the antient Franks, the latter of the Latin and the language of the antient Lombards. Both the French and Italian languages, therefore, are more complex in their compoſition than the Latin, and they are, conſequently, more ſimple in their declenſions and conjugations. In their declenſions, both of them have totally loſt their caſes. With regard to verbs, both of them have likewiſe loſt the whole paſſive, as well as part of the active voices. The want of the paſſive voice is ſupplied by joining the ſubſtantive verb to the paſſive participle. They, in the ſame manner, make out part of the active voice, by the aſſiſtance of the participle paſſive and the poſſeſſive verb.

The

The Engliſh is compoſed of the French and the antient Saxon languages. The French was tranſported to Britain by the Norman conqueſt, and continued, till the days of Edward III. to be the only language of the law, as well as the chief one of the court. The Engliſh, compounded as above, continues now to be the common language of the great bulk of the Britiſh nation.

In ſome parts of Wales, however, and in many parts of the North of Scotland, and of the Hebrides, the Celtic is ſtill the general language of thoſe diſtricts. It appears to be ſomewhat ſingular, that Mr Smith, in his ingenious tract upon *the formation of languages*, ſhould have taken no notice of the Celtic or Gaelic language, though the Engliſh, the Scots, the Iriſh, and many other languages of the continent of Europe, as well as that of Aſia, are deeply tinctured with the Celtic. I believe, he knew little or nothing of it; and, perhaps, for that reaſon, he declined entering upon a ſubject of which he had no proper knowledge. Still, however, he might, with the greateſt

greateſt eaſe, have had abundant information from many gentlemen of ability and learning, who had been born in theſe diſtricts, and underſtood the language thoroughly. I mention this circumſtance with regret; becauſe, from the known ingenuity of Mr Smith, much information was to be expected: Nay, if he had turned his views a little that way, it might, perhaps, have given a very different caſt to his elaborate treatiſe on languages.—But, to return to the analyſis.

The Engliſh language is more complex in its compoſition than the Italian or the French; and, of courſe, its declenſions and conjugations are more ſimple. The two latter languages retain partially, at leaſt, the diſtinction of genders; and their adjectives vary in termination, when applied to a maſculine or a feminine ſubſtantive. But, in the Engliſh language, no ſuch diſtinction exiſts; for the termination of the adjectives admit of no variation, to whatever ſubſtances they are applied. Both the French and Italian languages have the remains of a conjugation;

jugation; and thoſe tenſes of the active voice, which cannot be expreſſed by the junction of the poſſeſſive verb to the participle paſſive, as well as many of thoſe which can, are marked by varying the termination of the principal verb. But, in the Engliſh, all thoſe other tenſes are ſupplied by other auxiliary verbs; ſo that, in this language, there is hardly the veſtige of a conjugation. All the varieties of termination, which moſt part of Engliſh verbs admit of, are, *I love*, *I loved*, *loving*. The modifications of meaning, which cannot be denoted by any of theſe three terminations, muſt be aſcertained by auxiliary verbs. The defects of the French and Italian conjugations are ſupplied by two auxiliary verbs: But, it requires more than ſix to ſupply thoſe of the Engliſh, which, beſide the ſubſtantive and poſſeſſive verbs, employs *do*, *did*; *will*, *would*; *can*, *could*; *may*, *might*. It is in this manner that language, in proportion as it grows more complex in its compoſition, becomes more ſimple in its rudiments and principles.

By

By this ſimplification, however, languages are rendered more prolix, ſeveral words being now neceſſary to denote what formerly could have been expreſſed by a ſingle word. Thus, *Dei and Deo*, in the Latin, ſufficiently ſhow, without any addition, the relation the object ſignified has to the objects expreſſed by the other words in the ſentence. But, to expreſs the ſame relation in Engliſh, and in other modern languages, recourſe muſt be had to, at leaſt, two words, as *of God*, *to God*. Hence, with regard to the modern languages, the declenſions are more prolix than they are in the antient. In the conjugations, the difference is ſtill greater. What a Roman expreſſed by a ſingle word, as *amaviſſem*, an Engliſhman is obliged to employ four different words, *I ſhould have loved*. This prolixneſs, it is obvious, muſt enervate the eloquence of all modern languages. By the ſimplification of the principles of languages, they are rendered leſs agreeable to the ear. In the Greek and Latin, the variety of termination in their declenſions and conjugations beſtows on them a ſweetneſs and va-

riety

riety of which modern languages are totally deprived. In ſweetneſs, the Italian may, perhaps, be ſuperior to the Latin, and nearly equal to the Greek; but, in variety, it is much inferior to any of them. Beſides, this modern ſimplification makes the ſounds of our language not only more grating to the ear, but prevents us from diſpoſing the ſounds we poſſeſs in the manner that might be moſt agreeable. It fixes many words in a particular ſituation, which might often be placed in another with more beauty and harmony. Though the adjective and ſubſtantive, in the Greek and Latin, were ſeparated from one another, ſtill the correſpondence of their terminations conſpicuouſly indicated their mutual connection, and no confuſion or ambiguity was occaſioned. For example, in the firſt line of Virgil,

Tityre tu patulae recubans ſub tegmine fagi;

it is eaſily perceived that *tu* refers to *recubans*, and *patulae* to *fagi*, though the related words are ſeparated by the intervention of ſeveral others; becauſe terminations

of

of the caſes, as well as of the genders, determine their mutual correſpondence. If this line were literally tranſlated into Engliſh, and the ſame arrangement of the words preſerved, *Tityrus, thou of ſpreading reclining under the ſhade beech*, ſenſe could be made of it by no human being; becauſe there are no difference of termination to intimate to which ſubſtantive each adjective belongs. The ſame thing happens with regard to verbs. In Latin, without the ſmalleſt ambiguity, the verb may be often placed in any part of a ſentence. But, in Engliſh, its poſition is almoſt always determined with preciſion. In almoſt every caſe, the verb muſt follow the ſubjective and precede the abjective member of the phraſe. Thus, in Latin, whether we ſay, *Joannem verberavit Robertus*, or, *Robertus verberavit Joannem*, the meaning is the ſame, and the termination, in both caſes, fixes *John* to be the ſufferer. But, in Engliſh, *John beat Robert*, and *Robert beat John*, by no means convey the ſame meaning. Hence the poſition of the three principal members of the

ſentence,

ſentence, in the Engliſh language, and, for the ſame reaſon, in the Italian and French, is almoſt always preciſely determined. In the antient languages, on the contrary, a greater latitude is admitted, and the place of thoſe members is often indifferent. In order to explain ſome parts of Milton's literal tranſlation, recourſe muſt be had to Horace himſelf;

Who now enjoys thee credulous all gold,
Who always vacant, always amiable
Hopes thee; of flattering gales
Unmindful—

are verſes which, by any rules of our language, it is impoſſible to interpret. No man, from the nature of the Engliſh language, could poſſibly diſcover, that, in the firſt line, *credulous* referred to *who*, and not to *thee*, or that, in the fourth line, *unmindful* referred to *who* in the ſecond, and not to *thee* in the third; or, on the contrary, that, in the ſecond line, *always vacant*, *always amiable*, referred to *thee* in the third, and not *who* in the ſame line with it. All

this, however, is ſufficiently plain in the Latin;

> Qui nunc te fruitur credulus aureâ,
> Qui ſemper vacuam, ſemper amabilem
> Sperat te; neſcius aurae fallacis;

becauſe, in Latin, the terminations point out the connections which ſubſiſt between the ſeveral adjectives and the ſubſtantives, which is impoſſible to be done in Engliſh. How much this power muſt have facilitated the compoſition, both in proſe and verſe, of the antients, is obvious.

Having ſaid ſo much concerning the ingenious productions of this truly great man, I muſt limit myſelf to a very curſory view of his laſt work, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Cauſes of the Wealth of Nations*, a work which every where exhibits depth of thought, uncommon erudition, and a moſt acute diſcernment of human affairs.

This learned, ingenious, and moſt uſeful work, Mr Smith divides into five books. In

In the firſt book, he treats of the cauſes of improvement in the productive powers of labour, and of the order according to which its produce is naturally diſtributed among the different ranks of the people. The ſecond book treats of the Nature, Accumulation, and Employment of Stock. In book third, we have an Account of the different Progreſs of Opulence in different Nations. Book fourth gives a view of former ſyſtems of Political Economy. Book fifth treats of the Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth.

It is almoſt unneceſſary to mention, that each of theſe books are ſubdivided into a number of connected chapters, ſuitable to the different branches of the general ſubject.

In the third volume of the Edinburgh Philoſophical Tranſactions *, the ingenious Mr Dugald Stewart, Profeſſor of Morals in the Univerſity of Edinburgh, has given a pretty full and accurate account of Mr Smith's

* Phil. Tranſ. Edin. vol. III. p. 115.

Smith's life and writings. In this biographical account, I am much indebted to Mr Stewart both for many facts, and likewiſe for ſeveral pertinent obſervations. Mr Stewart properly remarks, that the great principle of Mr Smith's work is, to ſhew the proviſion made by nature in the principles of the human mind, and in the ſituation in which men are placed, for a progreſſive augmentation of the means of national wealth; and to point out the beſt method of advancing any collective body of people to greatneſs, by allowing every man to purſue his legal intereſt, and to bring both his intereſt and capital into a free competition with thoſe with whom he tranſacts. Every ſyſtem of policy, it is evident, which tends to extraordinary encouragements, to draw to a particular kind of induſtry a greater proportion of the ſociety's capital than would naturally happen, or, by extraordinary reſtraints, to draw from any ſpecies of induſtry a part of the capital which would otherwiſe be employed in it, ſubverts the very purpoſes it was intended to promote.

The

The cauſes and circumſtances which, in modern times, have contributed, in ſome meaſure, to derange and even counteract this order of nature, particularly, the great encouragement given to induſtry in populous towns, and the comparative neglect of a ſimilar encouragement in the country, Mr Smith has diligently inveſtigated, and in a manner ſo ingenious and maſterly as throws much light on the hiſtory of that ſtate of ſociety which, at preſent, exiſts in this quarter of the globe. On this ſubject, he ſhows, with his uſual accuracy and acute diſcernment, that theſe circumſtances were originally natural reſults of the peculiar ſituation of mankind in particular ſituations of ſociety, and that they aroſe, not from any general views of political foreſight, but from the private intereſts and prejudices of particular orders of men. The ſtate of ſociety, however, which originated from a combination of accidental circumſtances, has been prolonged beyond its natural period, by an erroneous, or rather falſe, ſyſtem of political economy, adopted and propagated by merchants and manufacturers; a claſs of men whoſe

whoſe intereſt is often repugnant to that of the public, and whoſe profeſſional knowledge gives them many advantages in ſupporting thoſe opinions which they wiſh to be encouraged. This ſyſtem gave riſe to freſh obſtacles to the progreſs of national proſperity. Thoſe which originated from the diſorders of the feudal ages, had a direct tendency to introduce confuſion into the internal arrangements of ſociety, by obſtructing the circulation of labour and of ſtock from one employment to another, and from place to place. The falſe ſyſtem of political economy which has hitherto prevailed, whoſe profeſſed object has been to regulate the commercial intercourſe of nations, has produced its effect in a leſs direct and obvious manner, but which is equally prejudicial to thoſe ſtates by whom it has been adopted.

This ſyſtem, as it aroſe chiefly from the intereſted motives of ſpeculative merchants, Mr Smith denominates *the Commercial or Mercantile Syſtem*. The two principal ingredients which conſtitute this ſyſtem, which has

has for its object the enriching of a nation, namely, reſtraints upon importation, and encouragements to exportation, he diſcuſſes with great penetration and knowledge. He remarks, that part of theſe expedients has been derived from a ſpirit of monopoly, and part from that of jealouſy of thoſe nations with whom the balance of trade was thought to be diſadvantageous. From his reaſonings, all of them appear to have a direct tendency to injure the proſperity of the nation by whom they are impoſed. In his remarks upon the jealouſy of commerce, he aſſumes a tone of indignation which is ſeldom employed in other parts of his works.

"In this manner," ſays he, "the ſneaking arts of underling tradeſmen are erected into political maxims for the conduct of a great empire. By ſuch maxims as theſe, nations have been taught that their intereſt conſiſted in beggaring all their neighbours. Each nation has been taught to look with an invidious eye upon the proſperity of all the nations with which it trades, and to conſider their gain as its own loſs. Commerce,

merce, which ought naturally to be among nations as among individuals, a bond of union and friendſhip, has become the moſt fertile ſource of diſcord and animoſity. The capricious ambition of Kings and Miniſters has not, during the preſent and the preceding century, been more fatal to the repoſe of Europe, than the impertinent jealouſy of merchants and manufacturers. The violence and injuſtice of the rulers of mankind is an antient evil, for which, perhaps, the nature of human affairs can ſcarce admit of a remedy. But the mean rapacity, the monopolizing ſpirit of merchants and manufacturers, who neither are nor ought to be the rulers of mankind, though it cannot, perhaps, be corrected, may very eaſily be prevented from diſturbing the tranquillity of any body but themſelves."

Theſe and ſimilar principles of liberality, Mr Smith tells us, ought to direct the commercial policy of nations. How this theory ſhould be introduced into practice, and applied to particular caſes, Mr Smith has not attempted to determine. That he was aware

aware of the dangers to be apprehended from a raſh application of political theories is evident not only from the general ſpirit of his writings, but from ſome incidental obſervations which he has made on the ſubject.

"So unfortunate," ſays he, "are the effects of all the regulations of the mercantile ſyſtem, that they not only introduce very dangerous diſorders into the ſtate of the body politic, but diſorders which it is often difficult to remedy, without occaſioning, for a time at leaſt, ſtill greater diſorders.—In what manner, therefore, the natural ſyſtem of perfect liberty and juſtice ought gradually to be reſtored, we muſt leave to the wiſdom of future ſtateſmen and legiſlators to determine." In the laſt edition of his Theory of Moral Sentiments, he has given us ſome obſervations which refer to the ſame important purpoſe. "The man," he remarks, "whoſe public ſpirit is prompted altogether by humanity and benevolence, will reſpect the eſtabliſhed powers and privileges even of individuals, and

ſtill more of the great orders and ſocieties into which the ſtate is divided. Though he ſhould conſider ſome of them as, in ſome meaſure, abuſive, he will content himſelf with moderating what he often cannot annihilate without great violence. When he cannot conquer the rooted prejudices of the people by reaſon and perſuaſion, he will not attempt to ſubdue them by force; but will religiouſly obſerve what, by Cicero, is juſtly called the divine maxim of Plato, never to uſe violence to his country no more than to his parents. He will accommodate, as well as he can, his public arrangements to the confirmed habits and prejudices of the people; and will remedy, as well as he can, the inconveniencies which may flow from the want of thoſe regulations which the people are averſe to ſubmit to. When he cannot eſtabliſh the right, he will not diſdain to meliorate the wrong; but, like Solon, when he cannot eſtabliſh the beſt ſyſtem of laws, he will endeavour to eſtabliſh the beſt that the people can bear."

With

With regard to the practical application of general principles, thoſe cautions, from the author of *the Wealth of Nations*, were peculiarly neceſſary; as the chief object of his work, an unlimited freedom of trade, by foſtering the indolence of ſtateſmen, is apt to ſuggeſt to thoſe who are in poſſeſſion of abſolute power, the notion of putting it in execution.

As moſt men of genius, eſpecially thoſe whoſe profeſſion obliges them to deliver annually public lectures to numerous and ſucceſſive races of ſtudents, are liable to have their beſt and moſt original thoughts and theories ſtolen and adopted as the property of others, Mr Smith, of courſe, had great reaſon to complain of this literary pilfering. Of this practice he complains with ſome warmth in a MS. which was lately, and perhaps now is, in the poſſeſſion of Mr Dugald Stewart, Profeſſor of Morals in the Univerſity of Edinburgh. In this paper, which was written in the year 1755, many of the moſt important facts and reaſonings,

ſonings, now publiſhed in Mr Smith's *Inquiry into the Nature and Cauſes of the Wealth of Nations*, are to be found. "Man," he remarks in that paper, "is generally conſidered by ſtateſmen and projectors as the materials of a ſort of political mechanics. Projectors diſturb Nature in the courſe of her operations in human affairs; and it requires no more than to let her alone, and give her fair play in the purſuit of her ends, that ſhe may eſtabliſh her own deſigns." In another place of the ſame paper he remarks, "Little elſe is requiſite to carry a ſtate to the higheſt degree of opulence from the loweſt barbariſm, but *peace*, *eaſy taxes*, and a tolerable adminiſtration of juſtice; all the reſt being brought about by the natural courſe of things. All governments which thwart this natural courſe, which force things into another channel, or which endeavour to arreſt the progreſs of ſociety at a particular point, are unnatural, and, to ſupport themſelves, are obliged to be oppreſſive and tyrannical.—A great part of the

the opinions he obſerves, "enumerated in this paper is treated of at length in ſome lectures which I have ſtill by me, and which were written in the hand of a clerk who left my ſervice ſix years ago. They have all of them been the conſtant ſubjects of my lectures ſince I firſt taught Mr Craigie's claſs, the firſt winter I ſpent in Glaſgow, down to this day, without any conſiderable variation. They had all of them been the ſubjects of lectures which I read at Edinburgh the winter before I left it; and I can adduce innumerable witneſſes, both from that place and from this, who will aſcertain them ſufficiently to be mine."

Mr Stewart very properly remarks, that the merit of Mr Smith's work is not to be eſtimated ſolely by the novelty of its principles, but by the reaſonings employed in ſupport of them. The advantages to be derived from a free commerce have been curſorily mentioned by ſeveral authors previous to Mr Smith's publication. But none of them have had the credit, in ſuch a complicated

plicated and difficult ſubject, to trace the principles of political economy to their ultimate conſequences. The ingenuity and extent of thought exhibited in his work can be diſcerned by thoſe only who have compared it with the productions of former authors who have written on ſimilar ſubjects. His labour in methodiſing their disjointed ideas is not, perhaps, leſs valuable than the reſults of his own ſpeculations. He uniformly expreſſes his ſentiments with a manly and dignified freedom, and never deigns to indulge any of theſe little paſſions which the factions of the times in which he wrote might have naturally excited.

Two years after the publication of his *Wealth of Nations*, Mr Smith, by the influence of his friend the Duke of Buccleuch, was appointed one of the Commiſſioners of his Majeſty's Cuſtoms in Scotland. Theſe two years he paſſed at London, in a ſociety too extenſive to allow him an opportunity of much ſtudy. His time, however, was not entirely loſt; for it was ſpent in the ſociety of ſome of the firſt literati in England.

England. Of theſe, a beautiful and moſt reſpectable ſpecimen is given by Dr Barnard, in ſome verſes addreſſed to Sir Joſhua Reynolds and his friends.

> If I have thoughts, and can't expreſs 'em,
> Gibbon ſhall teach me how to dreſs 'em
> In words ſelect and terſe:
> Jones teach me modeſty and Greek,
> Smith how to think, Burke how to ſpeak,
> And Beauclerc to converſe *.

Mr Smith, in conſequence of his appointment to the Board of Cuſtoms, came to Edinburgh, where he ſpent the laſt twelve years of his life. Here he enjoyed an affluence more than equal to his wants, beſide the proſpect of paſſing the remainder of his days among the companions of his youth. His mother, though now very old, ſtill poſſeſſed a conſiderable portion of health, accompanied him to town; and his couſin, Miſs Jane Douglas, a moſt prudent, affectionate, and attentive female, relieved him of a charge for which he was very ill qualified,

* Annual Regiſter, 1776.

qualified, by ſuperintending his domeſtic affairs.

The emoluments of his office enabled him to gratify, in a conſiderable degree, the natural generoſity of his diſpoſition; and, at his death, the ſtate of his funds confirmed what his friends had often ſuppoſed, that a great proportion of his annual ſavings was beſtowed in private charities. The neceſſary change of his ſituation when he was obliged to reſide in Edinburgh, was not favourable to his literary purſuits. His official duties, though by no means oppreſſive, were ſufficient to exhauſt his ſpirits, and to diſſipate any uncommon keenneſs of thinking. During the firſt years of his reſidence in this city, his ſtudies were very much interrupted. He read occaſionally, but with no other view than to amuſe himſelf in his leiſure hours. His mother died in the year 1784; and her death, joined to that of Miſs Douglas in 1788, contributed to ſuſpend, and even to fruſtrate, all his literary projects. Theſe ladies had been, during more than ſixty years, the objects of his affec-

tion;

tion; and, from his infancy, he enjoyed in their ſociety, all the endearments of a family which he ever experienced. By this misfortune Mr Smith was left alone, and, like all philoſophers in ſimilar circumſtances, almoſt entirely helpleſs. Though he bore his great loſs with fortitude, and, with regard to his general behaviour, ſeemed to have reſumed his former cheerfulneſs; yet his health and vigour gradually declined till the period of his death, which happened in July 1790. His laſt illneſs chiefly aroſe from an obſtinate obſtruction in his bowels, which was both tedious and painful. But his mind was perfectly reſigned; and he enjoyed every conſolation from the tender ſympathy of his friends.

Perceiving his end to be approaching with rapidity, he ordered all his papers, except ſome detached eſſays, to be deſtroyed; and theſe he entruſted to the care of his executors. The additions to *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, moſt of which were compoſed under the preſſure of a ſevere diſeaſe, the publication of which fortunate-

ly Mr Smith lived to ſuperintend, were among the laſt of his literary exertions. In the year 1787, he addreſſed the following letter to the principal of the Univerſity of Glaſgow, in conſequence of his being elected Rector of that learned body. "No preferment," ſays he, "could have given me ſo much real ſatisfaction. No man can owe greater obligations to a ſociety than I do to the Univerſity of Glaſgow. They educated me; they ſent me to Oxford. Soon after my return to Scotland, they elected me one of their own members; and afterwards preferred me to another office, to which the abilities and virtues of the never to be forgotten Dr Hutcheſon had given a ſuperior degree of illuſtration. The period of thirteen years which I ſpent as a member of that ſociety, I remember as by far the moſt uſeful, and, therefore, as by far the happieſt and moſt honourable period of my life; and now, after three and twenty years abſence, to be remembered in ſo very agreeable a manner by my old friends and protectors, gives me a heart-felt joy which I cannot eaſily expreſs to you."

Mr

Mr Dugald Stewart, formerly mentioned, near the concluſion of his *Account of Mr Smith's Life*, makes the following elegant and expreſſive remarks: "The ſhort narrative which I have now finiſhed, however barren of incident, may convey a general idea of the genius and character of this illuſtrious man. Of the intellectual gifts and attainments by which he was ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed;—of the originality and comprehenſiveneſs of his views; the extent, the variety, and the correctneſs of his information; the inexhauſtible fertility of his invention; and the ornaments which his rich and beautiful imagination had borrowed from claſſical culture;—he has left behind him laſting monuments. To his private worth, the moſt certain of all teſtimonies may be found in that confidence, reſpect, and attachment, which followed him through all the various relations of life. The ſerenity and gaiety he enjoyed, under the preſſure of his growing infirmities, and the warm intereſt he felt to the laſt, in every thing connected with the welfare of his friends, will be long remembered by a

ſmall

ſmall circle with whom, as long as his ſtrength permitted, he regularly ſpent an evening in the week, and to whom the recollection of his worth ſtill forms a pleaſing, though a melancholy bond of union.*" That Mr Smith had many peculiarities, both in his manners, and in his intellectual habits, (and what man of genius has not?) was obvious even to ſuperficial obſervers. He was but ill qualified for the general intercourſe of ſociety, or for the active employments of life. The various and extenſive ſpeculations which he indulged from a very early period of his youth, and the ample materials derived from his own invention, made him often inattentive to common occurrencies, and to familiar objects. Even when in company, Mr Smith was apt to be ingroſſed with his ſtudies, as appeared from the motion of his lips, as well as from his looks and geſtures.

Of what is called *abſence* in company, he exhibited frequent and remarkable examples. He often walked for miles with Dr Hutton, one of his moſt ingenious, learned,

* See Phil. Tranſ. of Edin. vol. 3. p. 133.

learned, and intimate friends in Edinburgh; and, though the cheerful Doctor, in order to rouſe Mr Smith's attention, talked to him frequently, he ſeldom uttered a word, but walked on moving his lips, and muttering to himſelf. It was probably owing, in ſome meaſure, to this circumſtance, that Mr Smith ſo ſeldom joined in the common topics of general converſation, and that he was occaſionally diſpoſed to expreſs his own ideas ſomewhat in the form of a lecture. This practice, however, did not originate from a deſire to gratify vanity, or to ingroſs too much of the converſation. His natural temper led him ſo forcibly to enjoy in ſilence the gay ſallies of others, that his friends frequently contrived particular modes to direct his mind to ſuch ſubjects as were moſt likely to intereſt and excite him.

His opinions of men, which he ſometimes formed upon a ſuperficial acquaintance, were often erroneous. But the natural temper of his mind diſpoſed him more to indulge fond partialities than ill-founded prejudices. Conſtantly occupied with extenſive

tenſive views of human affairs, he had neither time nor inclination to employ his thoughts on the peculiarities of common characters. Accordingly, though deeply ſkilled in the powers of the human mind, as well as in the paſſions and propenſities of the heart; yet, in judging of individual characters, his eſtimates were ſometimes formed in a manner remarkably falſe and precipitate. The ſame remark is applicable to the opinions he occaſionally gave of books, and of ſpeculative ſubjects. Theſe were often not uniformly what might have been expected from a man of his ſuperior underſtanding and knowledge. His opinions and ſimilar topics were not unfrequently influenced by accidental circumſtances and the humour of the moment; but, when theſe were retailed by perſons who were not thoroughly acquainted with him, they conveyed falſe ideas concerning his genuine ſentiment and character. On ſuch occaſions, however, his remarks always contained much truth and ingenuity; and, if the different opinions, which he expreſſed upon the ſame ſubjects, had been conjoined,

joined, they would have furniſhed materials for a judgment both juſt and comprehenſive. But, in his friendly aſſociations, he did not take the trouble of drawing thoſe qualified concluſions which are ſo conſpicuous in his printed works. He generally gave a bold and maſterly ſketch of the object from the firſt point of view that occurred to his fancy. His pictures were always vivid and expreſſive, and had a ſtrong reſemblance to the originals, when viewed under a particular aſpect, but ſeldom conveyed a juſt and complete conception of it in all its parts and dimenſions. But, however theſe peculiarities of his manners are to be accounted for, it is unqueſtionable that they were reſults of a candid and an innocent mind. His external appearance exhibited nothing very remarkable. In ſtature, he ſomewhat exceeded the ordinary ſize; and his countenance was manly and agreeable. When warmed with the converſation of his friends, his features were often illuminated with ſmiles of inexpreſſible benignity, and his geſtures were animated, and not ungraceful. His tendency

to

to *abſence*, eſpecially in the company of ſtrangers, gave his manner ſometimes the appearance of embarraſſment.

In his deportment, when walking, there were ſome ſingularities. His head had a gentle motion from ſide to ſide; and his body, at every ſtep, had a kind of rolling or vermicular motion, as if he meant to alter his direction, or even to turn back. In the ſtreets, or elſewhere, he always carried his cane on his ſhoulder, as a ſoldier does his muſket. Theſe may be conſidered as ſlight ſhades; but, in a picture, ſlight ſhades are often highly characteriſtic.

His library, though not a very large collection, but moſt judiciouſly ſelected, he bequeathed, together with the reſt of his property, to his couſin David Douglas, Eſq; Advocate. The firſt time I happened to be in his library, Mr Smith obſerved me looking at the books with ſome degree of curioſity, and perhaps ſurpriſe; for moſt of the volumes were elegantly, and ſome of them ſuperbly bound. "You muſt have remark-

ed,"

ed," he ſaid, " that I am a beau in nothing but my books."

Upon the whole, Mr Smith was one of theſe extraordinary men whom, at ſome times only, nature exhibits to the view of mortals. Enough has already been ſaid of his learning and mental abilities. Though his compoſitions always conveyed diſtinct ideas; yet, in language, he is often careleſs and inattentive. Every reader of taſte muſt perceive the juſtice of this remark. The inſtances are innumerable where he employs the ſame verb or noun, two or three times in the ſame ſentence, when he might, with the utmoſt eaſe, have diverſified them, and given a greater and more harmonious effect to his compoſition, without injuring, in the ſmalleſt degree, the perſpicuity of his thoughts and reaſonings.

A

DISSERTATION

ON THE

MEANS OF SUPPORTING AND PROMOTING

PUBLIC SPIRIT.

Wrote, Nov. 1760.

PREFACE.

NOTHING can be better calculated for exciting the mind to think with accuracy and preciſion, than the limiting its operations to ſome certain determinate ſubject. If a queſtion is put, or a propoſition laid down, how naturally do we make every idea which we poſſeſs, however ſlight its relation or connection with the ſubject, paſs in review before us? This power, or rather propenſity of the human mind, enables us not only to inveſtigate the various qualities of material objects, but likewiſe to unfold many leading qualities and affections of the mind itſelf. When an unknown plant is preſented to a Botaniſt, he does not content himſelf with a ſtrict examination of all its external parts. If an inſpection of theſe is inſufficient for his purpoſe, his next ſtep is to compare the ideas excited by its taſte and odour

odour with thoſe excited by the taſte and odour of other plants with which he is previouſly acquainted, in order to diſcover even the moſt diſtant reſemblance of qualities. On the other hand, when our thoughts are confined to a ſingle ſubject, of whatever nature, our ideas generally run on in one continued ſeries or train. But every man of reflection muſt have obſerved, that the connections of this train are ſometimes ſo extremely ſlight, that it is difficult for the thinker himſelf to trace them.

Though this conſtitutional faculty of the mind is the ſource of order and regularity in our thoughts; yet, like other eminent bleſſings in life, it is productive of many inconveniencies. Some men are endued with ſuch nice diſcernment, that they can eaſily perceive the moſt diſtant relations of ideas: hence, if a proper choice is not made, their compoſitions muſt be obſcure to readers of leſs delicate perceptions. It ſhould

therefore

therefore be the conſtant endeavour of every writer whoſe aim is to propagate uſeful truths, or to promote any popular advantage, to neglect the ſlight or diſtant relations, and exhibit ſuch only as are conſpicuous and intelligible to all. Simplicity will infallibly be the ornament, and general utility the fruit of ſuch an author's compoſitions.

I was led to theſe obſervations by accidentally looking into the public papers containing the premiums offered by the Hon. Select Society at Edinburgh. Amongſt many uſeful ſpurs to induſtry, which could have but ſmall influence on a perſon unacquainted with the particular arts they are intended to encourage, I perceived that a Diſſertation on the beſt Means of Supporting and Promoting Public Spirit was made the ſubject of a competition. I revolved moſt of the ideas I had acquired that bore any relation to this ſubject. Emulation,

ever

ever natural to youthful minds, ſprung up apace. The reſult was a reſolution to ſubmit the following thoughts to the judgment of that learned and truly public ſpirited body.

A DISSER-

This DISSERTATION *and the* ESSAYS *which follow were written when the* AUTHOR *was only Twenty years of age.*

A

DISSERTATION, &c.

SELFISHNESS, when carried beyond certain bounds, has univerſally been eſteemed a low and grovelling diſpoſition. Neither is this univerſal cenſure capricious or unjuſt. So conſcious is the ſelfiſh man of the meanneſs and turpitude of his own motives, that, like the vicious of every denomination, he conſtantly endeavours to conceal the narrowneſs of his heart under the ſpecies appearance of the contrary virtues. Frugality and prudent foreſight are the pretended motives of all his actions. Shrunk into a ſmaller compaſs than ſelf, he loſes ſight of

his real intereſt, by an over anxious ſolicitude to ward off imaginary misfortunes, and to turn every thing to his immediate advantage. Excluded from every ſocial joy, his ſoul is eat up with ſpleen, and his heart pines with envy at the honour and ſucceſs which conſtantly attend thoſe who are actuated by more liberal principles. Self-love in exceſs is the parent of fear. Hence the man poſſeſſed of this temper becomes ſuſpicious of the whole human race. Incapable of friendſhip himſelf, no man eſteems him any longer than he diſcovers his real character. Thus hated and deſpiſed by all, but moſt by thoſe who know him beſt, the ſelfiſh man lives without joy, and dies without having taſted the balmy conſolations of friendſhip, or the heart-expanding pleaſures of diſintereſted benevolence.

How oppoſite to this is the character of the man who is poſſeſſed of a liberal and public-ſpirited diſpoſition? So far is his love from being confined to ſelf, that it extends to the whole of his ſpecies. How amiable, how god-like the diſpoſition which

intereſts

intereſts the perſon endowed with it in the happineſs or miſery of all around him? His very exiſtence is expanded over the univerſe. He hears of the calamity of no individual, ſociety, or country, without feeling ſome degree of their pain. Nor, on the other hand, is it poſſible for him not to exult in the happineſs and proſperity of every one on whom ſuch eminent bleſſings are beſtowed. His eyes no ſooner behold the afflicted than his hand is ſtretched out for their relief. Deeply intereſted in every man's proſperity, his ſoul is conſtantly regaled with pleaſures which flow from a thouſand ſprings unknown to the ſelfiſh heart. Thus endowed with an univerſal love to his ſpecies, if the virtues of individuals at any time demand his peculiar regard, his breaſt glows with uncommon warmth of affection. The benevolent man's heart is the only genuine ſoil of friendſhip. Here friendſhip takes root; here it ſhoots forth its richeſt bloſſoms of love and ſympathetic affection.

View

View the public-ſpirited man diſcharging the duties of civil life. The complacence of his countenance, the affability of his behaviour, the generoſity of his actions, and above all, that ineffable ſomething which beams forth benevolence from his eyes, captivate every ingenious heart, and blunt the poignant darts of envy itſelf.

A diſcreet well regulated generoſity is, in every view, the beſt ſelfiſhneſs. What a wretch muſt he be, who will not revere and befriend the man whoſe conſtant ſtudy is to promote and enlarge the happineſs of his fellow-creatures? Envy, it is true, has perhaps too deep a root in human nature; but the powerful inſtinct of gratitude is, generally ſpeaking, ſtrong enough to diſappoint, or totally overcome, its moſt virulent deſigns. Liberality joined to diſcretion is ſuch a noble, ſuch an elevated diſpoſition of mind, that it muſt of neceſſity procure the general eſtimation and friendſhip of mankind. Add to this the ineſtimable pleaſure which naturally reſults from the conſciouſneſs of beſtowing happineſs upon a large

large body of mankind, and then reflect whether a ſelfiſh or a generous temper beſt ſuits the dependent condition of man.

Without expatiating further on the beauty or utility of public-ſpiritedneſs, we proceed to inquire into the means of promoting and ſupporting this amiable virtue among men of all ranks and conditions.

To have a clear conception of terms is an eſſential requiſite in every literary diſcuſſion. An explanation of theſe ſhall therefore be the firſt object of inveſtigation.

Public ſpirit, in its moſt extenſive ſenſe, may be defined, "An habitual temper or diſpoſition of mind which incites the perſon endowed with it, uniformly to prefer general advantage to private intereſt."

Public-ſpiritedneſs being thus a mental qualification, it is not matter of ſurpriſe, that ſome men ſhould be indebted for this diſpoſition merely to the bounty of Nature. But as public-ſpiritedneſs is far from being the

the general temper of mankind, in their preſent circumſtances, the man who ſhall point out any certain means of ſubſtituting, in the human heart, generoſity in place of ſelfiſhneſs, will do a more ſubſtantial ſervice to ſociety than if he had diſcovered the longitude, or ſolved all the ſpeculative problems that ever were exhibited to the world.

The attempt, it muſt be confeſſed, is arduous. Difficulties innumerable ſpring up on every hand; muſt we therefore pronounce, that ſucceſs is impracticable?—Let us rather collect our whole ſtrength, and proportion our efforts to the difficulties to be encountered. Courage and induſtry often ſurmount obſtacles which make genius ſhudder, and fly to the downy regions of Fancy, where he may rove at large, unfettered by common ſenſe, or public utility. Indolence and irreſolution, not want of ability, are generally the only cauſes why many uſeful problems are given up as impracticable, or looked upon as exceeding the limits of human capacity.

What

What are the beſt means of promoting and ſupporting public ſpirit? is ſo far from being a queſtion of eaſy ſolution, that we have no ſcruple to pronounce it a *deſideratum* of the moſt intricate claſs. To teach humanity to man; to extirpate ſelfiſhneſs from the human heart; to enlarge the circle of our feelings; to ſhow how all men may be rendered generous and benevolent: The accompliſhment of theſe, and many other conſequences included in a proper view of public ſpirit, may challenge the genius and application of the fineſt head that ever adorned a human body.

Far from eſteeming myſelf equal to this taſk, I ſhall have fully gained my point, if I can ſhow how this benevolent temper might be rendered more general among mankind than it is at preſent, hoping thereby to pave the way for perſons better ſkilled in the intricate ſcience of the human heart, to proſecute this uſeful ſubject to its utmoſt extent.

Few

Few ſciences are ſufficiently known to admit of a perfect ſyſtematic arrangement. But, that we may not be entirely deficient with regard to method, we ſhall always have the two following objects principally in view:

I. The cauſes of the decline of public ſpirit; or, in other words, an inquiry into the reaſons why the generality of mankind are more ſwayed by ſelfiſh than public-ſpirited motives.—And,

II. Some regulations ſhall be mentioned, by the due obſervance of which this defect might, in a great meaſure, be remedied.

PART

PART I.

Origin of Selfiſhneſs.

THE great Mr Locke, and ſeveral other ingenious philoſophers, have repreſented the human intellect, antecedent to its intercourſe with external objects, as a tabula raſa, or a ſubſtance capable of receiving any impreſſions, but upon which no original impreſſions of any kind are ſtamped. Agreeable to this hypotheſis, the ſoul, while deſtitute of that knowledge we acquire by experience and obſervation, is a mere paſſive being, having no natural principles of action, no power of chuſing or refuſing, but entirely ſubjected to receive the firſt impreſſions that are made upon it, without the capacity of diſcovering whether they are proper or improper, whether they tend to its preſervation or deſtruction.

That the mind cannot originally be poſſeſſed of clear and diſtinct ideas of any certain ſubſtances, is undeniable; for the acquiſition of theſe depends ſolely on obſervation. Indeed, according to the accurate definition of an idea given by the ingenious Lord Kames, it is impoſſible for the mind to have any original ideas; becauſe an idea, as he has defined it, is a recalling into the mind the image or impreſſion of an object which was formerly examined by one or other of our inſtruments of ſenſation; and therefore an idea preſuppoſes the mind's being converſant with external objects. But Mr Locke's definition of that term is by far too looſe and general. That ſagacious philoſopher defines an idea to be, "Whatever is the object of the underſtanding when a man thinks, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." Now, as ſoon as an embryo in the womb begins to live, it muſt of neceſſity be conſcious of its exiſtence; if conſcious of its exiſtence, that conſciouſneſs, of courſe, implies, that the mind is ſome how or other, however imperfectly, employed in thinking;

and

and therefore, agreeably to this laſt definition, the embryo is already in poſſeſſion of at leaſt one idea, to wit, that of its own exiſtence. This certainly deſerves the appellation of an *innate idea*, unleſs by innate ideas is meant, ideas antecedent to exiſtence.

We mean not that a fœtus in the womb is capable of forming an abſtract idea of its own exiſtence, as a ſeparate and diſtinct being; ſuch an idea is only acquirable by our perceptions and reaſoning on theſe perceptions, which is the work of time and experience. But, in this firſt ſtage of human life, which has been hitherto but too little attended to, the mind muſt undoubtedly acquire ſeveral ideas from the ſenſation of touch, which is a very fruitful ſource of perception. The extreme tenderneſs of the muſcles and nerves of a fœtus, the various motions and ſurpriſing viciſſitudes to which its whole ſyſtem is conſtantly ſubject, muſt neceſſarily ſubject this future man to numberleſs uneaſy and painful ſenſations. Several conſiderations lead us to imagine, that the

the mind has, at this early period of exiſtence, proper conceptions of pleaſure and pain, of joy and ſorrow, of fear, anger, and, in general, of moſt, if not of all the principles which are neceſſary for regulating its future conduct, call them ideas, perceptions, ſenſation, or what you pleaſe.

Were a child, at the inſtant of its eſcape from the womb, endowed with the faculty of ſpeech; and were it, at the ſame time, capable of remembering the different thoughts and feelings which occupied the mind during its growth and confinement, we imagine, its firſt words would be to the following purpoſe.

"Many and various are the pains I have ſuffered; but of all others this laſt is the moſt excruciating*. What I am now about to feel, is to me unknown. This much I know, that, if I am deſtined to endure as great miſery in this my new ſtate of exiſtence, as I have undergone in my former, miſerable

* Meaning the pain ariſing from the compreſſion of the head, &c. at the time of delivery.

miſerable indeed is my fate! Rather let me be reduced to that unfeeling condition in which all conſciouſneſs was aſleep.—When conſciouſneſs firſt began, I cannot diſtinctly learn; for the tranſition from an unfeeling to a feeling ſtate was ſo languid and confuſedly tranquil, that ſome time elapſed before I was certain whether I really felt or not.—But, after this indifferent period paſſed away, with what ardour have I often wiſhed for its return? Vain, however, have all my wiſhes been. At one time I felt ſtrange uneaſy motions *: I was carried about, but whether, for what purpoſe, or what was the cauſe of this motion, I could never perceive. One thing I too certainly know, that many of theſe geſtations gave me exquiſite torture. Sometimes my whole body was compreſſed and ſqueezed to ſuch a degree that I thought my frame would have been cruſhed to nothing. At other times I ſuffered little partial preſſures, which were no leſs tormenting: theſe did not ſtun me ſo much; but I was more ſenſible of their ſting.—I remember, indeed, that at certain

* When the mother dances, or walks too quick.

tain periods all motion ceaſed, and I ſeemed as if ſinking back to my former indifference *; then I enjoyed a temporary eaſe; a grateful languor blunted the inſtruments of ſenſation, and in ſome meaſure dried up the ſprings of ſorrow. But, alas! what a wretched creature muſt I be? Even here ſome unaccountable power, whether external or internal I could not ſay, frequently interrupted my tranquillity, by placing me in deluſive but painful ſituations, which, when rouſed by motion, I perceived were not juſt ſo real, though not leſs diſagreeable than thoſe which aroſe from preſſure †. But why ſhould I dwell entirely on the hardſhips I ſuſtained? Pleaſure was not always abſent. Some fortunate viciſſitudes brought along with them a ſmooth, delicate flow of I do not know what, which titillated every fibre of my ſubſtance, and pervaded me with extreme delight ‡. I was, however, frequently deceived by this unknown titillating

* When the mother was at reſt, and the fœtus falling aſleep.

† Diſagreeable dreams.

‡ A temperate ſupply of freſh nouriſhment.

titillating flow; for it would ſometimes pour ſo copiouſly in upon me, that inſtead of being accompanied with a refreſhing pleaſure, I found my frame begin to totter and grow giddy, in ſo much that my exiſtence was almoſt totally extinguiſhed *.— Strait confinement was added to fill up the ſum of my misfortunes. If galled on one ſide, I inſtantly made an effort to recede, and fly from pain. But fruitleſs, alas, was every attempt of this kind. Shut up from every reſource; cloſely environed on all ſides; I was compelled to bear the moſt dreadful afflictions, without having the leaſt power of redreſs. My longings after [illegible] and freedom were great; but even the little ſtrength I poſſeſſed was ſo limited and circumſcribed, that I had not room to exert it. To ſum up the whole in a few words; my life has conſiſted of one continued ſeries of viciſſitudes. Pleaſure, when I did enjoy it, was interrupted by the dread of returning pain. My pains, on the other hand, were ſomewhat ſoftened by the hopes of returning pleaſure. Many other ſtrange commotions

* Drunkenneſs or ſurfeit of the mother.

commotions and confuſed fancies, on different occaſions, diſturbed my peace. But huſh! a world of uncouth objects ruſh in upon me, and diſtract my attention *."

We have made choice of this method of conveying our thoughts concerning the ſtate of the human intellect while confined in the womb, becauſe we imagined it could be done in this way both more intelligibly and more conciſely. We preſume not to oppoſe what Mr Locke, Lord Kames, and other ingenious philoſophers have advanced with regard to the doctrine of ideas. All we intend is, to ſhow that mankind are born with certain ideas or notions of pain and pleaſure, of fear, hope, reſentment, &c. and peculiarly with ſtrong and lively deſires after ſelf-preſervation. The experience children neceſſarily acquire in the womb from their own feelings, and the natural communication with the feelings of the mother, added to reflection on theſe feelings, may be the origin of all the ideas of infants prior to their connection with external objects.

* Light and viſible objects.

jects. There is even reaſon to ſuſpect, that the human ſpecies enjoy the faculty of thinking and reflecting in the very firſt dawnings of their exiſtence.

It is a pretty general maxim among philoſophers, that a child in the womb is merely a ſentient being, that is, a being endowed with ſenſitive powers, but utterly incapable of reflecting on the ſenſations occaſioned by them. This is a very humiliating repreſentation of the human mind; and one would think, that nothing leſs than the cleareſt demonſtration could make it gain any credit. According to this hypotheſis, while confined in the womb, we are little better than mere *vegetables*. The ſenſitive plant retracts, and ſhrinks back, when it receives an unfriendly blow; the human fœtus, it ſeems, is incapable of doing any more. Is it not as good philoſophy to ſuppoſe, that the fœtus, after having once felt agreeable or diſagreeable ſenſations, has a power of recalling the ideas or images of theſe ſenſations at pleaſure, or at leaſt when any train, or fortuitous circumſtance, has a

natural tendency to bring them to its remembrance? A young cat, or a puppy, may run its noſe againſt a fire the firſt time ſuch an object is preſented to it; but will ſeldom be found to try the experiment again. Here the young brute enjoys a faculty denied to the human fœtus, which, conſidering the ſuperiority of the human intellect, may be reckoned nearly in ſimilar circumſtances. The former recalls in idea the painful ſenſation occaſioned by contact with a burning body, and therefore avoids a ſecond rencounter: the latter muſt feel again and again, and yet, after the ſenſation is gone, be unable to recall in imagination the image or form of one ſingle feeling.

From theſe, and many other obſervations that might eaſily be made on this ſubject, we think it reaſonable to conclude, that, if there are not ſuch things as *innate ideas*, there muſt be ideas *connate* at leaſt with exiſtence itſelf.

After what has been advanced on this point, we need no longer be at a loſs to find

find out the origin of ſelfiſhneſs in the human heart. We are not only born with this principle, but conceived in it. In a word, ſelfiſhneſs is a gift of nature coeval with exiſtence itſelf.

Some readers may be apt to imagine, that this view of the origin of ſelfiſhneſs repreſents the great Author of all exiſtence as the cauſe of one of the moſt perverſe principles which the human mind is capable of entertaining. Stop, zealous reader, and reflect, that it is not ſelfiſhneſs, but the abuſe of it, which is criminal. The degree of ſelfiſhneſs we receive from our Creator is nothing more than a powerful inſtinct, which impels men, and all other animals, to defend themſelves from injury and death: it is nothing more than that catholic principle of ſelf-preſervation, which is ſo far from being a criminal principle, that to it alone are we indebted for all the pleaſures and advantages of life.

Who can reflect, without indignation, upon that mean, that profane ſubterfuge, of charging

charging nature with our own vices and inconſiſtencies? How common, but how unjuſt is the excuſe we often plead for indulging ourſelves in pride, ſelfiſhneſs, envy, ſpleen, anger, voluptuouſneſs, &c.? "It is impoſſible but I muſt be paſſionate," ſays the choleric man, "for ſuch is my natural diſpoſition, and it is needleſs to oppoſe what is impracticable to overcome."

For the honour of mankind, we would wiſh never to hear of ſuch a palliative. Conſcience revolts at the thought!—The great Author of Nature, ſo far from entailing vicious inclinations on his creatures, has anxiouſly provided againſt it, by annexing a ſevere penalty to every action or affection, which is not confined within the limits of the ſtricteſt virtue. Antecedent to our contracting vicious habits, we have a much ſtronger bias to virtue than vice. Virtue is entirely conſonant to the original conſtitution of our minds. Vice muſt have recourſe to habit, in order to adorn its native deformity, before it can be made in any meaſure agreeable.

It

It is indeed to be lamented, that when once we allow vice to become habitual, it takes ſuch deep root in the affections, and ſo faſcinates the heart, that we are both unable and unwilling to eradicate it. Habit, in trivial matters, is allowed to be only a *ſecond Nature*; but, in matters of importance, we dignify it ſtill higher, by giving it the title of *Nature's ſelf*. Mankind are endowed with no original principles but what are calculated to promote their own good. We abuſe the gifts of nature, and, at the ſame time, are impudent enough to father theſe very abuſes on our bountiful Creator. The abuſe of the faculties which the Supreme Being has been pleaſed to confer upon us, is the ſource, the origin, the cauſe, of almoſt all the evils incident to the human race. Mankind are by nature endowed with a principle of ſelf-preſervation: but ſelfiſhneſs, or an overbearing ſelf-love, derives its being from the improper culture and management of our own faculties.

Selfiſhneſs, in a certain degree, being thus one of the moſt powerful inſtincts of our conſtitution,

conſtitution, we cannot reaſonably be ſurpriſed, conſidering how deeply it is rooted in human nature, that it ſhould grow up and luxuriantly over-run the hearts of men, unleſs timely pruned by a well regulated culture.

PART

PART II.

Of the Education of Children, with regard to Public Spirit.

MANKIND, it would appear, have entered into a general combination to train up the tender minds of their offſpring, by every method which can have the ſmalleſt tendency to contract their views, and render them hollow-hearted. In every trifling incident, the mother or the nurſe diſcover the utmoſt anxiety to protect the infant from the moſt remote appearances of danger. If the little innocent's noſtrils are ſtimulated, and it ſneezes, in order to give itſelf relief; God preſerve my dear child, cries the mother! the brothers, ſiſters, ſervants, all join in the ſame fooliſh exclamation. If the child be crawling about the room, and chance to roll over to one ſide, the whole family ſet up dreadful ſhrieks, and fly towards him with faces diſtorted by fear

fear and ſurpriſe. When a child perceives that every perſon about him is ſo ſolicitous to protect him from the ſlighteſt injury, he muſt be a dull child indeed, who cannot draw this natural but falſe concluſion, That he is a very important perſonage; that his own welfare is the principal concern of the *family*, which, in his circumſtances, ſignifies *mankind in general*; that, if he is ſafe himſelf, no matter what befal thoſe who defend him, whom he juſtly conſiders as his ſervants.—Does a child give the ſignal by extending his hand, and bending forward to any object, it is inſtantly brought to him: If otherwiſes, he knows of an infallible remedy; let him but cry, and then, My deareſt creature, here it is, here is the candle or the painted glaſs; now, now, peace, peace, my ſweeteſt, dry up your tears, &c. &c.

It is needleſs to be more particular on this point. The experience of every perſon who has ever been an hour in a nurſery or a mother's bed-chamber, is ſufficient to convince him, that mothers and nurſes could

could not fall upon more effectual methods of promoting an enormous ſelf-love in their offſpring than they commonly employ, ſuppoſing ſelfiſhneſs were the moſt important of all moral virtues.

When a man ruminates on the actions and affections of the human race, he is ſtruck with admiration to find ſuch a vaſt variety of effects proceeding from an inconſiderable number of cauſes. So fond are we of tracing things to their origin, and of reducing them to general cauſes, that ſeveral philoſophers have endeavoured to prove, that no action was ever performed by man, no paſſion or affection was ever harboured in the human breaſt, but what is reducible into one ſingle cauſe or motive. It has been repeatedly denied, that ſuch a thing as public-ſpiritedneſs, or diſintereſted benevolence, ever exiſted among men. Self-love, according to that ſect of philoſophers, is the ſource of every human movement: compaſſion, benevolence, love, friendſhip, and all the virtues called ſocial, are mere counterfeit terms, contrived to gratify our

vanity, and conceal the genuine motives which ſtimulate us to action. In a word, they maintain, that man is a mere ſelfiſh animal, incapable of entertaining any feeling or ſentiment which has not ſelf for its ultimate object.

If theſe philoſophers are right; if their repreſentation of the motives by which mankind are univerſally and conſtantly actuated, has its foundation in reaſon, What a world of abſurdities do we daily meet with in the common occurrences of life? Why do all ranks of people applaud friendſhip and benevolence, into whatever character theſe noble ingredients ſeem to enter? Why are the ſocial virtues ſo warmly recommended to our eſteem and practice? Why do patriots, clergymen, &c. exhort us to cultivate charity, humanity, and love to our country? Sure, if any of them belong to this claſs of philoſophers, they muſt be conſcious, that they inforce the practice of what is impoſſible to perform: They declaim againſt ſelfiſh views, and intereſted motives, at the ſame time that they believe

it

it impracticable to have any other. What, then, agreeably to theſe principles, do they recommend to our practice? Why, not only an impoſſibility, but, what is worſe, they would have us to aſſume the appearance of virtues which are too ſublime for our limited powers: they exhort, they implore us to be virtuous and benevolent, and, with the ſame breath, tells us, that not a ſingle grain of virtue or benevolence is to be found under the heavens.

Even ſuppoſing ſuch an hypotheſis to be true, it exhibits ſuch a gloomy view of human nature, by repreſenting men as void of every principle which can elevate them above the rank of the inferior creatures, that inſtead of propagating ſuch deſpicable doctrine, eſpecially among the vulgar, it would be more generous to imitate the conduct of the great Sir Robert Boyle, who ſacrificed the honour of a ſurpriſing invention to the ſafety and protection of mankind. He knew that ſelfiſh men would turn his diſcovery to their own emolument, at the expence of the lives of their fellow-creatures;

creatures; he did not heſitate on the alternative, but generouſly condemned it to eternal oblivion.

But let us not reſt ſatisfied with barely expreſſing our averſion at this hypotheſis; let us rather examine on what foundation it is built.

Several judicious writers have employed all their ingenuity in oppoſing this mean opinion of the human motives and faculties. But as no writer has ſo conciſely and accurately diſtinguiſhed ſelfiſh motives from thoſe that are ſocial, as the learned author of a late ingenious work, it is hoped, that the following quotation on this ſubject will give pleaſure to every lover of ſociety.

"Whatever moves me to act, may in one ſenſe be termed a motive; and in that ſenſe it is the ſame with a cauſe. But this is not the proper or ordinary ſenſe of the term; it is appropriated to actions done as means to an end; and our conviction of the certainty or probability that the action

in

in view will contribute to the desired end, is said to be our motive for performing that action. Thus a motive belongs to intentional actions, not to those which are merely instinctive: these have a cause, viz. the impulse of the passion; but they cannot be said to have a motive, because they are not done with any deliberation or any view to consequences.

"We learn from experience that the gratification of every desire is pleasant; and accordingly the foresight of this pleasure becomes often a motive which swells the original desire we had to act. Thus a child eats by the mere impulse of hunger; a young man thinks of the pleasure of gratification, which being a motive for him to eat, fortifies the original impulse: and a man, farther advanced in life, has the additional motive, that it will contribute to his health.

"From the definition of a motive above given, it is easy to determine, with the greatest accuracy, what passions and actions are selfish,

ſelfiſh, what ſocial: it is the motive or end in view that determines them to belong to the one claſs or to the other; where the end in view is my own good, they are ſelfiſh; where the end in view is the good of another, they are ſocial. Hence it follows, that inſtinctive actions, where we act blindly, and by mere impulſe, cannot be reckoned either ſocial or ſelfiſh: thus eating, when prompted by an impulſe merely of nature, is neither ſocial nor ſelfiſh; but add a motive, that it will contribute to my pleaſure or my health, and it becomes in a meaſure ſelfiſh. On the other hand, when affection moves me to exert actions to the end ſolely of advancing my friend's happineſs, without the ſlighteſt regard to my own gratification, ſuch actions are juſtly denominated *ſocial*; and ſo is alſo the affection that is their cauſe. If another motive be added, that gratifying the affection will contribute to my own happineſs, the actions become partly ſelfiſh. Animal love, when exerted into action by natural impulſe ſingly, is neither ſocial nor ſelfiſh: when exerted with a view to gratification and in order to make me happy, it

is ſelfiſh: when the motive of giving pleaſure to its object is ſuperadded, it is partly ſocial, partly ſelfiſh. A juſt action, when prompted by the principle of duty ſolely, is neither ſocial nor ſelfiſh. When I perform an act of juſtice with a view to the pleaſure of gratification, the action is ſelfiſh; I pay my debt for my own ſake, not with a view to benefit my creditor. But let me ſuppoſe the money has been advanced by a friend without intereſt, purely to oblige me: in this caſe, together with the motive of gratification, there ariſes a motive of gratitude, which reſpects the creditor ſolely, and prompts me to act in order to do him good; and the action is partly ſocial, partly ſelfiſh. Suppoſe again I meet with a ſurpriſing and unexpected act of generoſity, that inſpires me with love to my benefactor and the utmoſt gratitude: I burn to do him good: He is the ſole object of my deſire; and my own pleaſure in gratifying the deſire vaniſhes out of ſight: In this caſe, the action I perform is purely ſocial. Thus it happens, that when a ſocial motive becomes ſtrong, the action is exert-

ed

ed with a view ſingly to the object of the paſſion; and the ſelfiſh pleaſure ariſing from gratification is never once conſidered. The ſame effect of ſtifling ſelfiſh motives, is equally remarkable in other paſſions that are in no view ſocial. An action, for example, prompted by ambition, without any other motive but exaltation merely, is neither ſocial nor ſelfiſh: let exaltation be conſidered as a means to make me happy, and the action becomes ſo far ſelfiſh. But if the deſire of exaltation wax ſtrong, and inflame my mind, the ſelfiſh motive now mentioned is no longer felt. A ſlight degree of reſentment, where my chief view in acting is the pleaſure ariſing to myſelf from gratifying the paſſion, is juſtly denominated ſelfiſh. Where revenge flames ſo high as to have no other aim but the deſtruction of its object, it is no longer ſelfiſh; but, in oppoſition to a ſocial paſſion, may be termed *diſſocial* *."

Thus we ſee that this elegant Writer, deeply ſkilled in the ſcience of human nature,

* Lord Kames's Elements of Criticiſm, vol. 1. p. 62. edit. 2d.

ture, has clearly ſhown, that all our actions muſt be eſtimated according to the cauſes or motives which produce them. He has demonſtrated, in the moſt ſatisfactory manner, that we are actuated ſometimes by ſocial, ſometimes by ſelfiſh motives; ſometimes by motives which are partly ſelfiſh, partly ſocial; and ſometimes by mere inſtinctive motives which cannot be reduced either to the one claſs or to the other.

It is indeed impoſſible for any perſon, whoſe natural principles are not ſtrangely perverted by vicious habits, carefully to watch the feelings of his heart for a ſingle day, and not to perceive that he is ſtimulated to actions and affections ſo purely ſocial, that ſelf is not only entirely out of the queſtion, but even, in many caſes, actually injured.

Taking it then for granted, that mankind are at leaſt capable of ſocial motives, we proceed to ſhow how theſe ſocial motives may be expanded to ſuch a degree as

to produce public-ſpiritedneſs or diſintereſted benevolence.

If we would wiſh to ſee public-ſpirit rendered general in any nation or country, we muſt begin to cultivate this temper at a very early period of life. The world muſt by this time be ſenſible, that, in the education of children, too little attention is beſtowed upon that moſt eſſential part of it which reſpects morality and ſentiment. To guard againſt the infection of evil habits and example; to prevent the growth and expanſion of ſelf-love; to bar the entrance of unnatural principles from the heart; to cheriſh and unfold the ſocial affections—Theſe, it muſt be confeſſed, are ſuch laborious employments, that, conſidering the ignorance and indolence of the generality of mankind, it is not ſurpriſing to ſee them very generally neglected.

SEC-

SECTION II.

Of Infants, i. e. *that particular Stage of Life before Children acquire the uſe of Artificial Language.*

THE infantine ſtate of children requires a greater degree of care and attention than is commonly beſtowed upon it. Upon the proper cultivation of infants depend, in a great meaſure, the figure which the future man is to make, and the character he is to bear in Society. Here habits and paſſions commence, which, if allowed to harbour uncontrouled in the mind, will require the ſtrongeſt efforts both of reaſon and philoſophy to ſubdue and bring them under proper diſcipline.

It is no part of our preſent buſineſs to point out what means ſhould be employed to prevent every vicious habit, or to cultivate

vate every virtuous principle. Public-ſpirit is a ſingle virtue, but a capital one indeed; to it, therefore, ſhall our obſervations be entirely appropriated.

1. That parents, nurſes, ſervants, &c. ſhould conſtantly beware of betraying any ſelfiſh motives or actions in the preſence of children; if a domeſtic receives an injury before a child, he ſhould ſuppreſs all emotions of reſentment until the child is removed.

The utility of this maxim is evident; for, although infants are ignorant of artificial language, yet are they adepts in the natural language of paſſion. An infant knows, by the motion of the eyes, the diſtortion of the muſcles of the face, and the particular geſtures of the body, that a perſon in this ſituation is indulging a ſelfiſh paſſion; and that he is about to pour vengeance on the head of his adverſary. All appearances of every paſſion but what are ſocial and benevolent, ought to be concealed with the utmoſt vigilance from the eyes of infants.

infants. When an infant frequently beholds the natural marks of diſſocial paſſions, he is inſenſibly led, as it were by a kind of natural magic, to imitate what is thus repeatedly placed in his view.

Nature teaches an infant, whenever he perceives a certain appearance in the countenance, that the perſon is eager in the purſuit of ſome favourite object: the infant naturally employs the ſame means in order to get poſſeſſion of every thing that catches his fancy: and hence, if often indulged, he in time acquires a wayward, ſelfiſh temper.

2. That the στοργη or natural affection of parents to their children, ought to be concealed, as far as poſſible, from the obſervation of infants.

The difficulty of complying with this maxim may perhaps be objected to the utility of it.—How ſucceſsfully do mankind, and particularly the fair ſex, employ the arts of diſſimulation, when intereſt is at ſtake? This is all that is here required. Let them

them indulge the paſſion as much as they pleaſe; but let it not appear, by their words or actions, that they are thus obliged to love their children. When once a child perceives, that his parents are deeply intereſted in his welfare, he naturally concludes, that nothing, however improper, will be withheld from him. But, if not only the parents, but, which is commonly the caſe, the whole family concur in the ſame deſtructive ſhow of affection, the child is infallibly rendered ſelfiſh, and his heart is ſhut up from receiving any ſocial or public-ſpirited principle. The reaſon is obvious. He is denied nothing he aſks. Every perſon about him diſcovers the utmoſt ſolicitude to contribute to his pleaſure, and gratify his inclinations. He is a kind of tyrant in the family. Every edict he gives out, is inſtantly complied with. If he gives but the ſignal, quick as lightning is he obeyed. In a word, the youngeſt of the family has generally the whole domeſtics at his back.

What can be expected from ſuch conduct as this? Why, nothing but what actually happens every day. Children thus educated have no ideas but of ſelf; no affections, no deſires, but what are purely ſelfiſh. Were this ſuperabundant affection, this care and anxiety of parents concealed, children would then be led to conſider themſelves, as they really are, of leſs importance than their protectors: they would eſteem every act of attention and kindneſs, not as a duty or neceſſity, but as an unmerited munificence. Hence love, gratitude, and every ſocial affection would ſpring up in their tender minds.

SECT.

SECTION III.

Of Cultivating Public Spirit in Children, from the Infantine Stage, till they arrive at the Reaſoning Period of Life.

THIS is a ſubject of ſuch vaſt latitude, that it would require many volumes to treat it in proportion to its extent and importance. But as prolixity is abſolutely incompatible with our preſent plan, let it ſuffice, to ſelect a few principal obſervations, and leave the reader to make what additions his judgment or experience may ſuggeſt.

The regulations mentioned in the former ſection reſpected the treatment of children before they were acquainted with artificial language. In what follows, we ſuppoſe them to know both artificial language and the language of nature. What was there laid down with regard to the management of the dumb animal, applies with accumulated force with regard to the pratting boy.

Indeed,

Indeed, ſuch is the uniformity of the human intellect, prior to the maturity of all its faculties, that inſtead of requiring a different treatment at every ſeeming change in its age or conſtitution, it is indiſpenſably neceſſary to be conſtantly inculcating the ſame invariable principles upon the ſoft and ductile mind.

To commend children, even when their behaviour is good, tends univerſally to contract their hearts, and deaden the ſocial affections.

It is juſtly eſteemed one of the greateſt inſtances of ſelf-government, to withſtand the ſtealing inſinuations of flattery. From the higheſt to the loweſt rank of mortals, how difficult is it to find a mind ſtrong enough to reſiſt the attacks of this powerful foe? Reaſon, however well improved, is found to be inſufficient for this purpoſe. Every man lies open, at one quarter or other, to the aſſaults of flattery. Frequent have been the complaints of philoſophers, in all ages, that flattery, when artfully ap-

plied, never failed to render their nobleſt efforts abortive.

The cauſe of the exorbitant influence of flattery over the mind of man, is eaſily inveſtigated. An exceſs of ſelf-eſtimation is the ſource of this greateſt and moſt univerſal of all human foibles. Nature has inſpired us with a ſelf-preſerving principle: the common mode of education, inſtead of oppoſing this natural bias to ſelfiſhneſs, which is but too ready to lay hold of every advantage, ſhuts up our minds from entertaining any other object but ſelf alone. Were the mind properly tutored, love to the whole human race would, in a few ages, become as general as ſelf-love is at preſent. But let us not condemn the preſent methods of educating children, without a judicial trial.

Nature hath wiſely decreed, that parents ſhould have a ſtrong affection to their offſpring. The learned author above-mentioned makes the στοργη an expanſion of ſelf-love upon our children. The general conduct

conduct of parents ſeems to juſtify this hypotheſis. Were this opinion concerning the love of parents to their children ſufficiently propagated, we might hope in time to ſee fathers and mothers as ſhy in praiſing their ſons and daughters as mankind generally are of publicly applauding themſelves. Although all men poſſeſs ſome degree of ſelf-love; yet few are ſo void of delicacy as openly to proclaim their own praiſe. How would it grate every ſenſible ear, to hear a man ſeriouſly proteſting, That he is poſſeſſed of great depth of judgment; that his genius is quick, lively, and comprehenſive; that he has a prodigious fund of ſenſe and erudition; that he runs through the whole circle of the ſciences with the utmoſt facility; that he is amazed at the weakneſs and ſtupidity of thoſe who find inſurmountable difficulties in any branch of learning; that, for his part, he never met with any problem, the inveſtigation of which could give him the ſmalleſt uneaſineſs; and, finally, that nothing is too great, nothing too ſubtile, nothing too obſcure for his all-ſeeing penetration?

Would

Would not every ſober man juſtly imagine ſuch a perſon to be either entirely frantic, or wildly intoxicated with ſelf-eſtimation? Modeſty is ſhocked at the idea of ſuch intolerable vanity.—Be not thunderſtruck, delicate reader! if you have acquired the honourable appellation of *Father*, you are the man! if otherwiſe, ſuch were your progenitors; ſuch are more than nine-tenths of all the fathers and mothers in the univerſe.—You would incline to ſee on what foundation theſe aſſertions are grounded. The foundation, alas! is too well grounded in the general behaviour of parents toward their children.

Reflect, reader, on your own experience and obſervation. You are introduced to a gentleman and ſpouſe; common compliments being over, young Maſter makes his appearance.

Stranger. Come forward, my dear.—A mighty fine boy!

Mother.

Mother. Neighbour-like, Sir ;—but a rambling thoughtleſs dog.

Father. Not the worſe for that, honey ; you would not have a boy of his years as moroſe and thoughtful as a philoſopher :—Sprightlineſs and activity are the native fruits of a great genius.

Moth. Nay, as to that, my dear, nobody can diſpute his capacity ; he is quick as fire at his education.—Mr Pedaneus, his tutor, ſays that he will turn out to be a great man; for he himſelf, and you know he is a very learned man, is aſtoniſhed at the boy's abilities.—In a word, Sir, he takes it up much faſter than his maſter is able to give it him: —he outſtrips all his companions in every part of his learning ;—and indeed, as my huſband obſerves, he does no harm with his roguiſhneſs ; for he is naturally of a humane and generous diſpoſition ; he injures no body ;—and, as for his companions, they are all prodigiouſly fond of him.

Strang.

Strang. Well, young maſter, I underſtand you are an excellent ſcholar.

Boy. I do not know, Sir.

Moth. The boy, Sir, is baſhful before ſtrangers:—he is naturally very modeſt.

Strang. What books do you read, my dear?

Boy. What books, Sir?—I read any books my maſter deſires me.

Moth. Cannot you tell the gentleman, you clowniſh fellow, (affection and vanity burning in her countenance), that you have gone through your Latin, and have begun the French?—

Strang. Has he indeed, Ma'am!—that's ſurpriſing!—Why, ſure the young gentleman is not above ten!—

Moth. True, Sir; but he is a very extraordinary little creature.—Come hither, Sirrah,

Sirrah, and let the gentleman hear you read your Latin book.—Now obſerve, Sir, and you'll find my words good.

Here young Maſter explains a few lines of ſome claſſic which he has repeated perhaps an hundred times, without having any clearer ideas of the intention or meaning of the author, than a parrot, when it calls *Oyſters* or *Onions*.

Strang. Mighty fine!—

Moth. Now, Sir, you ſee I did not exaggerate;—he can read all the Latin with the ſame eaſe.—Beſides, Sir, if you and he were better acquainted, you would find how prettily he can talk upon every ſubject:—before he was five years of age, every body was aſtoniſhed at the witty things he would ſay.—God preſerve and bleſs him for a comfort to me in my old age; for he has always hitherto been a pleaſant, well-behaving child, &c. &c.—

I appeal to experience:—he muſt be a ſingular reader indeed, who has never had a ſimilar entertainment in a family-converſation. Is it not the general practice of parents openly to commend their children? Some parents there are, who, with a ſeeming modeſty, relate the virtues and exploits of their little ones as it were aſide. Fruitleſs expedient! So greedy of applauſe are children, and ſo well ſkilled in the language of Nature, that if they but perceive your countenance, or hear the moſt diſtant ſound of your voice, they ſee into the inmoſt receſſes of thy ſoul. Ceaſe, then, from wondering. Modeſty is a rare virtue. Mankind are never aſhamed to celebrate their children; but ſeldom reflect, that, in this reſpect, there is no material difference betwixt the parent and the child. Henceforth may it ever be eſteemed as great indelicacy and want of good-breeding for a man to ſpeak favourably of his ſon as of himſelf: And would to Heaven a period were put to this fulſome, ill-bred, poiſonable practice.

Now,

Now, it may be ſaid, granting all this to be true, what connection has it with public ſpirit? The connection is extremely obvious. The minds of men are very eaſily intoxicated with flattery. But the tender minds of children are ſtill more liable to be devoured by this enemy of the human kind. Self-love corrodes the very principles of public ſpirit. If in early youth ſelf-love is, upon every occaſion, inſtilled into the mind, how can we expect ever to ſee a race of patriots? In every ſtage and ſituation of life, ſelf is a favourite object. In the morning of life, ſelf is almoſt the only object we are ſolicitous about. Few are at that time the objects of our knowledge; fewer ſtill take any hold of our affections: How deſtructive, then, muſt flattery prove to a mind thus circumſtanced? To fill the ears of a child with praiſe, is as noxious to its conſtitution, as to adminiſter large quantities of alcohol in order to reſtore a drunken man to the uſe of his faculties. Such however is the daily regimen of children. No ſooner do they come into the world, than they are placed, as it were,

in the very center of adulation; and never, till too late, are they permitted to go beyond the limits of its bewitching ſphere.—What is the reſult? When children, thus educated, arrive at the years of maturity; when they eſcape out of the inchanted family-walls, and mingle with the more enlightened ſons of men; ſtrange and prepoſterous is the figure they make. Headſtrong, wayward, and ſelfiſh, they naturally expect to be careſſed, ſerved, and adored as they had formerly been by mamma, papa, &c. But how are they mortified to meet with the deriſive laugh in place of the fond embrace? How ſtruck with admiration, when they diſcover, that every man they converſe with is as ſelfiſh and willful as they themſelves? They now find that they are children ſtill, although they had long ſince eſteemed themſelves men. They had been accuſtomed to the ſervice and adulation of every perſon about them; now are they galled with repeated denials, and, what is worſe, obliged to ſerve and flatter in turn.

This

This reception which young men, trained up in ſelfiſhneſs, meet with upon their firſt intercourſe with the world, has a very good effect. It in ſome meaſure counteracts the principles they have imbibed. But ſo deeply are firſt impreſſions engraven on the mind, that neither philoſophy, nor the knowledge of mankind, are ſufficient to efface them.—A ſelfiſh child, generally ſpeaking, will never become a generous friend or a diſintereſted patriot.

In the treatment of children, we muſt not only guard them againſt entertaining too great a degree of ſelf-love, but we muſt likewiſe endeavour to ſubſtitute public ſpiritedneſs, or an univerſal love to the human ſpecies, in its ſtead. To accompliſh this, we muſt frequently preſent to their minds every action and every object which has a natural tendency to extend their views: we muſt convince them, in the beſt manner we can, that we are ſo framed by the hand of Nature, that perſonal eaſe and ſecurity do not conſtitute one half of that extenſive

happineſs

happineſs which the human mind is capable of enjoying.

To be able to execute this properly, requires a conſiderable degree of knowledge in parents, for whoſe uſe the preſent obſervations are chiefly intended: for this reaſon, our obſervations ſhall be levelled, as much as poſſible, to vulgar apprehenſions.

To ſow the ſeeds of public ſpirit in the minds of children, even after they have acquired a portion of the reaſoning faculty, we muſt not have recourſe to the airy ſuggeſtions of fancy. Imagination may miſlead our inquiries into human motives and actions, but can never be made ſubſervient to the practice of any ſingle virtue. Every man may erect an Utopian fabric of one conſtruction or other. But it may be aſked, Have any of theſe viſionary ſchemes ever had any extenſive influence on the behaviour of men? No; not one. Many of them are intituled, *Ideas of Perfection.* Ideas they are; but ideas ſo ill-ſuited to the conſtitution and circumſtances of human

man nature, that they fly off without making any useful or lasting impression. If we would successfully inculcate the practice of any virtue, no observations should be made, no rules of conduct laid down, but what are adapted to our powers, and easily reduced into practice.

Upon the supposition, then, that no selfish habits have been contracted during infancy, it may not be improper to make a few reflections on the nature and tendency of the books usually put into the hands of children*. No sooner is a child capable of mechanically joining letters and syllables together than he is ordered by his preceptors or parents, to read Fables, History, &c.

Of all human compositions, nothing can be so ill-adapted to the capacity, nothing so destructive to the minds of children, as fictitious representations of objects and actions. Not to mention the many evils this

* We are obliged to use the word *child* for all that space between infancy and manhood.

this ſpecies of compoſition actually produces in youthful minds, we ſhall only take notice of ſuch as are more immediately connected with our ſubject.

Look back, Reader, and conſider what notions you entertained of the various fables you may have read in the morning of your days. Inſtead of drawing moral concluſions, was you not principally delighted with that animal which devoured all its opponents by the ſuperiority of its ſtrength, or cunningly ſubdued them by the artfulneſs of its ſnares? The ſtrength and ferocity of the Lion; the deceitfulneſs of the Fox; the arch tricks of the Monkey, &c. were not theſe the chief objects of thy admiration? Doubtleſs they were. Neither was you to blame; Nature taught you to do ſo.—The fault lay in thoſe who inſtructed you.

When a boy ruminates on the unlimited authority which the Lion is repreſented to have over the beaſts of the field, or on the inexhauſtible artifices of the Fox, does he not ardently wiſh to be poſſeſſed of the power

power of the one and the art of the other? —For what reaſon?—Why, that he might be enabled to play the tyrant among his Companions, and cunningly to over-reach his Superiors.

Children are naturally and unavoidably led to eſteem thoſe animals moſt which make the greateſt buſtle in a fable. Fictions of this kind have a very ſtriking but unhappy reſemblance to real life. The vicious and unthinking part of mankind generally make the greateſt ſhow and noiſe in the world. True Virtue delighting in tranquillity and frequent retirement, is in danger of entirely eſcaping the public eye. What is called the Moral, or virtuous character, in a fable, is, for the moſt part, ſhut up in ſome obſcure corner, ſo far beyond the penetration of a ſchool-boy, that it often requires the ſagacity of a philoſopher to diſcover its retreat. Hence it is evident, that reading of fables has a natural tendency to excite in the minds of children a ſpirit of ambition, tyranny, cruelty, and deceit. Were this the only evil which fabulous re-

preſentations

preſentations entail upon youthful minds, children ſhould be as anxiouſly kept from indiſcriminately hearing or reading of fables, as from falling into the fire or tumbling headlong over a precipice.

The hiſtorical works which are commonly read in our ſchools, are as ill-adapted, and have, if poſſible, ſtill more fatal effects upon the diſpoſitions of children than fables. Cæſar, Quintus Curtius, &c. what benefit does a ſchool-boy derive from ſuch performances as theſe? If they are not underſtood, the labour both of the preceptor and pupil are entirely loſt;—if they are underſtood, worſe is the conſequence. By reading compoſitions of this kind, which are only fit to be peruſed by men of ſenſe and coolneſs, the principles of ambition, ſelfiſhneſs, and inhumanity, are neceſſarily impreſſed upon the pliant minds of children.

When a boy is ſo far advanced as to be able to read Cæſar or Curtius, his ſoul inſtantly catches the deluſive flame; he would now give a world, were it in his poſſeſſion, to

to be a Cæſar or an Alexander. Here he is actuated by the ſame motives which, not many months before, made him wiſh to be a lion or a fox. Were a ſchool-boy aſked, Why he ſo much admired Alexander? if he was ingenuous, he would reply, "Becauſe Alexander was a ſtrong man, and killed many millions of the barbarians."—To mangle and butcher the human race, is the only quality which ſchool-boys admire in a hero. Never pleaſed but when the hero is dealing death and deſtruction around him, their imaginations are heated to ſuch a degree, that, after reading the deſcription of a battle, the little creatures have been frequently obſerved to put on a haughty air, elevate their bodies, ape the firm pace of a warrior, and caſt a ſupercilious glance on their companions, as if each of them would ſay, "I am a King, and will be obeyed."

The deſtructive tendency of ſuch compoſitions to the minds of children, is ſo obvious, that it ſcarce requires any illuſtration. The mind being accuſtomed to the ideas of pride, ſlaughter, and uncontrouled power, a

haughty, ferocious, and imperious temper is neceſſarily generated.

Beſides, children are extremely ill-qualified for comprehending the route and diſpoſitions of an army. It is impoſſible for them to enter into the views of a leader: —Marches, countermarches, detachments, ſieges, encampments, &c. &c. are materials very ill ſuited to the genius of a boy in his twelfth year.

We would have our children benevolent, and inſpired with love to the public, and at the ſame time arm them with all the implements of war, by which every ſocial principle, every ſpark of humanity and patriotiſm is in danger of being utterly extinguiſhed. That ſuch an enemy of mankind as diſcord exiſts in the world, ought to be kept an inviolable ſecret, till the mind has acquired ſuch a degree of maturity as may enable her to perceive the innumerable evils of which it is productive.—It is as impoſſible for a boy, whoſe imagination is in a manner totally immerſed in blood, not to

be proud, ſelfiſh, and over-bearing, as for a perſon born in a camp, and trained up to manhood in the midſt of ſlaughter and deſolation, not to delight in the butchery of his ſpecies. Let children learn diſcord and the arts of war from the diſſentions of their companions: It is the buſineſs of parents and teachers to uſe their utmoſt induſtry in oppoſing every diſſocial paſſion, and in cultivating every humane and benevolent affection.

Imagine not, however, that we here exclaim againſt hiſtory in general. Nothing can be more foreign to our intention. It is only the hiſtory of tyrants, the great revolutions and diſſentions of empires and nations, which we deem improper to be put into the hands of children.

We rejoice in the capacity of pointing out one peculiar ſpecies of hiſtory, which, inſtead of corrupting the tender minds of youth, ſeems admirably calculated for promoting generoſity of temper and a true ſpirit of patriotiſm. Biography, or the hiſtory of

of the actions and diſpoſitions of particular perſons, upon the ſlighteſt conſideration, will be found to be that ſpecies of hiſtory which is not only beſt ſuited to the capacity of children, but likewiſe beſt calculated for inſpiring them with a catholic love to the human race. But here it muſt be remarked, that it is not the lives of warriors that we recommend; the biography from which any advantage can be derived to children, is the hiſtory of private lives and private characters:

Here we perceive a formidable objection riſing apace, and, like a thick fog, overclouding the imagination of the reader.—Where are ſuch biographical works to be got? The lives of private perſons are ſo common and unintereſting, that few writers of any diſtinction have ever condeſcended to employ their talents in exhibiting a deceaſed perſonage to the eyes of the world, who perhaps lived and died unknown to nine-tenths of the town in which he ſpent his days.

The

The ſlighteſt reflection will inſtantly diſpel this doubt. Bad as the world is, virtue is not entirely neglected. The lives of ſeveral diſintereſted lovers of mankind have been already immortalized by authors of great merit: and, were compoſitions of this nature oftener called for, without the aſſiſtance of a prophetic ſpirit, we may with abſolute aſſurance predict, that the publication of books of this kind, as well as of every other, will always be in proportion to the demand, or number of purchaſers. Let the current of the preſent taſte be changed, which, with regard to children, may be eaſily effected, and the event will infallibly juſtify the prediction.

Subſtitute, O ye authors! real life in the room of fictions; ſtem the torrent of romance, which for ſome centuries has deluged the earth. Exhibit to the world the virtues and vices of men, inſtead of the diſtorted viſions of fancy. Why do you ſcourge your imaginations with the invention of facts, events, cataſtrophes, &c.? Theſe are painful and often fruitleſs labours,

bours. Reflect rather on the virtues, actions, and various incidents in the life of your late friend. Celebrate his virtues; but conceal not his faults. Copy your repreſentations of Nature from Nature's ſelf. Your labour will then be leſs irkſome, attended with greater emolument to yourſelves, and productive of more intrinſic utility to your readers.

It is true, ſome ingenious romances do now and then make their appearance. With ſuch we have no quarrel; although even theſe, with all their advantages, are but ill-adapted to the capacity of children. But what effects do they produce? We have no heſitation to pronounce, that their effects are fatal both to the generality of men and to all children without diſtinction. A compoſition of this nature, however excellent, like an unpopular patriot paſſing along the ſtreets of a country-village, is conſtantly followed by ſuch a troop of dirty, raſcally vagabonds, that its paſſage is almoſt entirely obſtructed. No ſooner does a romance of any merit make its appearance, than

ſholes

ſholes of noxious imitations are inſtantly diſperſed through the nation, the bad conſequences of which more than overbalance the wholeſome fruits of the beſt performances.—One never-failing evil attends theſe ſervile imitations of genius. Want of ingenuity abſolutely diſqualifies ſuch authors for imitating the taſte and ſentiment of a fine writer. Hence they muſt either not write at all, or imitate the foibles and defects of their original. For the truth of this, we might appeal to the Reviewers, or any perſon who is obliged, from the nature of his employment, to read indiſcriminately every publication from a two-penny pamphlet to an unwieldy folio. Triſtram Shandy made us laugh at his hints, and his blanks, and his aſterics: but the ſervile band he dragged after him, as if eager to inſtruct the ignorant in the meaning, not only improved the hints, filled up the blanks in plain characters, and ſerved the ladies with a full expoſition of the aſterics, but, what is worſe, ſtuffed many volumes with ſuch a medley of ignorance and obſcenity, that no perſon of ſenſe or ſobriety would

ſo

ſo far defile his imagination as to give them a ſerious peruſal.

It was obſerved above, that the generality of mankind, and all children without exception, were unable to reap any advantage from romances wrote in a good taſte; the natural conſequence is, that the far greater part of mankind, who read romances with the utmoſt avidity, never inquire after thoſe of any merit, but content themſelves with the filth and ignorance with which the common herd of romances are amply replete.

Theſe obſervations are not capricious, or founded on mere hypotheſis. Experience, the only ſupport of every ſolid theory, opportunely comes in to our aid. Examine the houſes of that large claſs of mankind called the *vulgar*, meaning all but men of taſte and judgment, and in ſome corner or ſhelf you may, *a priori*, be certain of finding romances of one ſpecies or other. But we call upon you to declare, if you have ever, in the courſe of your viſiting, found one

one in a hundred of theſe romances, but what muſt, from their very natures, prove hurtful, not only to the minds of children, but, in moſt inſtances, to the oldeſt of the family. Children are naturally fond of romances: They are generally the firſt books which are read by youth of both ſexes, without the expreſs commands of a parent or preceptor. Often has young maſter been ſeen throwing down his grammar with the utmoſt contempt, ſtealing off to ſome ſecret corner, and there ſitting, fixed like a ſtatue, brooding for hours together over the French Lovers, or ſome other obſcene romance.—Miſs manages the matter with more addreſs; but, though leſs frequently detected, ſhe is not for that reaſon leſs criminal than her younger brother.

Now, as experience teaches, that the repreſentations of the actions, characters, &c. of particular perſons, are admirably calculated for fixing the attention of children, this natural bent of the youthful mind ought by no means to be curbed. It is the duty of parents and tutors to take advan-

tage of this diſpoſition, by protecting children againſt the infection of romances, and by placing within their reach books of a ſimilar nature, but whoſe effects upon their minds will be directly oppoſite.

What ſpecies of compoſition, then, can poſſibly ſo well anſwer this end, as a decent relation of the various actions, virtues, &c. of men whoſe ſtations in life have been ſimilar, or at leaſt not much above that of the reader's parents and acquaintances. It is indeed a ſubject worthy of regret, that moſt biographers diſdain to hand down to poſterity any character, however noble or exalted, unleſs the perſon has been either poſſeſſed of riches, or employed in ſome office of diſtinction.—A buſtling ſtateſman, though deſtitute of capacity, or a fortunate ſoldier, though a coward at bottom, is ſure of being celebrated with all the pomp and ſolemnity that panegyric can beſtow. But let men of inferior ſtations live ever ſo virtuouſly; let them be ſcrupulouſly juſt; let them be poſſeſſed of great warmth of affection to every creature of God; let them bear

bear misfortunes with fortitude and reſignation; let them be humane, generous, beneficent, &c. with theſe and a thouſand other qualifications, may they go down to the *ſilent* grave, without having their amiable characters diſplayed to the eye of the world! —Independently of doing juſtice to the memory of diſtinguiſhed virtue, the characters of ſuch men, although they had lived and died in beggary and rags, ought to be ſet up as beacons to direct the courſe of their brethren in ſtation or circumſtances. By the laws of all nations, a murderer forfeits his life to the public. Why ſo? That his unhappy fate, replies the lawyer, may ſerve as an example to deter others from committing the like atrocious crime.—Good. —But ſhould not the ſame reaſon determine us to record the actions of a man of eminent virtue, whatever be his ſtation, That his noble conduct may prove an incitement to others to follow his ſteps?

Another obſervation occurs, to ſhow ſtill farther the utility of this inferior ſpecies of biography.—It is at preſent the general practice

practice of biographers, to chuſe their ſubjects ſolely from men of high life. Of courſe, only people of a ſimilar ſphere derive any benefit from their works.—Say the body of the people, "Well might ſuch a man be public-ſpirited, charitable, and beneficent; were we as opulent, we would be as benevolent—Had his income been as ſcanty as ours, his beneficence would have been leſs diffuſive."

By thus neglecting to give unto merit its due reward, without regard to ſtation or circumſtances, a plauſible excuſe is furniſhed to the great bulk of mankind, for indulging themſelves in ſelfiſhneſs, avarice, and inhumanity.—"Men of opulence," ſay they, "may do good to their country; becauſe their riches and ſphere of action enable them to give full ſcope to the inclinations of their hearts:—We wiſh for the proſperity of our country and the happineſs of mankind as ardently as they;—but as to us, the will muſt be accepted for the deed: people in our ſituation and contracted ſpheres, have not the means of putting our

deſires

deſires in execution."—Hence it happens, that when any undertaking of public utility is propoſed, the whole burden devolves upon a few individuals; whereas, if every individual could be perſuaded to contribute in proportion to his circumſtances; were public-ſpiritedneſs the characteriſtic of our iſland; were the feelings of its inhabitants ſo far improved, and their minds expanded to ſuch a degree, that they found themſelves prompted both from motives of duty and of ſympathy, to give at leaſt ſome aſſiſtance to every plan formed for the improvement of their country, no undertaking, however great or extenſive, would ever prove abortive, from a deficiency either of money or manual labour.

The nature of things ſtamps it a palpable abſurdity, to entertain any reaſonable hopes of rendering public-ſpiritedneſs the characteriſtic of a nation, unleſs we apply our preſcriptions to the mind before it has acquired habits of an oppoſite tendency. Public-ſpirit, like every other virtue, muſt be early and repeatedly inculcated, in order to make

make it a permanent and eſtabliſhed principle of action.

It is imagined, that the ſpecies of hiſtory we have been ſpeaking of, if properly managed, might greatly promote, in the minds of children, a noble and diſintereſted affection to the human kind. Spirited, but ſimple and genuine narrations of the ſeveral actions, affections, and principles of men who have on all occaſions diſcovered an univerſal love to mankind, a ſtrong, unbiaſſed, and peculiar attachment to their country, &c. I ſay, were books of this kind as frequently peruſed by children as fooliſh or obſcene romances, the good effects of ſuch education would ſoon be diſplayed in the general tempers and diſpoſitions of youth. A generous public-ſpirited temper, like true devotion, is only attainable by an habitual contemplation of objects poſſeſſed of that valuable quality.

To imitate what we naturally admire, or what our minds are frequently converſant about, is a fundamental principle of the human

man conſtitution. This principle of imitation is moſt powerful in the morning of life. Of courſe, children ſhould never be permitted to ſee, hear, or read of actions, the imitation of which can in any degree vitiate their taſte or corrupt their hearts.

PART

PART III.

Means of Promoting Public Spirit, adapted to the Preſent Situation of Mankind.

To a diligent inquirer into the motives from which the generality of human actions take their riſe, it muſt appear, that diſintereſted love to the public, is a very rare virtue. Indeed, every man who has had the ſmalleſt intercourſe with his own ſpecies, will readily acknowledge, that ſelf is the great idol of almoſt every individual. Some exceptions, it is true, muſt be made: But theſe are extremely few in proportion to thoſe who ſeem incapable of conceiving, or, at leaſt, artfully ſmother every generous ſentiment as ſoon as conceived. It is impoſſible for men, on all emergencies, to diveſt themſelves entirely of humanity. Social feelings will, on ſome occaſions, glow in the breaſt of the miſer. Would to heaven

he

he were not endowed with the capacity of extinguiſhing the generous flame.—Give the ſelfiſh man but a moment's deliberation, and a thouſand cool pretexts will inſtantly render his ſoul callous and impenetrable by any motive or feeling which has not ſelf for its ultimate object.

It is a melancholy, but unqueſtionable truth, that, taking mankind by the bulk, liberality of ſentiment bears but a very ſmall proportion to partial and ſelfiſh feelings. Whence comes this great, this ignoble fatality?—Blame not Nature, O man! She has ſtamped upon your conſtitution the decent, well-meaning inſtinct of ſelf-preſervation; but you have induſtriouſly glutted this uſeful domeſtic, till it has grown up to be a proud, cruel, and tyrannical oppreſſor,—of what?—of the human kind, for whoſe protection and happineſs it had been originally deſtined by their bountiful Creator. Selfiſhneſs, as has been ſhown, derives its origin from indiſcretions in the education of children. It is our buſineſs now to ſhow, that the behaviour of moſt men, in the

common affairs of life, inſtead of eradicating this early bias to narrowneſs of ſpirit, tends to make its root ſtill deeper in the mind.

It is a frequent wiſh of men of contracted views, That all mankind were on a level with regard to power and wealth; that the terms *ſuperior* and *inferior*, *maſter* and *ſervant*, were never heard or underſtood among the ſons of men. This is undoubtedly the language of ignorance and peeviſhneſs. Nature has wiſely decreed, that certain degrees of ſubordination ſhould take place through the whole circle of her admirable productions. Men of learning and diſcernment eaſily perceive the beauty and utility of ſuch a ſeemingly unequal diſtribution: But to the vulgar it is, and muſt be an inexplicable myſtery: And what are the vulgar? Why, ninety-nine in a hundred of the whole human race. That vaſt body of men ſeldom or never think for themſelves. Their actions are not the reſult of reaſon or reflection. Precedents, habits, and the all-powerful influence of example, are

the

the principal ſources of all the actions and determinations of the vulgar.—If you aſk a clown why he thinks or acts in ſuch a manner? His anſwer, if he is ingenuous, will generally be to this purpoſe:—"Becauſe his father did ſo before him; becauſe he was uſed to do ſo all his life;" or more commonly ſtill, "Becauſe the Lord of the manor, or the clergyman of the pariſh always did ſo."—One ſhould imagine, that it would be a matter of very ſmall difficulty to alter, at pleaſure, opinions founded on ſuch mere ſhadows of reaſoning. Experience, however, evinces, that it is extremely difficult to rectify or change the notions and conceits of ſuch people. Their minds are ſteeled againſt the voice of reaſon, when it comes in competition with any of their prejudices. To endeavour to work upon the minds of the vulgar with fine ſenſe, (ſays a penetrating wit), is like attempting to hew blocks with razors.—How, then, muſt the vulgar be treated in order to make them public ſpirited? or how ſhall their views be ſo far extended as to render them ſubſervient to the good of the ſtate, or the

intereſts of ſociety? There is but one infallible method of ſolving this problem.—The very ſame means muſt be employed in order to make their diſpoſitions liberal and diſintereſted which were formerly the cauſes of their illiberality and ſelfiſhneſs.

Example, that great ruler of the human kind, is the only certain means of operating upon the vulgar mind. General example, it muſt be confeſſed, is capable, in ſome meaſure, of moulding almoſt every man's motives and actions into whatever ſhape it pleaſes to aſſume. Hence every man is bound by a double obligation to lead a virtuous life. Not only his own ſafety and happineſs depend on his good behaviour, but, if he is a man of rank and figure, his words, actions, and principles will inſenſibly infect moſt of his companions, and all his dependents without diſtinction. Did not the experience of all ages and nations extort our belief, it would be abſolutely incredible how far the influence of one man's example may ſometimes extend.—Let not thoſe of inferior ſtations, however, imagine, that

that their natural obſcurity and contracted influence, free them from this obligation. That man muſt be very low indeed, who is not a ſuperior to ſome. The meaneſt labourer as well as the greateſt monarch, is a man of figure in the eyes of many. Hence the obligation is binding upon every individual. The extent of their influence, their capacity of doing good or evil, muſt indeed always be in proportion to their power and ſuperiority. Hence the degree of obligation, and the extent of the influence of example will be great or ſmall, according as the perſon is of a high or a low rank in life.

How great, then, is the happineſs of that nation which is bleſſed with a humane, benevolent, and public-ſpirited Sovereign? The King is juſtly ſtyled the Father and Repreſentative of his people; his principles, his actions, his geſtures, nay, the very defects of his body, are all ſubjects of univerſal imitation. The vices or virtues of a Prince are firſt communicated to his Court, and, through that all-infecting channel, convey-

ed

ed to the fartheſt limits of his dominions. Hence every King may emphatically be ſaid to reign in the hearts of his ſubjects. —If credit is due to the general voice of the nation, the people of this fortunate iſland have no reaſon to call upon their Sovereign to exert the extenſive influence natural to his exalted ſtation, in order to diffuſe public ſpirit and diſintereſted patriotiſm through the nation. It ought nevertheleſs to be conſidered, that the influence of example, however eminent the perſonage, is ſlow in its motion. Allowing our preſent Sovereign to poſſeſs the higheſt degree of public ſpirit, and the warmeſt affection for his ſubjects; yet, as he has been but a ſhort time upon the throne *, and his reign, ever ſince he arrived at that exalted dignity, has been ſo much embroiled both by foreign and domeſtic commotions, that the influence of his example cannot poſſibly have induced any conſiderable number of imitators. We may indulge ourſelves in the proſpect of future happineſs, when the devouring mouths of clamour and faction ſhall be ſtopped; when that high tide of paſſion,

* 1763.

paſſion, which has excited inteſtine diſſentions among the chiefs of our nation, ſhall change its current, unite its force, and exert all its vigour, in promoting the intereſt and proſperity of Britons, and no longer ſtand, like a mighty barrier, obſtructing the powerful influence of Majeſty from diffuſing a ſpirit of univerſal benevolence over the land. Until that happy period arrive, which every lover of his country or of mankind muſt earneſtly wiſh for, we cannot expect that the example of our Sovereign can have any extenſive influence in promoting genuine patriotiſm among his people.

Next to the example of Majeſty, that of men of fortune and property ſtands forth as the great transformer of the people. Conſider all ye on whom Heaven has liberally beſtowed the good things of this life, ſeriouſly conſider your own real importance. On your conduct much depends: The proſperity of your country; the happineſs of your inferiors; nay, the eternal as well as temporal felicity of millions, in a good meaſure,

ſure, hangs on your behaviour. Every eye is intent on your actions; every ear greedily devours your words; your principles are infuſed into every heart. Like a lofty mountain in the centre of a wide extended plain, you attract the attention of the whole country round.—Nay more; you not only attract the general attention, but you poſſeſs the ſingular virtue of *transforming* the beholders into your own likeneſs! If you are virtuous, the generality of the people will be virtuous; if vicious, the people will be vicious likewiſe; if your hearts are narrow, ſelfiſh, and overbearing, avarice, chicanery, and pride, will be the characteriſtics of the multitude: In a word, you have the hearts of the whole nation in your power: Can you then heſitate one moment? Let your good example ſhine forth, and you are ſure of univerſal imitation.—Reflect, on the other hand, if you indulge vicious habits, if your conduct flagrantly declares, that you are actuated by ſelfiſh, not by public-ſpirited motives; that you are ready to deſert the intereſt of your country whenever it coincides not with your private advantage;—reflect,

we

we intreat you, that in place of being public bleſſings to your country, the influence of your fatal example unavoidably carries miſery and deſtruction wherever it unfortunately extends.

It is almoſt needleſs to be more particular upon this ſubject.—Does any man of property wiſh to ſee his lands improved by his tenants? Let himſelf take the lead, by employing all his ſkill and ingenuity in meliorating the portion he keeps in his own poſſeſſion; let him incloſe, plant, and otherwiſe adorn his own gardens and parks; let him be affable and condeſcending to his farmers and tackſmen; let him openly diſplay the advantages of proper culture; let him, finally, give leaſes of a reaſonable length, and not be too rigorous or oppreſſive in his demands; then, and not till then, will he ever be able to effect this noble purpoſe.

Trade and manufactures are no leſs neceſſary than agriculture for fortifying and enriching Great Britain. The peculiar ſi-

tuation of the iſland naturally demands the greateſt attention of its inhabitants to commerce and manual arts. Theſe are too evident ſources of national ſtrength and opulence to be neglected by the legiſlature. It is owing to the peculiar favour and ſupport of government, joined to the protection and encouragement of public-ſpirited ſocieties and individuals, that the commerce and manufactures of Great Britain have of late made ſuch rapid progreſs.

Nothing can contribute more effectually to promote public advantage, than the erection of ſocieties for propagating and encouraging arts, ſciences, and manufactures. To ſee men of the greateſt opulence and diſtinction in the kingdom forming themſelves into ſocieties, contributing large ſums of money, and beſtowing both their labour and time, in order to induce men of inferior ranks to improve their own branches of buſineſs, &c. muſt be a pleaſing object of contemplation to every liberal mind. The effects produced by theſe truly patriotic aſſociations fully juſtify the end of their inſtitution.

inſtitution. When the uninſtructed part of mankind perceive, that they are even bribed to do their duty, a ſpirit of emulation naturally ariſes in their minds; each endeavours to excel in his particular profeſſion, that he may obtain the approbation and reward of his countrymen: Indolence and ſlovenlineſs retire apace; and induſtry, neatneſs, and ingenuity occupy their place.

The wonderful changes in the manners of the people, the great improvements in agriculture, manufactures, &c. which have appeared, within theſe few years, in this northern part of the united kingdom, muſt ſurpriſe and delight every benevolent heart. Theſe unlooked for events are the native fruits of two or three public-ſpirited ſocieties*, the generous members of which have ſpared neither coſt nor labour in exciting their countrymen to induſtry in every art which can contribute to public utility. We

* The Commiſſioners and Truſtees for manufactures and improvements in Scotland;—Hon. Select Society of Edinburgh;—The Society for Propagating Chriſtian Knowledge, &c.

We preſume not to make any criticiſms on the manner of conducting theſe noble inſtitutions: we ſhould rather congratulate that country which gives birth to ſuch ornaments of human nature; and our congratulations ſhould be ſtill more hearty, were the number of ſuch ſocieties increaſed, or the funds of the preſent ones greatly enlarged.—We ſhall in a few words explain what is meant by this obſervation.

Provided all or moſt of the men of fortune in each particular county in Scotland would erect themſelves into ſeparate ſocieties for the encouragement of arts, &c. within their own particular counties, we imagine that inſtitutions of this kind would in a ſhort time diffuſe a ſpirit of improvement to the fartheſt bounds of the nation.

The advantages which would attend a prudent execution of this plan are abundantly obvious.—Manufacturers, &c. who live at a great diſtance from the metropolis, allowing them to be properly advertiſed of the bounties offered by the Edinburgh Societies,

cieties, muſt of neceſſity labour under ſeveral diſadvantages which thoſe who are leſs remote from the capital cannot feel. The riſk and difficulty of tranſmitting ſpecimens of their art or induſtry; the want of proper perſons to direct their behaviour; nay, ſome country-mechanics are ſo very ignorant, that they are unable fully to comprehend the directions contained in a common advertiſement. Theſe, and many other difficulties, although of a trifling nature, are more than ſufficient to cramp the influence of the ſocieties at Edinburgh, eſpecially in corners of the kingdom where indolence and ignorance are the characteriſtics of the people. It is even difficult to make perſons in this ſituation believe, that money, or any other reward of merit, will ever be tranſmitted to them, unleſs they have had experience of it themſelves, or ſeen it tranſmitted to others in ſimilar circumſtances. Time, and the diligence of the Edinburgh Societies, will no doubt obviate theſe difficulties. But the plan we have hinted at would, it is thought, be the means of introducing improvements in a ſhorter time,

and

and of propagating taſte, genius, and public-ſpirit more univerſally over the kingdom.

Were it practicable for every man of property to offer ſmall premiums for the improvement of arts, &c. among thoſe who reſide within the bounds of his own eſtate, we imagine this would be a ſtill more effectual method of diſpelling ignorance, exciting a taſte for improvement in every branch of manufacture, &c. than any that could be deviſed. A noble perſonage * has lately, by his own example, paved the way for this. May his generous attempt not only prove ſucceſsful, but incite ſuch of his countrymen as are enabled, by their ſtation and fortune, to purſue the like public-ſpirited reſolution.

The landed gentlemen of any particular county muſt neceſſarily know, from its ſoil, ſituation, and the genius of the inhabitants, what arts or manufactures, what ſpecies of commerce, &c. are moſt needed, and beſt ſuited to the diſpoſitions and capacities of the

* Duke of Queenſberry.

the people.—The proprietors of eſtates are, or ſhould be, beſt ſkilled in the means of improving or embelliſhing their own lands, and beſt acquainted with thoſe arts, &c. which require the greateſt encouragement, and would be moſt conducive to the proſperity and happineſs of themſelves and their vaſſals. Of courſe, the proprietors of each county, or the proprietors of each particular portion of land, are beſt qualified for ſuperintending the diſtribution of premiums, as the rewards of merit and induſtry in their reſpective counties or eſtates.

We have hazarded theſe obſervations with a view to excite all lovers of their country to think of this, or ſome other more practicable ſcheme of extending a ſpirit of improvement through this too much neglected part of our iſland.

No man of any ſenſibility can travel a dozen of miles from the capital itſelf without feeling very diſagreeable emotions, occaſioned by the appearance of vaſt tracks of barren ground, overſpread with heath and other

other diſmal productions of uncultivated nature.—Muirs, marſhes, and deſerts reflect not on any country, but are a keen ſatire upon its inhabitants. The beſt ſoils, the moſt favourable climates, muſt be cleared of their native rubbiſh before they can be made ſubſervient to the various uſes of man. —The inhabitants of Britain have for many years been infected with a very ſtrange phrenzy: they go over in flocks to our American colonies, to fell trees, &c. leaving perhaps one-half of their own country over-run with heath, furze, and quagmyres, although, in many reſpects, it is capable of as profitable culture. We are, however, unwilling to enter upon this ſubject, as it admits of endleſs diſpute. But we cannot help being ſurpriſed, that ſome method has not been fallen upon to render the culture of the mother-country more univerſal. The diviſion of commonties may in time have ſome effect. Would it not much forward this uſeful deſign, were private gentlemen, or public ſocieties, to offer premiums for rendering ſmall portions of muir or other

barren

barren ground fit for the growth of corn, flax, potatoes, turnip, &c.?

To the farmer, or other perſon, who ſhall, in a ſpecified time, make an acre of ſuch a muir fit for the growth of corn, &c. *Ten Guineas*; or any other ſum the offerers ſhall judge proper.

To the perſon who ſhall, in a limited time, render fit for the growth of corn, &c. half an acre; a quarter of an acre, &c.—ſums proportioned to theſe ſeveral quantities.

We have avoided the dogmatical ſtrain on this ſubject; ſenſible of our own inexperience in matters of this nature, we chuſe only to give hints, leaving the expediency or practicability of the execution to thoſe who are better acquainted with country-affairs.

As we have all along proceeded on the ſuppoſition, that, when inforcing the practice of any virtue, our principal application

ſhould be to the mind itſelf, we ſhall now point out ſome general maxims and modes of behaviour, which are deſtructive to public ſpirit; ſometimes barely mentioning the faults, and ſometimes giving directions how to avoid them.

SECTION I.

Gaming.

WHOEVER conſiders the nature and tendency of gaming, will readily admit, that whenever it is much practiſed in any nation, the ruin of that nation is faſt approaching. Idleneſs, inattention, luxury, profuſion, rancour, &c. are the genuine offspring of gaming. But, let us make the favourable ſuppoſition, that the ſpirit of gaming were entirely confined to men of opulence and diſtinction.—What are the diſpoſitions of a man's mind when keenly buſied at game? This queſtion admits of an

an eaſy ſolution. While a perſon is thus employed, he muſt of neceſſity be totally diveſted of every ſocial affection. Wholly occupied about his own fortune, and heartily praying for the loſs and misfortune of his antagoniſts, every generous, every public ſpirited motive is, during the time he is thus employed, entirely ſuppreſſed. Hence a habit of gaming muſt neceſſarily generate a habit of ſelfiſhneſs. Allowing gaming, therefore, to be ſolely the amuſement of men of fortune, the matter is but little mended; for, if the hearts of thoſe whom Nature has conſtituted patterns of imitation to their inferiors, are ſelfiſh and contracted, what can be expected of the common people?—In every view, therefore, gaming is deſtructive to public ſpirit, and, of courſe, to the general intereſts of the nation.

How ſhall this evil, which is but too much practiſed in our iſland, be remedied? Penal laws have hitherto been found inſufficient for the purpoſe. Unleſs ſome method can be invented of making gaming diſhonourable,

diſhonourable, nothing elſe will ever be able to baniſh it from the affections of people of faſhion. Were gaming once eſteemed as mean and infamous as theft or forgery, it would ſoon ſink into obſcurity. But how is this to be effected?—Would not a general reſolution of the principal noblemen and gentlemen, That from and after ſuch a date, all games of hazard, whatever be their denomination, ſhall be laid aſide, and, in all time coming, be eſteemed infamous and diſgraceful, produce a total contempt of this baneful practice?—The nation will be infinitely indebted to that county or ſociety who ſhall publiſh ſuch a noble reſolution to the world: Not only may they expect to ſee their example followed, but their generous and public-ſpirited conduct will inſure them of the applauſes of every virtuous heart.

SEC-

SECTION II.

Contempt of the Vulgar.

TO deſpiſe the Vulgar, is a very faſhionable, and very univerſal affectation. This modiſh ſpecies of cruelty is practiſed by almoſt every perſon who is able to purchaſe a *genteel* ſuit of cloaths.—Strange, that objects of compaſſion, inſtead of meeting with ſympathy and relief, ſhould be deſpiſed and oppreſſed by their ſuperiors! If the vulgar are poor or illiterate, we ſhould rather make their poverty ſupportable by our generoſity, and uſe our utmoſt endeavours to diſpel their ignorance.

Contempt neceſſarily begets contempt. If men of high rank deſpiſe thoſe of inferior ſtations, they are ſure of being deſpiſed by them in turn. Hence it happens, that when men of rank, who are haughty and ſupercilious to the multitude, propoſe any plan which requires the concurrence of the vulgar,

gar, they generally find great difficulty in the execution of it. The vulgar are naturally inclined to oppoſe whatever is propoſed by their contemners, whether it relate to public or private advantage. Hence the utility of popularity, and of condeſcending to the innocent humours of the people.

On the other hand, were men of fortune to look upon the vulgar as their children, and treat them with all the humanity of parents; would they overlook their ignorance or meanneſs, humour their innocent foibles or inconſiſtencies, &c. ſuch a conduct would greatly conduce both to their own intereſt and that of the nation. Daily experience ſhows, that when any gentleman behaves good-naturedly to his poor countrymen, not only his own domeſtics, but every labourer in the county is ſo firmly attached to his perſon and intereſt, that they are more jealous of his honour than of their own. They enter as it were inſtinctively into all his views: They do their utmoſt to gratify him in every thing which

which he discovers the least solicitude to have performed.—Hence one disinterested patriot has it in his power to create a thousand; *et e contra.*

SECTION III.

Scandal; or False Judgment of Actions.

MANKIND are naturally anxious to discover the motives from which actions proceed. Some men, indeed, are so charitably inclined, that they are unwilling to find out selfish or sinister motives even when the action is evidently bad. But much greater is the number of those who exert all their ingenuity in resolving the actions of others into bad or interested motives. If a person performs a generous deed, if he contributes money in order to promote any undertaking calculated for the good of the public, or that of individuals; this is immediately

mediately reſolved into mere ſhow and oſtentation. A man of virtue will doubtleſs deſpiſe ſuch ill-natured reflections, and conſider them as artful excuſes contrived to draw a veil over avarice and narrowneſs of heart. But inſinuations of this nature may ſometimes deter people of leſs reſolution from doing what their inclinations would otherwiſe lead them to perform.—To judge of the merit of the action, not of its motive or cauſe, is all that belongs to man. If the action be good in itſelf, praiſe is due to the author of it; if otherwiſe, the performer merits reproach in proportion to the turpitude of his behaviour.

SEC-

SECTION IV.

Of Marriage.

MARRIAGE is one of the greateſt bonds of ſociety. It gives riſe to a variety of endearing connections. Hence marriage increaſes that *amor patriae* which, in one degree or other, all are poſſeſſed of.—Of courſe, if ever this inſtitution ſhould fall into diſrepute, population will proportionally decreaſe, and the attachment to the native ſoil will be greatly weakened.

There ſeems to be ſome foundation for a pretty common complaint, that marriage is at preſent too little eſteemed, and too little practiſed in our iſland. This is an object which claims the deepeſt attention of the Legiſlature.—Taxes on celibacy have been talked of, whether ſeriouſly or not is uncertain. Although ſuch a law ſhould be

paſſed, the effects it would produce are at beſt very doubtful.

The root of this evil will be found, upon a ſtrict examination, to take its riſe from the prodigious number of proſtitutes which are diſperſed over the whole kingdom.—It is the intereſt of proſtitutes to uſe all their art in order to make marriage appear ridiculous, contemptible, and burdenſome, in the eyes of unexperienced young men, who are but too liable to catch, and too ready to ſpread, the poiſonous infection. Thus falſe repreſentations of one of the nobleſt ſources of human felicity are communicated to the whole youth in the nation. It requires a conſiderable degree of fortitude to reſiſt the attacks of ridicule. Of all other periods of life, youth is moſt eaſily overcome by raillery. Hence falſe modeſty, added to habits of licentiouſneſs, are the grand ſources of celibacy, eſpecially amongſt men of fortune, the influence of whoſe example procures the imitation of the lower claſſes of mankind.—The remedy, therefore, reſolves into a contrary practice of

men

men of figure and diſtinction, joined to a diminution or extirpation of proſtitutes.

SECTION V.

Profanity; or Contempt of Religion.

To prove that vice is more prevalent in this than in former ages, although practicable, could ſerve no uſeful purpoſe. Every man's own obſervation may convince him, that profanity, or a contempt of religion and virtue, is the characteriſtic of too great a proportion of mankind. Vice as well as virtue is of a progreſſive nature. It is not our buſineſs to inquire into the multiplicity of cauſes which conſpire in ſpreading the contagion of vice.—Willingly would we decline that diſagreeable neceſſity which obliges us to point out ſome of the teachers of religion themſelves as one chief cauſe of the prevalency of vice.

That

That ſome clergymen too frequently and too openly indulge themſelves in practices which are inconſiſtent with the nature of their ſacred function, is a truth founded on general experience.—That the vices of clergymen are more hurtful to ſociety than thoſe of the laity, is inconteſtible.

How cautiouſly, then, O ye ſervants of God! ſhould you demean yourſelves in every varying ſcene of life!—Jealouſy and malice continually watch your ſteps. If you ſtumble, or but ſeem to ſtumble, the enemies of religion triumph in the opportunity of traducing both your character and office. You declaim againſt ſcoffers and deſpiſers of religion. Such declamations are always ſeaſonable.—But conſider, we intreat you, whether you are anywiſe inſtrumental in propagating this noxious evil. Is it not a pretty frequent practiſe, eſpecially among the youthful brethren, to throw out portions of ſacred writ on the moſt abſurd and incongruous incidents?—Cheerful company, or a ſocial glaſs, naturally enliven the genius, and create an itch after wit and raillery.

lery. But ſhould not every ſource of ridicule, every fountain of wit be drained to the very dregs, before a clergyman ſhould have recourſe to the Sacred Oracles for a ſupply?—Such conduct may excite a laugh of applauſe from the inconſiderate; but, if men of ſober reflection chance to be preſent, they will certainly deſpiſe you. Reflect on the tendency of ſuch ludicrous treatment of the Scriptures. The vicious part of mankind are confirmed in their favourite hypotheſis, That the Chriſtian ſyſtem is a cheat, and its miniſters a ſet of impoſtors; and the weak or ignorant believers are in danger of eſpouſing the ſame opinion.—You complain, that your churches are badly attended: It is true.—But do you not often give orders, or licences, to perſons who are extremely ill-qualified for inſtructing the ignorant, convincing the infidel, and reclaiming the vicious?—We ſhall conſtitute you judges in your own cauſe;—Have you not often bluſhed at the ignorance and ſtupidity of ſome of your brethren when preaching in your own pulpits? Would to God you could anſwer in the negative!—

Ceaſe,

Ceaſe, then, from complaining, till you are more delicate in the article of licences.—Give no man a commiſſion to explain the nature of virtue, and the duties which religion enjoins, unleſs he is capable not only of underſtanding them himſelf, but likewiſe of decently inforcing the practice of them upon the minds of a judicious audience.—Beſides, do not even the men of ſenſe and erudition amongſt you, ſometimes deliver their ſermons in a very cold, indifferent, unaffecting manner?—No wonder that the hearers are liſtleſs and drowſy, when the miniſter himſelf ſcarce ſeems to have it at heart whether they attend to him or not!—Finally, if you would wiſh to ſee the Oracles of Truth more univerſally reſpected, and the precepts of religion and virtue more generally practiſed, never mention the former but with the utmoſt reverence; never ſuffer the progreſs of the latter to be obſtructed by your own ignorance or vicious example.

We have thus preſumed to mention ſome of the capital vices which preſently ſubſiſt amongſt

amongſt ſome of the clergy, not to gratify any motives of malice or reſentment, but ſolely becauſe we have often experienced, and as often lamented, that thoſe who are appointed to propagate religion and virtue ſhould be anywiſe acceſſory in retarding the progreſs of both.

Let us now conſider the ſtrong harmony which ſubſiſts between religion and public-ſpirit.—A very ſlight degree of attention is ſufficient for this purpoſe whether we reflect on the qualities of the great Object of religion, or on the wholeſome precepts which it enjoins.

The univerſal object of religious adoration is the Supreme Creator and Governor of every being that exiſts, or ever did exiſt, thoroughout the unlimited paths of immenſity.—All the qualities of the Deity known or comprehenſible by the human faculties, excite in us not only the ideas of infinite power, but likewiſe of unbounded goodneſs and beneficence. He has called myriads of animals into exiſtence not to make a pom-

pous

pous diſplay of power, but to communicate the bleſſings of life.—That exiſtence, in whatever form or degree, is a bleſſing to the poſſeſſor, cannot be queſtioned. That this bleſſing might be communicated in the moſt extenſive manner, is certainly the cauſe of that vaſt profuſion of animal life with which every element is crowded. It is a maxim in Nature, that no blank ſhould be left in the great ſcale of being. A ſtrict adherence to this benign maxim, is the reaſon why ſuch prodigious troops of animals, many of which are not only uſeleſs, but even noxious to the human kind, are called into life. Nay, leſt any void ſhould be left, man, the undoubted chief of all terreſtrial animals, is ſuffered to be infeſted, and, in many inſtances, actually injured both in his perſon and goods, rather than the bleſſings of exiſtence ſhould be anywiſe cramped or circumſcribed.

The Author of Nature has not only richly diffuſed animal life through all his ſtupendous works, but has provided every ſpecies with the means of preſerving their exiſtence

iſtence till they have taſted of every gratification which their ſeveral ends and conſtitutions are capable of receiving: ſo inconceivably benevolent is the Supreme Being, that he has furniſhed man and other animals with many objects whoſe chief end ſeems to be the recreation and entertainment of the animate creation.

The ſignatures of the moſt unbounded benevolence being thus evidently impreſſed upon every operation of the Great Parent of Nature, what better method can poſſibly be deviſed, in order to excite public-ſpiritedneſs and univerſal benevolence in the human heart, than the frequent contemplation of this moſt amiable and divine Object?—A powerful law of the human conſtitution impels every man to imitate the qualities or perfections of any being which draw forth his admiration. Of courſe, nothing can have greater energy in promoting and ſupporting humanity and benevolence among mankind, than an habitual contemplation of the perfections and operations of the Deity.

The precepts of religion are no leſs wiſely calculated for promoting benevolence and a public-ſpirited temper, than the contemplation of its Almighty Object. Benevolence, and diſintereſted love to the whole human race, is the very genius of Chriſtianity. Every action which the Saviour of mankind performed, every word he ſpoke was fraught with love and compaſſion to the ſons of men. He commanded nothing to be done by man, but what was ſtrictly connected even with his temporal advantage.—Temperance, and ſelf-government; induſtry and meekneſs; ſubmiſſive reſignation to the determinations of providence; ſupreme love to God; an ardent, unbiaſſed affection to mankind;—theſe are the leading precepts of the Chriſtian ſyſtem.—It ſeems indeed to be a general maxim in revelation, That the intereſt of individuals ſhould always vaniſh whenever it comes in competition with the good of the public.

Upon the whole, then, we muſt conclude, that true religion and public-ſpirit are ſo intimately connected, that the former neceſſarily

ceſſarily implies the latter. Hence, if we would wiſh to ſee public-ſpiritedneſs the genuine characteriſtic of our nation, every method ſhould be uſed which can have the remoteſt tendency to recommend religion and virtue to the eſteem and affections of the people.

ESSAY

ESSAY I.

WHETHER are all Animate and Inanimate BODIES Made for the Immediate Uſe and Conveniency of MANKIND; or, is that only a Secondary END of their EXISTENCE?*

THAT every created ſubſtance was originally deſigned for the immediate or more remote benefit of mankind, is a very popular opinion.—That it is ſo, is not to be wondered at, as it is a doctrine which gratifies that arrogance and preſumption which ſo univerſally characteriſe the human ſpecies.

If we take a ſurvey of man as connected with the numerous objects which miniſter to his neceſſities, or with thoſe which ſerve only

* Read before the Newtonian Society of Edin. 1762.

only to rouſe his admiration, and call forth the latent principles of invention and ingenuity, which, without being excited by the contemplation of ſuch objects, would probably never be brought to light; ſuch a ſurvey will doubtleſs carry a ſtrong conviction along with it, That mankind derive very eminent advantages from the inferior orders of beings. Horſes, ſheep, cows, dogs, &c. alleviate the toils or gratify the appetite of this Lord of Creation. The vegetable and foſſil kingdoms likewiſe concur with the animal in facilitating his mechanical operations and filling his ſtomach, with the additional circumſtance of curing his diſtempers, and repairing his conſtitution when worn out or ſhattered by the fumes of intemperance.

But that the advantage derived to mankind from theſe creatures is the primary end of their exiſtence, or was the motive which induced the bountiful Author of Nature to call them into being, is an opinion, not only doubtful, but contradictory to reaſon itſelf.

If

If it was originally intended that every thing this world contains ſhould, in ſome degree, be ſubſervient to the uſe of man, I am afraid, the following obſervations will clearly ſhow, that this intention has been fruſtrated, and miſſed its aim.

Many ſpecies of animals roam wild and ſavage in the barren mountains or the pathleſs foreſt, where never mortal dared to approach, without having cauſe to repent of his temerity.—The inland parts of America, the ſandy deſarts of Africa, the frozen mountains of Greenland, and the vaſt tracts of uninhabited land to the North Eaſt of Muſcovy and Tartary: Theſe, though ſeldom trodden by the foot of man, are nevertheleſs teeming with numberleſs animals, which never have the ſmalleſt communication or intercourſe with the human ſpecies.—On the contrary, it is well known that they fly from and hate the ſight of a human face.

It is remarked by the planters in the Back Settlements of America, That whenever

ever they take up their reſidence, although in the moſt uncultivated woods, the wild beaſts, which, upon their firſt approach, they obſerve crowd together during the night in incredible numbers, howling, and ſending forth ſuch hideous cries, as to render the perſons incapable of hearing one another in their tents; as ſoon, however, as they perceive that men have intruded upon their property, they inſtantly retire to the inmoſt receſſes of the woods; and thus, as conſcious of the cruelty of mankind, and of their own independence, they endeavour to avoid the ſociety of beings whoſe fellowſhip is ſo repugnant to their own natures.

Beſides, all noxious animals, of which there are many ſpecies, inſtead of being uſeful, are, to the inhabitants of many places of the world, the very bane of ſociety and mutual intercourſe. Travellers from one city to another muſt be very careful in defending themſelves from theſe mercileſs enemies. Every ſtep they advance, a new degree of terror and anxiety is eaſily

diſcoverable

diſcoverable in their timorous and foreboding looks.—I know it will be obſerved by ſome of my readers, That many of the noxious animals, ſuch as Rattle-ſnakes, Vipers, &c. afford powerful ſpecifics againſt the fatal effects of poiſon: But, it muſt be conſidered, that the fat of ſuch animals, which is the ſubſtance principally employed, is only a ſpecific againſt the effects of thoſe very diſeaſes of which they themſelves are the immediate cauſe. It is likewiſe found by experience, that the fat or oil of any animal has the ſame tendency to correct the vicious ſtate of the humours occaſioned by the poiſonous bite of ſerpents, as the fat of the Viper or Rattle-ſnake.

Add to all this, That there are a vaſt variety of animals, inhabitants of earth, air, water, &c. which have but very lately been diſcovered, and, ſince ſuch diſcovery, have been but ſeldom ſubject to the examination, far leſs appropriated to the uſe, of man: not to mention how natural the concluſion of the exiſtence of many ſpecies which to this

hour have never been diſcovered by the moſt induſtrious naturaliſts.

Again, if we direct our views to the inſect tribe, we will, from paying a ſufficient attention to the life and economy of theſe, find it equally impoſſible to ſhow, or deduce from any accurate proceſs of reaſoning, that the condition of man is any how bettered, or his happineſs in any degree promoted, by their exiſtence. That the induſtry and activity of the human genius has invented the means of converting the manufacture of ſome, and the bodies of others, into materials fitted either to embelliſh and adorn the exterior figure, or to repel the force and virulence of ſome diſtempers, I am ſufficiently aware can admit of no doubt.

But as a counterpoiſe to ſuch trifling advantages, the experience of all ages concurs in demonſtrating, that many of the diſeaſes and calamities that attend human life are owing entirely to theſe minute but formidable enemies, which are enabled, by the ſmallneſs

ſmallneſs of their bodies, to enter into the compoſition of all kinds of food, and even to paſs unobſerved into the moſt important and tender organs of our bodies, and there produce the moſt violent and fatal effects.

Many ſimilar obſervations might be made concerning the ſcarcity, inutility, and deleterious nature of ſeveral ſpecies of vegetables and foſſils.

I preſume, that many of my readers have, by this time, prevented me in drawing the proper concluſions from the ſhort hiſtorical view I have given of this ſubject; and are therefore fully prepared to join with me in exclaiming againſt the abſurdities which flow from the ſuppoſition, That the principal intention of every created ſubſtance was ſolely the intereſt of the human race.

Is it not, then, abſurd to imagine, that theſe ſpecies of animals, whoſe exiſtence is barely known, ſuch as the Ourang Outang, &c. who ſerve no other purpoſe but to terrify or ſurpriſe the unwary traveller; who, ever

ever ſince this world was created, have never had any connection with mankind, far leſs been by them applied to any beneficial purpoſe: Is it not abſurd, I ſay, to maintain, That the principal deſign of ſuch animals, of which there are infinite numbers, was the advantage of the human ſpecies?

Again, would it not, if poſſible, be ſtill more abſurd to ſuppoſe, That animals of the rapacious kind, whoſe chief aim is to deſtroy every perſon who is ſo unfortunate as to come within the reach of their power, were intended by Nature to miniſter comfort or afford real benefit to man?

Can any thing be more contradictory to common ſenſe, than that noxious animals, ſuch as the Torpedo, Serpents, Tarantula, &c. ſhould be of uſe to mankind, the poiſonous qualities of ſome of which are ſo virulent, that inſtant death is the conſequence of their ſlighteſt bite or ſting: Is it not unreaſonable to think, that ſuch creatures are in any degree ſerviceable to mankind? eſpecially when it is conſidered, that there is an original

original inſtinct implanted in our nature's which teaches us not only to avoid, but to do our utmoſt towards an utter extirpation of them from the face of the earth.

Again, can any perſon, who, in a ſultry ſummer-day, has travelled through a thick wood, or even between two of our common hedges, believe, that ſuch a vaſt profuſion of animals as every where aſſault his eyes and ears are of ſingular advantage to him, and that he could not be ſo happy without them? A man poſſeſſed of ſuch a degree of credulity may eaſily be convinced, that whoever drubs him heartily, or beats the eyes out of his head, is upon the whole his real friend, and that it would have been a diſadvantage to him if ſuch a man never had exiſted.

But, paſſing ſuch general reaſoning, were I aſked, What advantage do mankind receive from Moles, Rats, Mice, &c.? I would anſwer, That we are mightily obliged to them for undermining our houſes, deſtroying the productions of our gardens, defiling

defiling and gormandiſing our bread, &c. But another perſon might ſay, that theſe animals were made to employ the ingenuity, and fill the ſtomachs of cats: In this caſe, I would add; If ſuch animals did not exiſt, the uſe of cats would likewiſe be entirely ſuperſeded.

But I foreſee a ſpecious objection riſing up, which muſt be immediately obviated.

It will, perhaps, be ſaid by ſome, That theſe notions are too confined; that I have taken but a partial view of the works of creation; and ſeem to have no idea of that vaſt chain of nature which connects every ſpecies of creatures together, and makes them mutually to depend and be ſubſervient to each other; and that this chain of utility advances by ſlow degrees till it arrives at that noble creature Man, whoſe good is the ultimate end of every created exiſtence.

I ſhall always think myſelf happy in the contemplation of that beautiful concatenation

tion of being: But I cannot admit that beings are thus linked together for the ſole benefit of their chief, without any regard to their own welfare and happineſs. Were this the caſe, the Ourang Outang, and all the Monkey kind, as approaching neareſt to the human ſpecies in wiſdom and ſagacity, ſhould be more ſerviceable to mankind than horſe, ſheep, cows, &c. which I am perſuaded none will ever take it into their heads ſo much as to ſuppoſe.

I have already ſaid enough to convince the philoſopher: But I have others to convince.

I have looked into the Pentateuch of Moſes, and picked out a few verſes, relative to this ſubject, with a view to illuſtrate them.

Gen. 1. & 28. "And God bleſſed Adam and Eve, and ſaid unto them, Be fruitful and multiply and repleniſh the earth, and ſubdue it, and have dominion over the fiſh of

of the ſea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth."

It is almoſt needleſs to obſerve here the difference between having the ſuperiority or dominion over any Creature, and the chief end of that Creature's being. On a contrary ſuppoſition, the life of all the lower ranks of men would be chiefly intended to gratify the avarice of their Maſters. The people would be created for the ſake of the King, and the whole world, for the ſake of a few ambitious individuals; than which nothing can be more ridiculouſly abſurd.

Verſe 29. "And God ſaid to Adam and his wife, I have given you every herb bearing ſeed which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree in which is the fruit of a tree, yielding ſeed: To you it ſhall be for meat."

In order to underſtand this verſe, I muſt contraſt it with its neighbour the 30th.

30th.

30th. "And to every beaſt of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to every thing that creepeth upon the earth, wherein there is life, I have given every green herb for meat."

Theſe two verſes are quite irreconcilable to experience, unleſs we limit the ſenſe of the word *every*. For, without ſuch limitation, men ſhould, in compliance with the inſtitution contained in the 29th verſe, without diſtinction, eat every individual green herb that beareth ſeed, and every individual tree that beareth fruit. And, if the brute creation complied with the injunctions given them in the 30th verſe, every beaſt of the earth ſhould eat every individual green herb; every fowl of the air ſhould eat every individual green herb; and every inſect that creepeth upon the earth ſhould eat every individual green herb. This would indeed introduce a moſt extenſive and univerſal community of goods.

The evident meaning of every tree, fruit, and herb's being given to man for food, is no more than giving him authority to ſelect, from the vaſt variety of vegetables, whatever herbs, fruits, or ſeeds, he finds, by experience, to be moſt proper for the health and nouriſhment of his body. And, without the aſſiſtance of ſuch experience, unerring inſtinct directs the diſtinct ſpecies of animals to pick out only ſuch herbs as are fitted by Nature for their ſuſtenance.

As I am now tired of the ſubject; I ſhall crown the whole by another obſervation or two, which may be conſidered as very ſtrong arguments in favour of my ſide of the queſtion.

When a man endeavours to take a complex view of this lower world, he is apt to be ſo ſtruck with the immenſity of the idea, as to give up all as an inexplicable myſtery. Although unable to arrange the whole into any regular plan, he will eaſily perceive, that the Author of Nature ſeems to diſcover a degree of anxiety for crowding every element

element with as much life as it is poſſible for it to maintain; air, earth, water, nay, even the bodies of animals themſelves, are overſtocked with inhabitants. The cauſe of this anxiety can be nothing elſe but the overflowings of beneficence in the Divine Mind, willing that no vacuity ſhould be left, but that all ſhould be filled with beings capable of enjoying the bleſſings of his bounty.

Of all the inhabitants of this world, man is undoubtedly the moſt noble. Of courſe, it is reaſonable that he ſhould inherit greater privileges and advantages than creatures of inferior natures; and, likewiſe, that he ſhould endeavour to render as many things ſubſervient to his peculiar advantage, as he poſſibly can. The ſuperiority of his genius, and, I am afraid, frequently the cruelty of his diſpoſition, is the cauſe of his extenſive dominion over the brute creation. This unlimited tyranny may perhaps have given riſe to the general, though miſtaken notion, That theſe creatures were made chiefly with a view to his intereſt.

That

That exiſtence, in whatever form or degree, is a bleſſing to the poſſeſſor, is an undeniable truth. That this bleſſing might be diffuſed in the fulleſt and moſt ample manner, is the foundation of the wonderful concatenation of animal life above taken notice of. It is a maxim in Nature, That no blank ſhould be left in the vaſt ſcale of being. A ſtrict adherence, I imagine, to this catholic maxim, is the reaſon why ſuch prodigious troops of animals, not only uſeleſs, but even noxious to mankind, are called into life. Accordingly we ſee, that, leſt any void ſhould be left, mankind are ſuffered to be infeſted, and, in many inſtances, actually injured, by creatures which all his ingenuity is unable to turn to any advantage. This, again, throws light upon another maxim, That all partial evil is univerſal good; for even man, the chief of animals, muſt ſubmit to many evils and inconveniencies, rather than that the bleſſings of life ſhould be denied to inſects and wild beaſts.

With

Were this doctrine properly purfued, it would, I apprehend, reconcile us to many of the myfteries of Providence, "and juftify the ways of God to man."

ESSAY

ESSAY II.

Whether ORATORY, upon the whole, has been of Uſe to MANKIND *?

IN all our reaſonings concerning matters of fact, we ought to lay it down as an invariable rule, to take as general and extenſive a view of the ſubject as the nature of it will admit of: If we obſerve not this method, we are unavoidably led into a labyrinth of inſtances and examples; which, in almoſt every queſtion, are ſo numerous on both ſides, that the mention of them neceſſarily leads off our attention from the ſubject, and creates a great deal of fooliſh and idle diſputations concerning their propriety, force, application, &c.

In

* Read before the Newtonian Society of Edinburgh 1762.

In order to adhere as ſtrictly as poſſible to this rule, I ſhall begin with obſerving, That the human mind is ſubjected to a number of laws or principles of action, which are abſolutely neceſſary either for the immediate preſervation of our lives, or for prompting us to perform the ſeveral duties that ſociety is entitled to require of us. Ambition forcibly puſhes the mind to pay attention to thoſe objects which are warmly recommended to our regard by parents, nurſes, ſuperiors, or any perſon whom we particularly eſteem. Hence thoſe who are acquainted with human nature, and who have an affection for the good of ſociety, exert all their talents, and employ the whole energy of words and action, that they may the more ſucceſsfully fire the ambition of mankind, and excite them to that courſe of action which is moſt ſuited to the dignity of their nature, &c.

In the ſame manner decent and manly pride is made to ſpring up in the mind by juſt and lively repreſentations of the deformity and pernicious qualities of vice, and

of

of the rectitude, beauty, and amiableneſs of virtue. Hence the uſe and neceſſity of oratory, which is nothing but the proper dreſs and colouring of objects, in order to render them odious or agreeable to the mind.

Fear and hope, deſire and averſion, and many other uſeful paſſions, could not be called forth to action, or could not act with ſuch ſpirit and reſolution without the aſſiſtance of a juſt repreſentation of their different objects, or, in other words, except theſe objects were placed in a clear and diſtinct point of view, by the ſtrong and energetical influence of oratory.

Under this view of oratory is comprehended whatever is peculiarly addreſſed to the paſſions, in general, or whatever acts upon any one paſſion as its particular object, in order to call forth that paſſion into action, either for private or public utility.

Nurſes, then, are undeniably very great and powerful orators; and as they addreſs

themſelves particularly to the paſſions of children, accordingly we find, that, in proportion as nurſes are wanting in this faculty, or employ it to wrong ends, the children under their care come forth into the world, either dull and inſipid, and altogether void of the ſprings of action, or having thoſe ſprings bended towards a perverſe courſe of action, and their minds impreſſed with miſtaken notions of human nature, &c.

Hence the neceſſity and uſefulneſs of oratory as it brings to light the hidden faculties of the ſoul, and, by a pathetical deſcription of the ſeveral duties of life, powerfully inforces the practice of them.

I believe it will be allowed by all, that oratory in general is of very great benefit to mankind, as its principal buſineſs is to give a lively deſcription of the objects which it exhibits to our view; and, of courſe, conveys to the mind a clearer and more diſtinct idea of thoſe objects than any barren or inſipid repreſentation. For illuſtration of this,

I need only appeal to common experience. What an infinite difference betwixt one and the ſame ſtory related by different perſons?

It may perhaps be ſaid, that theſe obſervations tend only to ſhow that oratory in general may be very advantageous to mankind, if properly uſed, and employed towards inforcing the performance of virtuous and praiſe-worthy deeds. But the queſtion is, Whether this uſe has been made of it?

And here would be the proper place for producing the numberleſs examples of the good and bad effects of oratory. But I ſhall willingly paſs over this chaos, and go on to obſerve, That many of the beſt paſſions and affections of the ſoul would for ever lie dormant, or at leaſt their ſtrength would be ſo greatly impaired, that mankind would, without the aſſiſtance of oratory, grow inactive, moroſe, and taſteleſs.

Wherever we obſerve an univerſal, a catholic law of Nature, and at the ſame time

are

are acquainted with its object, we muſt neceſſarily conclude that Nature has mutually adapted them to each other, and that they are in themſelves ſo inſeparable, that the one could not ſubſiſt without the other. It is almoſt to no purpoſe to mention the application of this to oratory and the different affections of the human ſoul; and the abſurdity of ſuppoſing that Nature would plant theſe affections in the ſoul, and at the ſame time make the means of exciting them to action hurtful to mankind.

It would be no leſs abſurd to ſuppoſe that any catholic law in Nature has, upon the whole, been diſadvantageous to ſociety.

Theſe obſervations, were it needful, might be carried to a very great length; but I think they are ſo plain and convincing, that it would be in vain to puſh them any further.

I ſhall only add, that I eſteem it a very happy circumſtance, that the whole volume of ſacred writings conſpire in confirming the

the truth of the above obſervations. Whatever truth or precept they inculcate, they invariably addreſs themſelves to the paſſions of men; fear, hope, ambition, ſhame, and, in a word, every paſſion of the ſoul, is warmly wrought upon by the livelieſt and moſt engaging ſtrains of oratory, in order to allure us to obedience. A plain proof this, that mere reaſoning is not alone ſufficient to reſtrain mankind from the commiſſion of vice, or to keep them within the paths of virtue. Beſides, would it not be the groſſeſt abſurdity to ſuppoſe, that the inſpired writers would make uſe of any ſpecies of writing, the imitation of which would tend to the diſadvantage or ruin of mankind?

Many arguments might be produced to ſhow that Oratory has been of uſe to mankind; but I imagine, from the above hints, we may very ſafely conclude, that Oratory has, and always will be, of ſingular benefit to the human ſpecies.

ESSAY

ESSAY III.

Of Poverty.

THERE is no ſituation in life more univerſally dreaded than that of poverty. We are apt to conceive the poor man's condition as a complication of every ſpecies of wretchedneſs. This natural dread of poverty tends to promote induſtry, frugality, and temperance. But, at the ſame time, when it ſinks too deep, lays a foundation for avarice, anxiety, and a diſtruſt of Providence.

Some men, in all periods, have felt the real inconveniencies of poverty; but there is

is hardly any man who has been uniformly exempted from the fear of becoming poor.

The poor man is not deſtitute of every enjoyment. His deſires are few and eaſily gratified. He cannot reach the luxuries of life; but his appetite for luxury is not ſo ſtrong as to make him unhappy. He is obliged to labour; but labour is not a burden to him; habit has rendered it not only familiar, but pleaſant. Confined to a narrow ſphere of action, his mind is not liable to be ruffled by jealouſy or interference of intereſts: His attachments will therefore be few, but ſincere, and generally fixed for life. Are theſe the objects of our horror? Is this a condition ſo much to be dreaded?

There are indeed very material differences between the ſituation of a perſon who is born poor, and of one who falls from affluence or moderate circumſtances into a ſtate of poverty and dependence. Even a ſober mind will look upon the tranſition with averſion. It is hard to give up all our proſpects of riſing and making a figure

in the world; to be neglected by friends and ſhunned by acquaintances; to loſe in a great meaſure that character which for many years we have been labouring to maintain; and to ſink at once into a ſtate of obſcurity.

People of an anxious temper are fond of indulging theſe melancholy thoughts. Upon every croſs-incident, or little piece of bad fortune, they have a ſtrong propenſity to turn up the dark ſide of things, and enjoy a kind of gloomy ſatisfaction in repreſenting to themſelves imaginary ſcenes of diſtreſs. This unhappy temper is not peculiar to any age or ſtation. It haunts the rich and opulent, people of buſineſs and in the middle ſpheres of life, as well as thoſe who are on the verge of poverty itſelf.

If ever this temper can admit of an apology, it muſt be confined to thoſe perſons only who are really ſtruggling with the world. Education, connections, and particular ſituations in life lay many worthy men under a kind of neceſſity to keep up

an appearance which their income is but ill-ſuited to ſuſtain. Such perſons feel more than the natural hardſhips of poverty; they feel the bittereſt effects of a ſituation much more unhappy. In order to ſupport their character and credit, they muſt dreſs decently, and aſſociate at times with companions. They muſt maintain the common intercourſe of ſociety, by occaſionally entertaining friends and acquaintances. Their circumſtances cannot admit of theſe neceſſary expences. When they have a little money, it muſt frequently be laid out, not on neceſſaries, but to ſave their reputation. This obliges them to contract little debts. But, as their external appearance and character is in ſome meaſure fictitious, they are in conſtant terror leſt they ſhould be detected and expoſed. The very thought of being indebted gives them pain. But when money is aſked, they are completely miſerable. A man thus ſituated can hardly avoid the fear of becoming poor; poverty is conſtantly before his eyes; it is in the power of others to ruin him by a ſingle ſtep.

The

The dread of poverty takes its rife from pride, and miſtaken notions concerning the condition of the poor.

There is a principle in human nature which makes us abhor every thing that is mean and diſhonourable.—When this principle is directed to proper objects, it proves a ſource of noble and virtuous actions. But an improper application of it not only renders us unhappy in ourſelves, but often ridiculous and contemptible to others. Dignity of character has no dependence on wealth: it is a quality of the mind which cannot be affected by external circumſtances. A poor man may paſs through life and maintain a propriety and dignity in his ſentiments and behaviour as well as the rich. A poor man may have a juſt ſenſe of the importance of human nature; he may entertain ſentiments of piety, of fortitude, of benevolence. But the great error lies in attributing the idea of meanneſs to outward appearances.—Jealous of our dignity, and miſtaking its proper objects, we regard the poor man as indicating a low and grovelling

ling character merely because he is covered with rags.

As a principal antidote to this anxiety about our future condition, I would recommend firmness and resolution of mind. To bear good or bad fortune with calmness and equanimity is the noblest character in human nature. This is the object to which our pride and sense of dignity ought to be chiefly directed. There is a certain meanness in discovering an anxiety to be rich. It is equally mean to value ourselves on account of riches. Such characters are utterly inconsistent with true greatness of mind. If, therefore, we would avoid this imputation, we ought to aim at independence by acting and thinking agreeably to the dignity of our nature.

Resignation is another excellent ingredient in the cure of anxiety. The man who is thoroughly persuaded that human affairs are governed and directed by a wise, beneficent, and powerful Being, is in little danger of being over-anxious about his future condition.

condition. Reſignation and belief in Providence are ſo intimately connected that the one cannot ſubſiſt without the other. To believe in the moral government of the Deity, requires no great ſtretch of faith or depth of obſervation. Every man, if he pleaſes, can produce inſtances of it from his own experience. Reflect but a moment. Have you not, on ſome particular occaſions, been ſo ſituated, that you thought it impoſſible to ſtop the courſe of ſome event the approach of which gave you great pain? Have you not, on ſuch occaſions, uniformly found relief? Was not the event you ſo much dreaded either totally prevented; or, if it actually happened, have you not uniformly found, that it always brought ſome alleviating circumſtances along with it; that it was not ſo bad as you feared it would be? I might aſk ſtill further: Can you not recollect diſappointed proſpects, diſconcerted ſchemes in your life as the evident ſources of ſucceſs and happineſs which could not have fallen out but through their intervention?—Here then is a foundation for the mind to reſt upon. Beware of fretting and vexing

vexing yourſelves even with what may ſeem probable views of misfortune. Conſider how many difficulties you have already got over, how often you have vexed and terrified your minds in vain with the proſpect of poverty and ruined circumſtances. Every inſtance of falſe ſuſpicion is a powerful argument of the folly of your preſent anxiety.

Further, the dread of poverty renders us incapable of purſuing the meaſures of avoiding it. Anxiety ſours and depreſſes the ſpirits. It renders us weak, timid, and irreſolute. While under the influence of this paſſion, no enterpriſe, however plauſible its appearance, can rouſe us into action. We love to gratify the paſſion by ſitting ſtill and brooding over our misfortunes. In ſuch circumſtances, we are extremely ingenious in magnifying and increaſing the ſources of our own diſtreſs. We augment what appears to be unfavourable in our ſituation, and ſo much undervalue every thing really favourable, that we are often in danger of giving up all for loſt. Inſtead

of

of hoping for better days, we look forward with diſguſt, and think it vain to attempt any thing that promiſes relief. It is unneceſſary to mention the oppoſition of ſuch a temper to our intereſt. Prodigality itſelf is not a more certain road to poverty than the indulgence of a timid and irreſolute diſpoſition.

I cannot in this place paſs over a practice which is too common in the world. When a perſon ſuffers a remarkable diminution of fortune, it is not unuſual with his former friends either to neglect him altogether, or at leaſt to treat him with coldneſs and indifference. This practice is ſo contrary to the principles of humanity, that I would willingly hope the bare mentioning of it were ſufficient. Such a perſon ſtands in need of every thing that can have the ſmalleſt tendency to reconcile him to his condition. But there is not perhaps any circumſtance which gives a man of broken fortune more uneaſineſs than being obliged to loſe the ſociety of his friends and companions. This bears peculiarly hard, if the misfor-

tune

tune falls out in an advanced period of life. It is too late to form new attachments when the mind is become ſuſpicious by age, and ſoured by diſappointment. There is indeed a jealouſy accompanying a reverſe of fortune which makes us judge of the conduct of our friends with a more than ordinary ſeverity. What before would have paſſed unnoticed or been regarded as light and trivial, is now interpreted into neglect or ridicule. This natural jealouſy makes our behaviour towards a reduced friend or companion more delicate. But it affords no apology for neglect: it ought rather to heighten our attachments, and render us more attentive to his eaſe and happineſs.

I have already mentioned a ſet of men who are obliged to aſſume an appearance ſuperior to their income. Poor ſhop-keepers and ſtudents, ſubaltern officers, maſters of trades with a ſmall ſtock and little employment, and many of other denominations come under this claſs. I cannot conclude my paper without cautioning men of opulence

opulence or eaſy circumſtances againſt leading ſuch people into ſituations which require expence. Solicit not their company to the tavern, to the theatre, or to jaunt with ladies. Perhaps you love them for their ſenſe, modeſty, or other amiable qualities. But is it not unkind and ungenerous to injure thoſe you love? Perhaps they too are fond of your company, and wiſh for nothing more than to be able to aſſociate with you. This will ſtrengthen the temptation, and make them uſe every poſſible mean of complying. But does not this lay you under ſtill deeper obligations to caution and prudence: It is true, there is no diſtinguiſhing ſuch men by their dreſs or appearance, otherwiſe my caution on this head might be more direct and ſucceſsful. But would it not be a good rule for people of opulence, never to ſolicit their acquaintances to parties of pleaſure or other ſituations which infer expence, until they are pretty well informed of their conditions?—From mere thoughtleſſneſs and want of prudence in this matter, I have known a ſingle young gentleman of for-

tune beggar numbers of his acquaintances, and oblige them to leave their country and relations, to ſeek ſubſiſtence from ſtrangers in a foreign land.

FINIS.

Printed by ALEX. SMELLIE, *Anchor Cloſe, Edinburgh.*

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM